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 Recursions: Editors’ Introduction
Recursions: Theories of Media, Materiality and Cultural Techniques is a book 
series about media theory. But instead of dealing with theory in its most 
classical sense of theoria as something separate from practice that looks at 
objects and phenomena from a distance, we want to promote a more situ-
ated understanding of theory. Theory, too, is a practice and it has an address: 
it unfolds in specific situations, historical contexts and geographical places. 
As this book series demonstrates, theory can emerge from historical sources 
and speculations still closely attached to material details.
We therefore speak of the recursive nature of theory: It is composed of 
concepts that cut across the social and aesthetic reality of technological 
culture, and that are picked up and reprocessed by other means, including 
the many media techniques featured in this book series. The recursive loops 
of theory and practice fold and define each other. The genealogies of media 
theory, in turn, unfold in recursive variations that open up new questions, 
agendas, methodologies, which transform many of the humanities topics 
into media theory.
The Recursions series revolves around the material and hardware un-
derstanding of media as well as media archaeology – a body of work that 
addresses the contingent historical trajectories of modern media technolo-
gies as well their technological condition. But we are also interested in 
addressing the wider f ield of cultural techniques. The notion of cultural 
techniques serves to conceptualize how human and nonhuman agencies 
interact in historical settings as well as to expand the notion of media to 
include the many techniques and technologies of knowledge and aesthetics. 
This expansive – and yet theoretically rigorous – sense of understanding 
media is also of great use when considering the relations to biology and 
other sciences that deal with life and the living; another f ield where media 
studies has been able to operate in ways that fruitfully overlap with social 
studies of science and technology (STS).
Overall, the themes emerging from the Recursions book series resonate 
with some of the most interesting debates in international media stud-
ies, including issues of non-representational thought, the technicity of 
knowledge formations, and the dimensions of materialities expressed 
through biological and technological developments that are changing the 
vocabularies of cultural theory. We are interested in the mediatic condi-
tions of such theoretical ideas and developing them as new forms of media 
theory.
Over the last twenty years, and following in the footsteps of such media 
theorists as Marshall McLuhan, Friedrich Kittler, Vilem Flusser and others, 
a series of scholars working in Germany, the United States, Canada and 
other countries have turned assumptions concerning communication 
on their head by shifting the focus of research from communication to 
media. The strong – and at times polemical – focus on technological aspects 
(frequently referred to as the ‘materialities of communication’) has since 
given way to a more nuanced approach evident in appellations such as 
‘media archaeology’ and ‘media ecology’. These scholars have produced an 
important series of works on such diverse topics as computer games, media 
of education and individuation, the epistemology of f iling cabinets, or the 
media theories underlying the nascent discipline of anthropology at the 
end of the nineteenth century, thereby opening up an entirely new f ield 
of research which reframes our understanding of media culture and the 
relationship be tween media, culture, politics, and society. In other words, 
these approaches are distinguished by the emphasis on the materiality of 
media practices as well as the long historical perspectives they offer.
A major part of the influences of recent years of media theory, including 
f ields such as software and platform studies, digital forensics and media 
ecology, has been a conjunction of German media theory with other Eu-
ropean and trans-Atlantic influences. The brand name of ‘German media 
theory’ commonly associated with, though not restricted to, the work of 
Friedrich Kittler – is a helpful label when trying to attempt to identify a lot 
of the theoretical themes the book series addresses. However, we want to 
argue for a more international take that takes into account the hyphenated 
nature of such influences and to continue those in refreshing ways that do 
not just reproduce existing theory formations. We also want to challenge 
them, which, once again, refers to the core meaning of recursions: variation 
with a difference.
Jussi Parikka, Anna Tuschling & Geoffrey Winthrop-Young
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 Introduction: The Media Philosophy of 
Sybille Krämer
Anthony Enns
Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan famously argued that the 
purpose of media studies was to make visible that which normally remains 
invisible ‒ namely, the effects of media technologies rather than the mes-
sages they convey. When he originally proposed this idea in the 1960s 
McLuhan was widely celebrated as the great prophet of the media age, but 
in the decades that followed his work gradually fell into disregard. In the 
1970s, for example, Raymond Williams claimed that McLuhan’s ideas were 
‘ludicrous’1 and Hans Magnus Enzensberger dismissed him as a ‘charlatan’ 
who was ‘incapable of any theoretical construction’ and who wrote with 
‘provocative idiocy’.2 This tacit dismissal of McLuhan’s ideas was largely 
accepted until the late twentieth century, when there was renewed interest 
in his work among several German media theorists, such as Friedrich Kittler 
and Norbert Bolz. Unlike the critics associated with the Birmingham Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies, who primarily focused on the content 
of media texts and the interpretive work performed by media audiences, 
these theorists applied epistemological and philosophical questions to the 
study of media, which was largely inspired by McLuhan’s famous claim 
that ‘the medium is the message’.3 Kittler even argued that ‘[w]ithout this 
formula…media studies itself would not exist as such in isolation or with 
any methodological clarity’.4 Kittler’s emphasis on the technical aspects of 
media gradually became fashionable in intellectual circles, and it is now 
widely known as ‘German media theory’. Some of the concepts and ideas 
that are common to both Canadian and German media theory include 
their focus on the materiality of communication, the notion of media as 
prosthetic technologies or ‘extensions of man’, the concept of media ecol-
ogy, the impact of media technologies on the formation of subjectivity as 
well as the military applications of media technologies. Although German 
media theory has often been criticized for ignoring questions of content 
and reception and for promoting a kind of technological determinism (as 
was McLuhan and other critics associated with the Toronto School of Com-
munication Theory), it has also been described as one of Germany’s most 
signif icant intellectual exports,5 and despite these criticisms the technical 
aspects of media have once again become a central issue in the humanities.
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Sybille Krämer is rarely mentioned in these discussions, as her work is 
not widely known outside of Germany and it does not share the technical 
emphasis that is widely seen as the hallmark of German media theory. 
Nevertheless, her early work primarily focused on developing a philosophy 
of technology and theorizing the function of the computer as a medium. 
Krämer received a Ph.D. in philosophy at the Philipp University of Marburg 
in 1980, and her doctoral thesis, Technik, Gesellschaft und Natur: Versuch 
über ihren Zusammenhang (Technology, Society and Nature: An Attempt to 
Explain their Relationship), outlined her earliest reflections on technology. 
Beginning in 1984 she was also part of the ‘Mensch und Technik’ (Humans 
and Technology) work group as well as the ‘Artif icial Intelligence’ commis-
sion of the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (Society of German Engineers) in 
Düsseldorf. In 1988 she published her second book, Symbolische Maschinen: 
Die Idee der Formalisierung in geschichtlichem Abriss (Symbolic Machines: 
A Historical Abstract on the Concept of Formalization), which investigated 
the use of formalization, calculization, and mechanization in mathematics. 
Krämer introduced the terms ‘symbolic machines’ and ‘operational scripts’ 
to refer to mathematical equations, as these equations are not readable 
texts but rather executable processes. If concrete numerals are replaced by 
letters, for example, it is possible to calculate using signs in a fundamentally 
more abstract manner. The introduction of algebra thus made it possible to 
use new signs for new operations, such as the introduction of differential 
calculus, which made it possible to work with inf initesimally small values. 
This book effectively expanded Krämer’s understanding of technology 
by arguing that all mathematical equations are essentially mechanical 
operations. In other words, Krämer did not attempt to provide a history of 
the computer or even to suggest that the machine should be understood 
as a manufactured object; rather, she suggested that the concept of the 
machine was a result of the mediating function of symbols or the process 
of ‘formalization’. Symbolische Maschinen thus signaled a shift from the 
study of technological history to the study of intellectual history and from 
the concept of technical operations to the concept of symbolic operations.
In 1989 Krämer became professor of theoretical philosophy at the 
Institute of Philosophy at the Free University of Berlin, and in 1991 she 
published her habilitation treatise Berechenbare Vernunft: Kalkül und 
Rationalismus im 17. Jahrhundert (Computable Reason: Calculation and 
Rationalism in the 17th Century). This book represented an extension of the 
argument presented in her previous book by elaborating on the history of 
the idea of computation, and it similarly focused on operations rather than 
technologies. Berechenbare Vernunft can thus be seen as part of a similar 
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shift away from the technological a priori that shapes or determines medial 
processes to the question of ‘mediality’ itself as a topic of philosophical 
inquiry. Kramer’s divergence from the dominant trends in German media 
theory at this time was made particularly apparent in her contribution to 
the 1998 anthology Medien, Computer, Realität: Wirklichkeitsvorstellungen 
und Neue Medien (Media, Computer, Reality: Perceptions of Reality and New 
Media), in which she articulated a very different concept of media: ‘We do 
not hear vibrations in the atmosphere but rather the sound of a bell; we do 
not read letters but rather a story.’6 In other words, the medium is supposed 
to be inaudible and invisible, and it only becomes apparent when it is not 
functioning properly.
Krämer made a similar argument in her 2001 book, Sprache, Sprechakt, 
Kommunikation: Sprachtheoretische Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Lan-
guage, Speech Act, Communication: Theories of Language of the 20th Century), 
which focused on the disembodied nature of speech acts:
Not only is language dematerialized, but also the speakers themselves. 
Vocality as a trace of the body in speech is not a signif icant attribute 
for language, just as the embodiment of speakers is not a constituve 
phenomenon for their linguisticality…. Just as the vocal, written, gestural, 
and technical embodiments of language are marginal for language itself, 
so too do the bodies of speakers ‒ the physical precondition of their 
speech ‒ remain hidden.7
Krämer added, however, that language is always already embodied, and 
this embodiment takes two different forms. On the one hand, ‘language 
itself provides access to a material exteriority in the form of voice, writing, 
gesture, etc. And this materiality of language is not marginal, but rather a 
basic fact’.8 In other words, language only exists as language through the 
mediation of an intervening medium, whether it be speech, writing, or 
gestures, and therefore it is closely linked to the bodies of language users. 
Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation thus not only employed speech acts in 
order to show that media are never entirely transparent, but it also shifted 
the discussion of mediality from technical operations to interpersonal 
communication as well.
This argument has been most fully developed in Krämer’s 2008 book 
Medium, Bote, Übertragung: Kleine Metaphysik der Medialität (Medium, Mes-
senger, Transmission: A Small Metaphysics of Mediality), which is her f irst 
book to be translated into English. Krämer’s primary argument is that in 
order to understand media we must go beyond the technical apparatus and 
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understand the relations of mediality upon which the apparatus depends. 
Krämer also argues that all forms of communication are actually acts of 
transmission and that all media should therefore be understood as trans-
mission media. The confluence of these two ideas results in a philosophy of 
media that defies much of the conventional wisdom about communication, 
which is commonly understood as dialogue, understanding, self-expression, 
etc.
Krämer explains this distinction in her prologue to the book, in which 
she describes two competing approaches to media philosophy. She refers 
to the f irst approach as the ‘technical’ or ‘postal’ principle, which is based 
on the notion that all communication requires an intervening medium, 
yet communication is only successful when this medium fades into the 
background and remains unobtrusive. According to the ‘postal’ principle, 
in other words, communication is asymmetrical and unidirectional and the 
medium represents a necessary precondition for the possibility of communi-
cation, as it facilitates the connection between the sender and the receiver. 
This is essentially the technical transmission model of communication 
developed by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver,9 and the phenomenon 
of ‘information entropy’ occurs when the medium becomes a ‘disruptive 
third’ through the generation of noise or interference. Krämer refers to the 
second approach as the ‘personal’ or ‘erotic’ principle, which is based on the 
notion of communication as social interaction or dialogue, whose goal is 
social interaction, understanding, and community. According to the ‘erotic’ 
principle, communication is a symmetrical and reciprocal process and the 
aim of communication is not connection but unif ication through direct 
and unmediated access. In other words, communication allows speakers 
to transform heterogeneity into homogeneity and difference into identity, 
thereby achieving a kind of ‘single voice’ or consensus that represents the 
fusion of separate halves. This is essentially the personal understanding 
model of communication developed by Jürgen Habermas, and it implies that 
the presence of any intervening medium constitutes a form of disturbance 
since the unif ication of these disjointed fractions depends on the annihila-
tion of the intervening space. These two approaches thus represent two 
contradictory trends in media theory, and Krämer explicitly argues that 
‘the concern of this book is…to rehabilitate the postal principle and thus 
the transmission model of communication’, as ‘most community-building 
and culture-founding forms of communication precisely do not follow the 
standards of dialogical communication’. In short, media are essential tools 
for bridging distance and difference, and they thus represent a necessary 
precondition for the possibility of culture and community, yet they also 
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preserve this distance or difference, as the presence of an intervening 
medium implies the existence of an intervening space that precludes any 
possibility of unif ication. In other words, mediality represents the negotia-
tion of radical alterity rather than the formation of a consensus reality.
Krämer explains this argument by providing a comprehensive over-
view of various philosophical theories of transmission, including Walter 
Benjamin’s theory of translation as the revelation of an unbridgeable gap 
between languages, Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of community as founded on 
a basic divide that constitutes our very essence as communal beings, Michel 
Serres’ notion of communication as an attempt to establish a bridge between 
worlds that always remain distinct and unbridgeable, Régis Debray’s theory 
that immaterial ideas are only transmissible when they are embodied in 
material objects, and John Durham Peters’ theory of communication as 
non-reciprocal, non-dialogical dissemination, which is based on a funda-
mental separation or difference. The idea of communication as dialogue is 
problematic for each of these thinkers in their own way, and Krämer is able 
to draw a series of preliminary conclusions from these theories:
(1) A philosophy of mediality can only begin by recognizing that there 
is an unbridgeable distance between the sender and the receiver ‒ a 
distance that can never be overcome.
(2) The medium occupies the intervening space between the sender 
and the receiver, and it is able to facilitate their connection while still 
maintaining the distance that separates them.
(3) All forms of communication are reducible to acts of (non-reciprocal) 
transmission between the sender and the receiver, as unif ication and 
dialogue remain impossible.
(4) Transmission is an embodied, material process, yet it is frequently 
understood as disembodied, as the medium is supposed to be invisible 
through its (noise-free) usage.
Krämer illustrates these ideas using the f igure of the messenger as a key 
metaphor for all medial processes. The f igure of the messenger provides an 
ideal illustration of the function of transmission for three reasons:
(1) As with the classic sender-receiver model of communication, the 
concept of transmission presupposes the existence of a divide or differ-
ence between heterogeneous worlds, and the function of the messenger 
is to mediate between these worlds while simultaneously preserving the 
distance that separates them.
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(2) The messenger is able to establish this connection between heteroge-
neous worlds by making something perceptible, thereby embodying the 
immaterial in a material form. As a representative of his employer, for 
example, the messenger’s body becomes an extension of his employer’s 
body. The messenger thus transforms his employer’s absence into a form 
of presence, which shows how all transmissions function as forms of 
display.
(3) The embodiment of the message is only made possible through the 
disembodiment of the messenger, as the messenger must relinquish his 
own autonomy and agency in order to become invisible and impercep-
tible. In other words, the messenger disappears behind the content of 
his message, which makes the process of mediation appear to be direct 
and unmediated. This idea is most vividly illustrated in the trope of 
the dying messenger, who expires at the very moment his message is 
delivered.
According to Krämer, every form of mediality illustrates these aspects of 
the messenger model. For example, f ilms are not supposed to be perceived 
as celluloid strips but rather as moving pictures, and the presence of the 
material strip only becomes apparent when the transmission is disrupted, 
such as when it jams in the projector. In the same way, the messenger is 
also supposed to remain transparent in order to facilitate the transmission 
of his message.
The implications of this theory are fourfold:
(1) All forms of communication are actually forms of transmission, which 
are always unidirectional and non-dialogical. In other words, communi-
cation is a form of dissemination rather than dialogue, and it is directly 
opposed to the ‘personal’ principle of communication, which is based on 
the concept of understanding, dialogue, consensus, etc.
(2) The medium embodies the message through its own disembodiment, 
and therefore transmission depends on the separation of text and texture, 
sense and form, signal and noise.
(3) The medium is heteronomous, as it speaks with a voice that is not its 
own and therefore it is not responsible for the content of the message it 
transmits. The messenger model is thus directed against hermeneutics 
and points to a subject-free theory of communication that challenges 
the notion of media as autonomous agents or as the cause of cultural-
historical dynamics (i.e. Kittler’s famous dictum that ‘media determine 
our situation’10).
inTroduc Tion: The Media PhilosoPhy of sybille KräMer 15
(4) The invisibility of the messenger enables its function as a transmitter 
to be easily replaced by non-human entities, which suggests that the 
technical transmission model of communication can be used to explain 
the function of interpersonal communication and vice versa.
Medium, Bote, Übertragung thus moves beyond the history of technology 
and the study of technical operations and focuses instead on the ways in 
which the phenomenon of mediality shapes our understanding of the world 
around us. In other words, mediality is fundamentally productive because it 
represents the basis of all forms of social and material systems of exchange.
Krämer explains this argument in more detail by examining a diverse 
range of transmission events, including angelic visitations, the spread of 
infectious diseases, circulation of money, the translation of languages, 
psychoanalytic transference, the act of bearing witness, and even the 
development of cartography. Angels illustrate the concept of mediality 
because their embodied manifestations facilitate communication with God 
while at the same time implying the impossibility of direct communication 
between heaven and earth. The connection between God and humans 
thus remains unidirectional, and it is only achieved through the process 
of embodiment, as angels can only communicate with humans in so far as 
they themselves also assume human form. Viral infections also depend on 
physical contact between two heterogeneous entities, and they similarly 
illustrate the unidirectionality of transmission, as they are one-sided and 
non-reciprocal. Money also represents the transfer of ownership between 
sender and receiver, which is only possible through the establishment of an 
equivalent relationship between heterogeneous goods. Money thus enables 
the desubstantialization of goods, which makes ownership objectif iable. 
Translators also bridge the differences between languages by making these 
differences visible, yet they also maintain the divide separating languages 
by preserving different connotations. Psychoanalysts similarly function 
as media during the process of transference, as they serve to represent 
primary attachment f igures from their patients’ past, thereby enabling 
the transmission of feelings from their patients’ unconscious minds. While 
analysts make these feelings perceptible to the patient’s conscious minds, 
they must not respond to them emotionally. Psychoanalysis represents a 
dialogue not between the patient and the analyst (which is implied by the 
notion of the ‘talking cure’), but rather between the patient’s unconscious 
and conscious mind, and the analyst is only able to facilitate the transfer 
of unconscious emotions by remaining neutral and withdrawn. The act of 
bearing witness also presupposes a gap between the witnesses, who have 
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perceived a past event, and their listeners, who were not able to perceive 
the event for themselves. Like messengers, witnesses are able to make this 
event perceptible to their listeners through the process of transmission, 
which depends on their presumed neutrality and impartiality. In other 
words, witnesses are ‘data collection and retrieval instruments’, and they 
are expected to withhold their own opinions and judgments from their 
testimony. Krämer describes martyrdom as the most extreme form of wit-
nessing, as witnesses are considered to be most trustworthy when they are 
prepared to die, and the suffering of their bodies thus serves to guarantee 
the truth of their testimony (much like the dying messenger). Krämer’s 
f inal case study focuses on the use of maps, which similarly function as 
media by making perceptible something that is invisible to the eye. Like an 
incorruptible messenger, maps are also supposed to serve as a transparent 
window onto the world. In order for maps to facilitate transmission, in other 
words, users ‘must remain blind’ to their distortions. Krämer thus concludes 
that ‘cartographic distortion is a condition of possibility of representation’ 
and ‘transparency and opacity are two distinguishable dimensions of maps 
that require and include one another’. Krämer thereby rejects the debate 
between maps as neutral visualizations of reality and maps as cultural 
constructions that shape our perceptions of reality by suggesting that there 
is no point in f ighting over the truth of maps; instead, it is more important 
to understand how maps mediate our perception of the world by obscuring 
their inherent inaccuracies. More than any of her other case studies, this 
chapter most clearly illustrates the signif icance of traces, which reveal that 
the medium itself is never completely transparent or neutral. By making us-
ers aware of the map itself, in other words, cartographic distortions preclude 
the possibility of transparency, yet the illusion of transparency remains a 
necessary precondition for the possibility of transmission, as users must 
perceive the map as an accurate representation of reality in order to be able 
to orient themselves in space.
According to Krämer, all of these various forms of transmission ‒ angels, 
viruses, money, translators, psychoanalysts, witnesses, and maps ‒ can be 
seen as media in the sense that they simultaneously bridge and maintain 
differences between heterogeneous worlds. The messenger model thus 
depends on the basic insight that a community of different individuals is 
founded on the distance that separates them, which precludes the possibil-
ity of unif ication or intersubjectivity, and all attempts at communication 
are actually acts of transmission, as communication is fundamentally uni-
directional, asymmetrical, and non-reciprocal. This theory also implies that 
the technical transmission model of communication is no longer unique 
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to mass media; rather, it is an inherent dimension of all forms of human 
communication ‒ a point that is emphasized throughout Krämer’s book, 
as she repeatedly focuses on interpersonal rather than technical forms of 
communication. The emphasis of the messenger model thus allows for a 
media theory based on processes and thirdness rather than the technical 
apparatus.
In her conclusion, Krämer acknowledges that the f igure of the mes-
senger is also fundamentally ambivalent, as ‘every messenger acts as a 
reversible f igure: the angel becomes the devil, the mediator becomes the 
schemer, the circulation of money develops into greed and avarice, etc.’ In 
other words, the danger always exists that the medium might introduce a 
degree of noise or interference into the act of transmission by making his 
presence felt instead of remaining neutral and transparent, such as when 
the devil attempts to manipulate listeners, when the psychoanalyst falls 
in love with his patient, or when the user of a map becomes aware that it is 
presenting a distorted image of reality. Ambivalence is therefore inherent 
in the role of the messenger, and it is reflected in the form of the trace, 
which exposes the mediating function of the messenger by making his 
participation perceptible and revealing the possibility that the messenger 
might also represent a sovereign being with his own individual autonomy 
and agency.
While Krämer’s messenger model may appear somewhat esoteric to 
readers who are unfamiliar with her previous work ‒ and particularly to 
English-language media scholars who are more familiar with the technical 
emphasis of most German media theory ‒ it provides several insights that 
are potentially valuable for contemporary media studies. In particular, it 
outlines a general theory of transmission that does not distinguish between 
technical and interpersonal communication or between technological 
and human agents. It thus expands our understanding of the concept and 
function of media as active agents in all systems of social and material 
exchange, which offers exciting new possibilities for other interdisciplinary 
approaches to the study of media and communication. Krämer’s conflation 
of technical and interpersonal communication also allows her to avoid the 
pitfalls of technological determinism, as it does not grant undue power 
to the technical apparatus, while still recognizing the importance of the 
materiality of communication or the interface between the medium and the 
senses. Krämer thus emphasizes the notion that communication is depend-
ent on embodiment, yet at the same time it she also preserves the idea of 
communication as non-dialogical and non-reciprocal, thus acknowledging 
the active role of the receiver, who does not necessarily interpret messages 
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in the way they were intended by the sender (i.e. Stuart Hall’s ‘encoding-
decoding’ model of communication).11 Krämer’s messenger model thus offers 
an alternative to McLuhan-style media theory, which focuses primarily on 
the impact of media technologies, and the Birmingham School approach to 
media studies, which focuses primarily on content and reception. Within 
a German context, one could also say that it carves out an original space 
in contrast to Kittler’s emphasis on the technical aspects of media and 
Habermas’ emphasis on the dialogic aspects of communication.
By reinforcing the function of perception and mediality as opposed to 
that of technology and content, Krämer’s book occupies a key position in 
contemporary debates concerning the future of media studies in Germany 
and it represents a signif icant contribution to a growing body of work that 
challenges dominant trends in German media theory, such as the work of 
Hans-Dieter Huber, Dieter Mersch, Matthias Vogel and Lambert Wiesing. 
The fact that some of these names may be unfamiliar to English-language 
media scholars clearly shows that we need to expand our understanding 
of media theory in Germany and the wide range of approaches that this 
f ield of study encompasses. This edition will hopefully encourage increased 
international visibility for these alternative approaches, many of which have 
not yet been translated into English.
 Prologue
Transmission and/or Understanding? On the ‘Postal’ and ‘Erotic’ 
Principles of Communication
Two Preliminaries and a Problem
How can the meaning of media be thought about in such a way that we 
acquire an understanding of our relationship to both the world and to our-
selves? How can a concept of the medium be developed that encompasses 
our experiences using media? How can we determine what media ‘are’ in 
a way that embraces both generally accepted (voice, writing) and newer 
forms of media (computer, Internet)? How can media be conceptualized 
in a way that enables not only a reformulation of traditional philosophi-
cal questions but also a new conception of philosophy? Assuming f irst 
of all that one media concept could actually address all of these various 
questions, wouldn’t this concept remain so abstract and general (in a bad 
sense), wouldn’t it turn out so bare and tenuous, that it would say nothing 
and therefore not provide any answer at all?
As in most cases, it depends on the attempt.1 And in order to let the cat 
out of the bag immediately let me state that this attempt will address the 
question ‘What is a medium?’ in the context of the idea of the errand. The 
messenger thus represents a primal scene of media transmission. You could 
even say that the messenger represents the force behind these reflections 
on media, and my claim is that this relationship – measured against the 
present state of the debate over media – provides a new perspective on the 
phenomenon and concept of media.
Isn’t this a strange or downright outlandish effort? The messenger ap-
pears to be a relic of an epoch when the technical support of long-distance 
communication was not available, and it became obsolete with the develop-
ment of the postal service or at the very least with the invention of the 
radio, the telegraph, and the telephone – not to mention the computer. 
What could the archaic institution of the messenger offer to modern media 
theory, whose reflections and explanations must address more advanced 
media? This provocative impression, which is often evoked by references 
to the messenger, is further reinforced by two associated preliminaries and 
an intruding problem:
(i) First Preliminary: ‘There is always an outside of media.’ Messengers 
are heteronomous. The messenger perspective thus challenges attempts 
to conventionalize media as autonomous sovereign agents or the solitary 
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causes of cultural-historical dynamics, and it contradicts the conception 
of media as a foundational a priori in the sense of a ‘medial turn’.
(ii) Second Preliminary: ‘The bulk of our communication is not dialogi-
cal.’ Messengers are necessary when there is no unmediated interaction 
between sender and receiver; in other words, when communication lacks 
reciprocity and is precisely not a dialogue. The errand is – to start with – a 
unidirectional, asymmetrical situation. In the messenger perspective, 
therefore, reflecting on media means at the same time challenging to a 
certain extent the fundamental dialogical orientation of the philosophical 
concept of communication.
(iii) The Problem: ‘Can transmission be creative?’ Messengers transmit 
what is given to them. They are supposed to pass their messages along 
across space and time with the least distortion possible, and they should by 
no means change them. How then can our understanding of the phenom-
enon of transmission ever take into account the creative impulse, which is 
commonly associated with communication? Yet even computer-mediated 
communication is not a matter of data transmission but rather data pro-
cessing, and it thus concerns not the conservation of order but rather its 
transformation. The rehabilitation of transmission will therefore only be 
compelling when it incorporates the innovative dimension of transmission 
and reconstructs the creativity of mediation.
It is therefore no small task to explain and substantiate a media theory 
of the messenger. This perspective forces us to question previously trusted 
philosophical assumptions, and it once again problematizes what now 
seems natural or self-evident.
To ref lect on media philosophically therefore does not mean seeing 
media as more or less a seamless continuation of a philosophical tradition. 
In order to understand how our reflections on media require a willingness 
to question our own self-evident and trusted assumptions and thereby see 
them in a new light, I will now provide an introductory sketch using the 
example of ‘communication’.
The Postal and Erotic Concepts of Communication
Hardly any other word has experienced such a rhizome-like diffusion in our 
everyday language and our disciplinary vocabularies as the word ‘communi-
cation’. Communication even functions as a central perspectival vanishing 
point in our conceptual image of ourselves at the end of the twentieth 
century: practically everything that affects our civilized self-understanding 
can somehow be structured and described with the help of this word. There 
is ‘communicative action’, which complements the goal-directed utilitarian 
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considerations of instrumental action that constitute an ethos oriented 
towards self-understanding; there is the description – sometimes even 
conceptualized as a priori – of language as a medium of communication, 
which reduces perception, experience, and recognition to the structures of 
linguisticality; there is the labelling of problems as ‘communication prob-
lems’, the diff iculties of which are neutralized and casually associated with 
the promise of feasibility; there is ‘man-machine communication’, which 
signals that the scope and limits of information technologies constitute a 
key phenomenon of contemporary civilization and which moreover shows 
that communication is not limited to the interpersonal realm; there is the 
vision of a globalization that conceptualizes communication as a world-
spanning network; and f inally we should not forget the laconic assertion 
that one cannot not communicate.
It would be easy to continue this list. Considering the ubiquity of the 
word ‘communication’ and the range of its possible uses, it is no surprise 
that critics are increasingly critical of this concept. Botho Strauß dismisses 
the word ‘communicate’ as the ‘non-word of the age’ and characterizes it as 
a ‘garbage disposal word’.2 Uwe Pörksen remains somewhat more objective 
in his description of ‘communication’ as an ‘amoeba-word’ (or also ‘plastic 
word’): it conceals its metaphorical character, enters the everyday after pass-
ing through the mathematized sciences and is then used both unhistorically 
and imprecisely as the minimal code of industrial society: ‘Communication’ 
is deployed like a ‘Lego brick’, which is arbitrarily combinable and practi-
cally envelops our entire living space in its word net.3
Nevertheless, the imprecision that Pörksen attributes to the word ‘com-
munication’ conceals an obvious tension and divide that is characteristic 
of the contemporary usage of the word ‘communication’: in the present 
discourse the word leads a conceptual double life. It appears in two mutually 
opposed contexts, which I will refer to as the ‘technical transmission model’ 
and the ‘personal understanding model’ of communication. The technical 
transmission model is elaborated in the communication theory developed 
by Shannon and Weaver, who studied the technization of information flows, 
from information transmission to data processing.4 The output problem 
in the technical transmission model consists of the spatial and temporal 
distance between the sender and the receiver. Both the sender and the 
receiver are considered instances, which could be human beings or objec-
tive nature, that form the beginning and end points of a linear chain that 
consists of essential interlinks either in the form of a medium (a channel) or 
an external disturbance. What happens along this chain is the relaying of 
signals or data; in other words, the transmission of uninterpreted entities. 
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The process of data transmission is thus physically specif iable and math-
ematically operationalizable. The transmission is considered successful 
when something material is transported from one side (the sender) to the 
other side (the receiver); there is no such thing as immaterial signals. The 
basic problem of communication thus consists in keeping signal structures 
stable in the face of the erosion of this order through external disturbances. 
The technical connection is successful, in other words, when it keeps the 
‘disruptive third’ away from the transmission event that occurs between 
the sender and the receiver.
The approach of the personal understanding model, whose design is 
embodied in Jürgen Habermas’s communication theory, is entirely differ-
ent.5 Here communication is considered an interaction between people, 
which is dependent on mutual understanding with the help of symbols that 
convey meaning – preferably a language. Communication thus becomes an 
expression of human being-in-the-world. The output problem consists in the 
heterogeneity of people and thus in the question of how intersubjectivity is 
possible at all under the conditions of individuality. Communication thus 
represents the basic process that enables coordinated action, which results 
in the formation of community. It is conceived as a reciprocal process of so-
cial interaction. Intersubjectivity is made possible through dialogue, which 
is presented as the primal scene and established norm of communication, 
and the goal of dialogue is understanding. Unlike the technical approach, 
the performance of communication consists not only in establishing a 
connection across distance, but also in fostering agreement and creating a 
unified society whose goal is precisely to overcome distance and difference. 
When dialogical communication is successful, those who communicate 
with one another in a sense become ‘one’; if the goal of understanding has 
been achieved, then it is as if they are speaking with one voice.
While communication-as-understanding is conceived as a symmetrical 
and reciprocal process, communication-as-transmission is conceived as 
asymmetrical and unidirectional. Transmission is precisely not dialogical: 
the goal of technical communication is emission or dissemination, not 
dialogue.6 We can thus clearly distinguish between the personal principle 
of understanding and the postal principle of transmission.7
The postal principle presents communication as the production of con-
nections between spatially distant physical instances. On the other hand, 
the dialogical principle presents communication as the synchronization 
and standardization of formerly divergent conditions among individuals. 
We could thus say that there is a latent erotic dimension to the telos of this 
personal perspective (i.e. the merging of people who were separated from 
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one another).8 In order to emphasize the differences between these two 
notions of communication in an intentionally ironic way, we could even 
refer to them as the ‘postal’ and ‘erotic’ concepts of communication.
Both of these concepts presume a distance that can also be described as 
a qualitative difference: difference constitutes one – if not the – universal 
precondition of communication. According to the postal principle this 
difference lies between the sender and the receiver, and it is generated 
through the spatial and temporal distance between them. According to 
the erotic principle it is the difference between individuals with their 
heterogeneous and initially impenetrable inner worlds. In each of these 
cases, however, communication provides an answer to the problem of how 
to bridge distances. These concepts thus represent different strategies for 
dealing with distance and difference. The technical concept of communica-
tion bridges distance without annihilating it; indeed, it is precisely through 
and in the successful transmission that the sense of being distant from one 
another is stabilized and reinforced. The goal of the personal concept of 
communication, on the other hand, is to overcome and abolish distance and 
mutual inaccessibility. It thus presumes the existence of difference without 
endorsing or stabilizing it; instead, it attempts to transform the different 
into the identical, which is actually divided among the participants and 
becomes something ‘communal’.
When we ask which role media are assigned to play in each of these 
different approaches, there will obviously be various answers. For the 
transmission model, media are indispensable; they occupy the position 
between the sender and the receiver, and without them it would not be pos-
sible at all for the sender to ‘post’ something that would reach the receiver. 
The medium neither annihilates the distance between the sender and the 
receiver nor enables any unmediated ‘contact’ between them; rather, it 
establishes a connection despite and in the distance that separates them. 
For the understanding model, on the other hand, media are peripheral 
and negligible vehicles that provide undistorted and unmediated access 
to something that they themselves are not, much like transparent window 
panes. Because the dialogical relationship results in the annihilation of 
distance and the direct experience of reciprocal understanding, which 
happens precisely when two individuals in their own inner worlds agree 
and ‘merge’, there is no more space for a mediator or a medium.
Just as media are seen as indispensable for the postal aspect of com-
munication because they make mediation itself possible, they are also 
seen as detrimental to the immediacy of the dialogical. While transmission 
media are designed to minimize disturbances, media themselves cause 
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disturbances in dialogical situations. The elusiveness of the voice thus 
meets the ephemeral status of communication media; and conversely: the 
more the materiality of the medium is shown to be technical, opaque, and 
compact, the more the notion of communication understood as dialogue 
(which is then still possible) appears distorted.
This description of the confrontation between the technical/postal and 
the personal/erotic approaches to communication is obviously exaggerated. 
Using names like Shannon and Habermas as a form of shorthand to invoke 
these theoretical approaches also clearly lacks the reflexive subtlety that 
would somehow do justice to the ingenuity and the potential compatibility 
of these approaches. However, this was not the reason for sketching out 
these radicalized positions for the purposes of a prologue. The opposing 
models and meanings of communication that have been emphasized in 
this outline are intended to show why the use of a messenger perspective 
demands at the same time the surrendering of convictions and attitudes that 
are commonly taken for granted. From the point of view of a philosophically 
substantial concept of communication, there is no question that dialogue 
and mutual understanding are more worthy of description and explanation 
than the phenomenon of transmission and the one-sided sending of signals. 
As a theoretical framework for the description and explanation of what 
happens when people communicate with one another, the postal principle 
of technical communication appears utterly inadequate. To express this in a 
more exaggerated way, one might say that the letter carrier cannot possibly 
provide a f igure worthy of explanation for a philosophically sophisticated 
theory of communication.
The concern of this book is not to elevate the status of the letter carrier, 
but rather to rehabilitate the postal principle and thus the transmission 
model of communication. In contrast to the privileging of dialogue as the 
unalterable essence of communication and the privileging of reciprocity as 
the primary structural principle and emancipatory norm of communica-
tion, the following reflections on mediality are inspired by the insight that 
most community-building and culture-founding forms of communication 
precisely do not follow the standards of dialogical communication. The 
‘erotic’ communication in the speech act of confluent differentiality is 
indeed one possibility, but interpreting it as the ideal or merely the general 
form of communication constitutes a form of Romanticism.
From Communication to Perception?
And yet this is not a book about communication, as it debates the question 
of ‘What is a medium?’ in terms of transmission processes. By introducing 
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the f igure of the messenger as the primal scene of media, it indeed appears 
that from the very beginning I have set a course for a communication-
centric mediation; the unidirectionality and asymmetry of the transmission 
process, which culminates in the messenger f igure, also raise the question 
of whether media-theoretical mediations concern not the categories of 
communication and understanding, but rather those of ‘making percep-
tible’ (Wahrnehmbarmachen) and ‘making appear’ (Erscheinenlassen). 
Can the gimmick of the messenger perspective thus lie in a shift from 
communication to perception? In this light, the non-dialogical – if this 
can be conceived as an attribute of perception – to a certain extent loses 
its potential for irritation. The conventional view being challenged here is 
the categorical and categorial separation between ‘communication’ and 
‘perception’, according to which the def initive foundation of sociality is 
a communality made possible through communication, not perception. 
Could a goal of this media reflection thus lie in problematizing not only 
the philosophical preoccupation with understanding-oriented, reciprocal, 
‘media-free’ communication, but also the marginalization of perception 
that this preoccupation necessarily implies? Could the ‘rehabilitation of 
the postal principle’ thus also rehabilitate the community-building and 
culture-founding functions of perception and the ‘making perceptible’?
Questions upon questions. Before beginning to look for answers, however, 
I will f irst reveal my method, which is inspired by a ‘metaphysical gesture’ 
that is in need of explanation.

 Methodological Considerations
Is a Metaphysics of Mediality Possible?
The following section continues with a look at contemporary reflections on 
media, albeit limited to the discourses of cultural studies and philosophy.1
Media Marginalism and Media Generativism – The Scylla und 
Charybdis of Media Theory?
The debate over media that was f irst articulated in the 1960s and continues 
to flourish today is confusing, multivocal and heterogeneous: there is no 
consensus in the phenomenal domain, the methodological approach or 
even the very concept of media. Nevertheless, through the multitude of 
heterogeneous voices – at least in the cultural studies camp – it is possible to 
perceive a certain vocal range that could be called the ‘bon ton of the media 
debate’. This ‘bon ton’ involves reflecting and researching media with an at-
titude that is committed to a maxim of generativity. Lorenz Engell expressed 
this maxim with enviable clarity: ‘Media are fundamentally generative.’2
The meaning is obvious: in contrast to a marginalizing perspective, 
which treats media as negligible vehicles that add nothing to the messages 
they convey, this maxim signals a change in perspective that turns towards 
the media themselves rather than their contents. By shaping their contents, 
media fundamentally participate in the generation of messages – when 
not entirely producing them. Marshall McLuhan’s provocative thesis ‘the 
medium is the message’ radically challenges the assumption that media are 
transparent and thus a secondary phenomenon that offers the most unim-
peded view of the ‘actual’ objects of humanistic work, like ‘sense’, ‘meaning’, 
‘spirit’, ‘form’, and ‘content’ – an assumption that had previously been taken 
for granted by the humanities.3 The ‘culturalization of the humanities’, 
which was so characteristic of the outgoing twentieth century, thus found 
a support and a material grounding in the medialization of sense, spirit, 
and content. In the heterogeneous f ield of media theory a small common 
denominator is the idea that media not only relay their contents, but are 
also fundamentally generative.
Doesn’t this assumption of the shaping power of media towards their 
messages represent a necessary presupposition for all media theoretical 
efforts, insofar as these efforts would make themselves meaningless without 
this assumption? Where then lies the problem with the ‘generative maxim’?4 
In order to trace this problem, I will now turn to philosophy.
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The media debate reached philosophy late, but the f irst drafts of a media 
philosophy are available,5 the meaning and scope of philosophical media 
reflections are being debated,6 the history of media philosophical thought 
is being written,7 and the status quo of media philosophical reflections are 
being analyzed.8 This inspiring orientation towards questions of media 
certainly originated at the margins of academic philosophy. Core areas 
in philosophy, like the philosophy of spirit and language, epistemology, 
and the theory of science, not to mention ontology and metaphysics, still 
remain largely unaffected by the issues in media theory. Why is philosophy 
struggling with these questions?
Perhaps an evident family resemblance can lead the way to a possible 
answer, which emerges between the ‘medial turn’ in cultural studies and 
the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy.9
The strategic goal of McLuhan’s identif ication of the medium with the 
message was to take away the transitory transparency and neutrality of the 
media and make visible their autonomous opacity and instrumental shaping 
power. This is precisely the central theme of the ‘medial turn’. The discovery of 
the formational power of media parallels the ‘linguistic turn’ that took place 
at least f ifty years earlier through the work of Austin, Ryle and Wittgenstein, 
who determined that linguisticality was a basic condition of our relation to 
the world. However, the discovery of language as a constitutional condition 
of experience and cognition presumed precisely that language could not 
(any longer) be interpreted as a medium. This does not at all mean that the 
mediality of language would have played an explicit role in the philosophy of 
language. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the modern era philosophical 
concepts of language also always implicitly reinforced the idea that language 
represents a verbalization of thoughts, and linguistic relations therefore 
constitute the – more or less successful – expression of a system that is prior 
to language – a system based on the structures of the world or human intel-
lect. While philosophy inaugurated the ‘linguistic turn’ by conceptualizing 
language and communication no longer as representational instances but 
rather as productive sites of mind and spirit, rationality and reason, it also 
challenged the merely derivative status and medial secondarity of language. 
As a result, language or (as with Peirce) signs or (as with Cassirer) symbolic 
forms became a constitutional condition of the world and its cognition: in 
keeping with a strategy of thought that was established since Kant’s critical 
turn, language and sign systems thereby become a condition of possibility 
for our experience of and relation to the world.
The family resemblance between the medial and linguistic turns 
should now be clear: in both cases it involves a reflexive f igure whose goal 
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is to reconstruct the opacity and autonomy of transitory and secondary 
phenomena, thereby showing that something considered derivative and 
inferior actually has the power to define structures and systems. The genera-
tive potential attributed to language and media also involves something 
demiurgical, for when this creative power is attributed to something it is 
ennobled as an Archimedean point in our relation to the world, and it is 
thus thought to be as fundamental as it is unavoidable.10
At the same time, however, there is a remarkable contradiction between 
the ‘linguistic’ and ‘medial’ turns. As mentioned earlier, establishing the 
linguistic a priori meant that language was no longer ‘only’ a medium. This 
shift was certainly based on an understanding of the medium as a vehicle 
and carrier in the sense of a transitory medium; however, over the course 
of the debates concerning media such a concept was gradually rejected 
in favour of an instrumental media concept. As a result, by virtue of this 
instrumental-generative dimension the media a priori can now actually 
compete with the linguistic a priori.
It is now necessary to return to Derrida. The radical nature of his 
deconstructive philosophy reveals itself precisely in the assertion once 
again – therefore recursively – of the reflexive f igure of language criticism 
as opposed to simply the results of this criticism, insofar as he undermined 
the primacy of speech in the name of the secondarity of writing. This 
undermining does not lead to the replacement of the writing a priori with 
the linguistic a priori, however, but rather it results in the baring of dilem-
mas or aporias: in Derrida’s perspective writing becomes a condition of 
both the possibility and impossibility of speech and semiosis.11 Derrida’s 
interpretation will not be pursued any further here, but it suggests an idea 
that is more important for our considerations.
If Derrida’s reflections on writing are interpreted in an undeniably over-
simplistic way as a (recursive) application of media criticism to language 
criticism, it shows that the traditional transcendental ref lexive f igure 
‘condition of the possibility of’, which still underlies Kantian epistemol-
ogy, modern language criticism and implicitly also contemporary media 
criticism, is not simply transformed but rather collapsed in its recursive 
self-usage. Basically, with the linguistic turn the media critical break proves 
to be both a breakdown as well as an ultimate justif ication of the idea of 
the a priori. It also proves to be a breakdown of the attempt to distinguish, 
universalize and thus make autonomous one phenomenal domain as a 
prior matrix of our being-in-the-world. When the media critical impulse 
is brought to bear on the linguistic turn, therefore, it reveals aporias that 
are distinctive to all a priori processes.
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An explanation of this aporetic approach would require a separate study. 
For the purposes of this book, however, it is easier to postulate on the basis 
of this diagnosis, thus heuristically, that one rather obvious method remains 
completely barred to philosophical reflections on media: the method which 
posits that an engagement with media is philosophically legitimated by the 
fact that media are seen as a priori of our experience of the world, which 
elevates media to an unavoidable condition of the possibility of perception, 
communication, and cognition. According to this position, there can be 
nothing ‘outside’ of media. If it does not make sense to think about media 
in this way – to insert them in the line of succession of the linguistic a 
priori – then how else can and should a philosophical reflection on media 
proceed?
The Disappearance of Media in Their Implementation?
In addition to the transcendental program there are also other reflexive 
f igures of philosophical assurance. One of these f igures can be called the 
‘metaphysical gesture’. This gesture does not consist in the Kantian sense 
in inquiring after the condition of the possibility of something, but rather 
it consists in the Platonic sense in reflecting on what lies behind a given 
appearance – namely, what it really is. Kant’s ingenuity consisted in show-
ing that those accepted a priori forms and concepts are to be sought and 
found behind appearances, which f irst enables the coming-to-appearance 
of something in our own experience. At the same time, however, it was also 
clear to Kant that the things that determine the world cannot simultane-
ously be in the world and from the world. Plato, on the other hand, was 
convinced that the ideas that constitute the archetypes of all appearances 
are real – more real in any case than all material phenomena. The reflexive 
movement that penetrates the sensible, perceptible surface of a concrete, 
particular event in order to enter into its depths and expose the concealed 
entity hiding behind it, which is universal and invisible but nevertheless 
real and therefore effective and at the same time constitutes the ‘essence’ 
of this event: this approach provides a philosophical f igure of thought that 
is widely accepted and has not at all gone out of use with the cognitive a 
priori. It is this f igure of thought that will now be addressed.
I thus propose to reflect philosophically on media in a way that does 
not conceive of media as a condition of the possibility of our relation to the 
world, but rather grapples with the question of what lies ‘behind appear-
ances’. To begin, I will pursue this gesture of attending to what lies ‘behind’ 
and grapple with media and mediality from this metaphysical perspective. 
This now appears – at best – to be in need of explanation, and at worst as a 
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regression back to Platonism, which has long been obsolete. My intuition 
and intention is nevertheless entirely different: I want to show how applying 
a Platonic f igure of thought to the use of media does not restore Platonism, 
but rather undermines it. I will now provide a brief summary of what this 
means.
In their everyday use media enable something to emerge, but this thing 
is not precisely in the media themselves, but rather in their messages. In the 
media event, therefore, the sensible, visible surface is the meaning, while the 
‘deep structure’ constitutes the non-visible medium. The use of media is thus 
‘an-aistheticizing’, as media remain hidden in their noise-free implementa-
tion.12 Like it or not – or also paradoxically – this is why a metaphysics of 
mediality leads to a ‘physics of media’, to take up a term coined by Walter 
Seitter.13 But this is premature. First, I must make sense of the argumentative 
hinge of this ‘metaphysical approach’, which is the fact that while enabling 
something to emerge media themselves tend to remain invisible.
We hear not vibrations in the air, but rather the kettle whistling; we 
see not light waves of the yellow colour spectrum, but rather a canary; 
we hear not a CD, but rather music; and the cinema screen ‘disappears’ as 
soon as the f ilm grips us. The smoother media work, the more they remain 
below the threshold of our perception. ‘Media make something legible, 
audible, visible, perceivable, while simultaneously erasing itself and its 
constitutive involvement in this sensuality, thus becoming unperceivable, 
anesthetic.’14 At the same time that media bring something forth, they 
themselves recede into the background; media enable something to be 
visualized, while simultaneously remaining invisible. And vice versa: only 
noise, dysfunction and disturbance make the medium itself noticeable.
A medium’s success thus depends on its disappearance, and mediation is 
designed to make what is mediated appear unmediated.15 The perceptibility 
of the message, or the appearance of what is mediated, is thus inversely 
proportional to the imperceptibility of the messenger, or the disappearance 
of the mediator. This results in the paradoxical idea of an ‘unmediated 
mediacy’, an ‘immaterial materiality’, or an ‘absence in presence’. The 
implementation of media depends on their withdrawal.16 I will call this ‘ais-
thetic self-neutralization’. It is important to note that this neutralization 
belongs to the functional logic of media. It is not an inherent feature of the 
medium itself, but rather it only takes effect when media are in use.17 The 
invisibility of the medium – its aisthetic neutralization – is an attribute of 
media performance.
Even a media theory that is only close to being comprehensive and 
productive cannot overlook the fact that media remain latent in the 
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manifestation of their messages. Niklas Luhmann’s media theory, which 
explores the relationship between medium and form, is the most thorough 
attempt so far to explain why we always see the forms but not the media 
themselves, but I will not discuss Luhmann here, as he is oriented towards 
media of communication.18 Instead, I would like to focus on two positions 
that are concerned with media of perception and that are also important 
for an understanding of the principle of ‘self-neutralization’ because of 
their reflections on the ‘invisibility’ of media: on the one hand, Aristotle’s 
aisthetic-oriented concept of media, in which the transparency of the 
medium becomes a conditio sine qua non of its function,19 and on the other 
hand Fritz Heider’s interpretation of the transparency of the medium as a 
symptom of the ‘external conditionality’ of media and thus its subordina-
tion to an external system.20
Aristotle opened the philosophical reflection on mediality insofar as 
he claimed that all perception was inevitably dependent on media. The 
eye is a distant sense: whatever touches the eye directly cannot be seen.21 
For Aristotle, sight is dependent on distance in two different ways. On 
the one hand, spatial distance is necessary for something to be seen. On 
the other hand, sight also requires the renunciation of interaction: vision 
cannot be explained as the interaction of the perceiving subject and the 
perceived object. Lastly, there is also a third: it is not enough that an empty 
space merely extends between the seer and the seen.22 Rather, the space 
in between the subject and the object must actually be filled, and this is 
precisely the task of the medium that mediates between the seer and the 
seen as a third. Aristotle thus grants the medium a material facticity as 
well as a functional autarchy. At the same time, however, Aristotle also 
articulates the sole condition under which media can fulf il their task 
of enabling perception, which involves ‘media diaphana’ or diaphanous 
media.23 Media are indeed bound to materiality, but their transparency 
is practically required: air, water or crystals are thus the most favourable 
materials for media of perception. However, this transparency is – as Walter 
Seitter emphasized24 – not simply a physical characteristic of the corporeal-
ity of media, but rather a functional attribute: it could almost be called a 
property, which all media of perception to different extents (must) always 
possess. In the transparency of the medium materiality intersects with 
the transitory: transparency thus emerges as a conditio sine qua non of 
Aristotle’s concept of media. As Thomas Aquinas later notes, the medium 
is qualif ied to convey a manifestation only when it does not manifest itself: 
‘A diaphanous medium must be without color.’25 Mediation is dependent on 
the illusion of immediacy. To summarize these reflections, transparency 
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(the diaphanous) as a characteristic of Aristotle’s perception medium is 
an early thematization of the phenomenon of medial self-neutralization.
Although the idea of the transparency of the medium emerges within 
the context of perception theory, it is then taken up in modern theoretical 
discussions of signs and symbols and in linguistic theory, or more pre-
cisely in reference to the specif ic nature of language with respect to the 
f igurative modality of signif ication.26 Linguistic signs are always already 
designed not to make their material form apparent but rather to make it 
recede into the background, so that the sign practically converges with the 
meaning it conveys. The incarnation of such materiality, whose specialty 
is making itself ‘immaterial’, is the voice, in which this disappearance 
takes the form of sound. Hegel thus notes: ‘The word as sounded vanishes 
in time.’27
I will now jump to the f irst half of the twentieth century, when Fritz Hei-
der took up the idea of medial transparency and gave it a signif icant twist 
in his theory of perception. Heider also def ines a ‘true medium’ as one that 
can be ‘seen through without obstructions’.28 While Aristotle understood 
this transparency quite literally, Heider interpreted it as a metaphorical 
symbol of the non-autarchy or other-directedness of media. Regardless of 
what media do, this ‘external conditionality’ always remains signif icant 
for their activity: the activity of media involve ‘forced vibrations’, such that 
what is visible during the media event constitutes an external system, for 
which Heider also employed the expression ‘false unity’.29 ‘Media processes 
are only important insofar as they are chained to something important, but 
they themselves are mostly “nothing”.’30
It is not necessary to trace here the intricacies of Heider’s concept of 
media. Naturally Heider was aware that media must also have their own 
system, albeit a system that must be conditioned to allow the highest pos-
sible degree of plasticity. Aristotle already conceived of this malleability 
when he emphasized that the emollience of wax made it possible for the 
f irst time to record the form (but not the material) of the signet ring.31 The 
special quality of media thus consists in being materially conditioned to 
separate the material and the form from one another in the course of their 
operations. Heider conceived of this unconnected multiplicity of elements, 
which were not f irmly established and were thus considered loose or soft, 
as the physical nature of media. This thought would later be taken up again 
not only by Niklas Luhmann but also Walter Seitter, who made it the focus 
of his ‘physics of media’. What matters now is that Heider understood the 
transparency and plasticity of the medium as evidence of its constitutional 
external conditionality: ‘The media event […] is externally determined.’32
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Aristotle and Heider’s reflections on media, which were motivated by 
perception theory, can be summarized as follows: a medium always oc-
cupies the position of middle and mediator, and it is thus fundamentally 
non-autonomous. Media are not sovereign, and heteronomy is their defining 
feature. Aristotle’s idea of the ‘diaphanous’ as distinctive of media of percep-
tion and Heider’s concept of the ‘false unity’ of the media event represent 
two different ways of conceptualizing this heteronomy. To condense this 
into a catchy formula: There is always an outside of media.
Because it is a third placed between two sides, which f ills the space 
between them, the corporeality assigned to media is a ‘transitory corporeal-
ity’. Media are bodies that can be disembodied; the kind of materiality that 
appertains to them is the kind that is ‘immaterial’ during their usage.
On the Difference Between Signs and Media
This transitory nature, which manifests in the functioning materiality 
of media, nevertheless does not appear to be specif ic to media. In a long 
tradition of semiological discourse, signs also present a kind of materiality 
that ‘stands for something else’ and thus points beyond itself. Take for 
instance the most basic meaning of the concept ‘sign’ as a relation between 
a perceptible carrier and an imperceptible meaning: in this perspective, 
the sensibly factual signif ier has the task of bringing to mind a mostly 
insensible signif ied. While avoiding the semantic simplif ication that the 
signif ier represents the signif ied, which Saussure already made obsolete, 
a syntactic relation still remains dominant: according to Charles Sand-
ers Peirce we can and must start from the premise that every particular, 
perceptible sign event is identif iable as a sign because and insofar as it is an 
instantiation of a universal sign type.33 But when the material sign carrier 
is only individualizable as the realization of a universal model, then isn’t 
this sign carrier in its material-sensible givenness the incarnation of the 
heteronomy and other-directedness that Aristotle and Heider attributed 
to media? Doesn’t this indicate that sign carrier, signif ier and medium are 
all one and the same?
Media and material sign carriers are actually conflated quite often. Nev-
ertheless, all that matters here is a definitive difference between sign carrier 
and medium. This is a pivotal point in my argument. However, to avoid any 
misunderstanding in advance: the distinction between medium and sign 
(carrier) in the following cannot be understood as disjointed sorting in the 
sense of two classes or types of objects. There are not simply signs and in 
addition also media. Thematizing something as either a sign or a medium 
refers to two perspectives that describe the very same thing – for example, 
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language – in different ways. But how can the difference between these 
two perspectives be understood?
A sign must be perceptible, but what is perceptible in a sign is secondary, 
while the meaning of the sign, which is usually assumed to be invisible, ab-
sent and perhaps also immaterial, is considered primary. When something 
is viewed as a medium, however, it behaves in the exact opposite way: what 
is perceptible is usually the message itself, and the message is also what 
matters most in the media event. The message is thus considered primary, 
while the medium itself is secondary; it neutralizes itself, becomes invisible 
and disappears in its (noise-free) use. In the semiological perspective, the 
meaning is ‘concealed’ behind the sensible; in the mediological perspective, 
on the other hand, the sensible is ‘concealed’ behind the meaning.34
This difference reveals a strange inversion in the way the binaries of 
visibility/invisibility, surface/depth and secondary/primary are allocated in 
each case. If a metaphysical approach is applied to signs, then a universally 
trusted formula emerges: behind the sensible (‘token’) lies the sense (‘type’). 
If a metaphysical approach is applied to media, then this formula is inverted 
in a signif icant way: behind the visible message lies the invisible medium. 
The metaphysics of mediality thus leads to a ‘physics of media’.
It should now be clear why the difference between material sign carrier 
and medium is so pivotal for these theoretical considerations. To put it in 
an exaggerated way: the procedural logic of signs fulf ils the metaphysical 
expectation to search for meaning over and beyond the sensible, but the 
functional logic of media reverses this metaphysical expectation by going 
over and beyond the meaning and confronting the sensibility, materiality, 
and corporeality of media concealed behind it.
That the visible constitutes the message while the invisible constitutes 
the medium is nevertheless only ‘half the story’: it is not the whole story 
because in this constellation of ‘surface versus depth’ the medium all too 
easily assumes the position of a source; it is thus regarded as a generative 
and hence conditional mechanism, which emphasizes its autonomy. If a 
metaphysical approach is adopted to seek out the concealed materiality 
of the medium behind the surface of the meaning, then it must at the 
same time be agreed that the medium possesses a demiurgical power, 
which is always implied by the concept of a ‘medium behind’. When the 
medium is encountered on the reverse side of that which reveals itself 
as the message, therefore, its ‘mode of being’ excludes the possibility 
that the medium is endowed with an autonomous creative power and 
can be conceived as a quasi-sovereign actor or constitutive conditional 
relationship.
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This line of thought suggests for the f irst time a good reason for the 
proposed messenger perspective. Etymologically the word ‘medium’ de-
notes not only means, but also middle and mediator, yet media theory has 
(still) hardly explored this dimension. It is precisely this facet that will be 
addressed here.
The Medium as Middle – The Messenger as ‘Dying Messenger’
A brief etymological explanation is now in order.35 There were originally 
two signif icant ways of using the word ‘medium’. On the one hand, it 
was a grammatical form of Greek, which remained neutral with respect 
to active and passive. It was a genus verbi for activities that constituted 
a mixed form between doing and suffering, production and reception 
or making something happen and something happening to oneself. 
‘πείδομαι’, for example, did not simply mean ‘I am persuaded’; rather, 
in a far more subtle way it signalled grammatically ‘I allow myself to 
be persuaded’. The speaker is thus not simply in the position of object, 
but also at the same time in the position of subject, which is similar to 
what happens when people wash their hands. A person is receiver and 
sender at the same time, while also holding the middle position between 
receiver and sender.
On the other hand, ‘medium’ refers to the middle term in a syllogism. 
The terminus medius appears in both premises of a syllogistic deduction 
and it establishes the correlation between these premises, which in turn 
makes deductive reasoning on the basis of these premises possible. The 
conclusion lies in connecting the terms that are not middle terms, but 
this only happens in the act of effacing the middle term. ‘All mammals are 
warm-blooded; all polar bears are mammals. Therefore, all polar bears 
are warm-blooded.’ By establishing a connection, the terminus medius 
‘mammal’ makes itself superfluous. The medium fulf ils its function in the 
process of its own elimination.
These comments on grammar and logic as characteristic sources of the 
concept of media obviously do not provide an etymology of the concept 
of media. Nevertheless, the early use of the word casts an interesting light 
on the concept. Occupying the middle is precisely what the position of 
the medium represents. This ‘middle’ can be understood in three ways: 
spatially as an intermediate position, then functionally as mediation and 
f inally formally as neutralization.36 And – as evidenced at least by the use 
of logic – the medium disappears in its successful implementation. Its role 
consists not in being retained, but rather in being made superfluous. Media 
cannot be collected.
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The idea that the medium becomes superfluous is emphasized most 
clearly in the legendary f igures of dying messengers in myth, religion, and 
art. In the legend passed down by Plutarch, the runner from Marathon 
delivers the message of the victory of the Athenians over the Persians – in 
full armour no less – and then immediately drops dead.37 The messenger 
is consumed through his activity. In the transmission of his message, he 
himself perishes. The motif of the dying messenger can be pursued further 
to a fresco by Lauretti Tommaso (circa 1530-1602), which shows the statue 
of Hermes, the messenger of the gods, shattered in pieces at the foot of an 
altar featuring the crucif ied Christ.38 The fresco is called The Triumph of 
Christianity. Its creator thus intended it to be an allegory of the victory of the 
Christian age over pagan antiquity. In his commentary on the fresco, how-
ever, Michel Serres noted: ‘Both Mercury and Christ are at the point of death, 
their limbs wracked and their bodies torn. Messengers disappear in relation 
to their message: this is our key to understanding their death agonies, their 
death and their disaggregation.’39 The ‘life’ of the message purchased with 
the death of the messenger; the messenger sacrif iced through the delivery 
of the message; Is there a connection between being a messenger and being 
a sacrif ice? In any case, the motif of the dying messenger is a radical version 
of the idea of the eliminatability of the medium, a more moderate version 
of which was already seen in the aforementioned discussion of syllogisms. 
The ‘becoming invisible’ of the carrier is therefore not a phantasm or an 
idealization: it is fundamentally connected to the messenger function.
This concludes my methodological considerations. The main idea, 
therefore, is that it is possible to trace the ‘disappearance of the medium 
behind its content’ and at the same time reveal the non-sovereignty, the 
constitutive external conditionality of the medium by understanding what a 
medium ‘is’ according to the messenger model. According to the messenger 
principle, ‘foreground’ and ‘background’, the sensible and the insensible, 
are very clearly allocated: what the messenger brings to the eye and the 
ear is not simply ‘himself’, but rather the message he has to convey. In the 
messenger, who ‘speaks with a strange voice’, a process emerges that is 
typical of media events, by which the medium withdraws and neutralizes 
itself in order to transmit its content.

 Introductions
The foregoing preliminary considerations show what the following study 
intends to accomplish and what it intends to avoid:
(1) The medium will not be theorized as a means or an instrument but 
rather as a middle and a mediator. In light of this mediating function, the 
‘transmission perspective’ and the ‘postal principle’ will be explored by 
investigating whether ‘transmission’ is def inable in a way that at the same 
time reveals how media affect and shape what they transmit. The original 
scope of medial effectiveness will also be reconstructed as a perceptual 
relation and a letting-appear (Erscheinenlassen), in which the communica-
tive functions of media are rooted and on which they ultimately depend. 
A philosophical gesture will thus be adopted that is traditionally called a 
metaphysical perspective insofar as what media let appear can be traced 
back to something concealed behind it and thus invisible. This process 
effectively reverses the classical metaphysical gaze, as it involves the ‘hidden 
materiality’ of media.
(2) What is to be avoided now appears as a negative image: no media 
a priori is to be established, and media are thus not to be located within 
the frame of ultimate justif ications. Media are also not to be endowed 
with a quasi-demiurgical power, thus blazing a trail for a kind of ‘media 
generativism’ that at the same time also brings forth what media let appear.
The underlying assumption is that these intentions can be realized 
by successfully using the messenger model as an inspirational source of 
media-theoretical reflections. Before we proceed, however, the following 
chapters will show how various contemporary authors (with the exception 
of Benjamin) have inspired this media-theoretical project.
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Walter Benjamin
‘Mediation, which is the immediacy of all mental communication, is the 
fundamental problem of linguistic theory, and if one chooses to call this immediacy 
magic, then the primary problem of language is its magic.’ 1
The link to Walter Benjamin is more than close. His essay on ‘The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ has become a classic of 
media theory. This is largely due to the fact that Benjamin is seen as a 
pioneer in the discovery of a conditional relation between technics and 
art, technology and perception, media, and the senses. In each case, the 
way art, perception, and the senses are presented is not only preformed 
but practically constituted by media, technics, and technology. Because 
of his artwork essay, Walter Benjamin has been characterized as an early 
proponent of the media generativistic position. So why include Benjamin 
when attempting to give a hearing to critical voices that are opposed to a 
constitution-theoretical understanding of media?
With one exception,2 the contemporary media debate consistently 
overlooks a text written by Benjamin in 1916 titled ‘On Language as Such 
and on the Language of Man’, in which he introduces the concepts ‘com-
munication’, ‘medium’, and ‘mediation’ in a way that def initely does not 
support or promote the generativistic tone of the media debate, which 
all too willingly sees Benjamin as a decisive time keeper. The fact that 
this early essay on language is almost never interpreted as an insightful 
media-theoretical source is also due to the author himself: Benjamin wrote 
these pages less for publication than self-understanding. Benjamin thus 
produced a cryptically laid out and hermetically held document that he 
only shared with friends as a sign of his personal esteem.3 I will now turn 
to the text itself, although I do not intend to discuss its linguistic content; 
this has already been done superbly by Winfried Menninghaus4 and, more 
recently, Anja Hallacker.5 Rather, I am looking for traces of a media concept 
in Benjamin’s early work that is shaped by a divergence between the me-
dium and the technical instrument. This media concept will come to light 
as soon as the non-trivial meaning of the idea that language is a medium of 
communication is understood.
A media theory could not begin in a more unspectacular way: Benjamin 
explains that communication requires a medium, which he then calls ‘lan-
guage’. In contrast to their traditional meaning, however, these three con-
cepts – ‘communication’, ‘medium’, and ‘language’ – assume an unfamiliar 
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meaning in Benjamin’s text, and this unfamiliar meaning must be partially 
reconstructed in order to push forward to the essence of the media concept 
in Benjamin’s early work. Here is a hint as to where this essence is to be 
found: the relationship between these three concepts is conceived in such 
a way that ‘translation’ emerges as the core task of mediation.
‘Language’ as Medium of Communicability: Reconstruction of a 
Concept
A reconstruction of Benjamin’s early understanding of language can be 
explicated in six steps:
(1) Language: Benjamin understands ‘language’ as a ‘tendency […] toward 
[…] communication’.6 He also calls this principle ‘communicability’. This is 
the f irst conceptual shift: with his use of the concept ‘language’ Benjamin 
diverges from the notion of a language spoken by speakers, for ‘[l]anguages 
[…] have no speaker’.7 It thus becomes possible for Benjamin to concede the 
existence of languages of technology, art, justice, and religion,8 but at the 
same time to emphasize that these languages are not verbalized; instead, 
the legal decisions of justice, the terminology of technicians, the design 
vocabulary of art, and the reports of revelations in religion represent some-
thing that lies itself ‘in the subjects concerned – technology, art, justice, or 
religion’.9 Moreover, communicability is an attribute that applies not only to 
cultural spheres – ‘symbolic forms’ in Ernst Cassirer’s sense of the term – but 
also to animate as well as inanimate nature. For Benjamin, therefore, there 
are ‘languages of things’ – he mentions here lamps, mountains, foxes10 – even 
if their languages are ‘imperfect’ and ‘dumb’.11 And lastly there is also the 
language of God: in the creation story God creates by speaking.
Therefore: ‘The existence of language is coextensive […] with absolutely 
everything.’12 And conversely: for Benjamin there is no ‘existence’ that is 
‘entirely without relationship to language’.13 Existence is thus related to 
language and communicability like the front and back sides of a page. 
This is possible in that Benjamin bids farewell to three attributes that are 
commonly associated with the concept of language: language is not to be 
understood as the use of signs, it is not tied to vocalization, and it also does 
not depend on conscious awareness.14 So what is ‘language’?
Because language is identif ied with the principle of communicability 
and this principle corresponds to everything that somehow constitutes 
our experiential world, it is necessary to look more closely at how Benjamin 
understands ‘communication’.
(2) Communication in language versus communication through language: 
‘What does language communicate? It communicates the mental being 
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corresponding to it.’15 A formulation could hardly sound more conventional, 
yet what is funny about Benjamin’s thought lies less in what communicates 
– the mental being – than in how it communicates: ‘It is fundamental 
that this mental being communicates itself in language and not through 
language.’16 It comes down to this phrase: to communicate ‘in’ and not 
‘through’ language. Communicating ‘through’ language is what is typically 
understood by the use of spoken language. Benjamin also refers to this as the 
‘bourgeois conception of language’, which he considers invalid and empty17 
and characterizes as follows: ‘It holds that the means of communication is 
the word, its object factual, and its addressee a human being.’18 Whenever 
people communicate through language in the conventional sense by some-
one communicating something to someone else, words are employed as 
means and instrument. In that case, words make something appear that is 
itself not linguistic ‘nature’: ‘The word must communicate something (other 
than itself).’19 But Benjamin characterizes this as ‘the true Fall of the spirit 
of language’,20 for it assumes that ‘the word has an accidental relation to its 
object, that it is a sign for things (or knowledge of them) agreed by some 
convention’.21 In short, ‘communicating through language’ makes language 
into an arbitrary verbal sign system, which is employed as an instrument 
of communication. The location where language in this arbitrary sense is 
communicated through is the speaker,22 yet ‘being a speaker’ is precisely 
not a revealing fact for Benjamin’s philosophy of language. Against the 
background of this ‘bourgeois’ concept of language, therefore, I will now 
question what Benjamin means by ‘communicating in language’.
(3) ‘Communicating oneself ’ versus ‘communicating something’: this is 
a decisive point that reveals how Benjamin’s concept of communication 
differs from our everyday notions. It is already clear that language should 
not be understood as signs, and it should also not be conceived as means. 
Benjamin calls such a language, which surpasses its semiotic and instru-
mental functions, ‘expression’; more precisely, language becomes a ‘direct 
expression of that which communicates itself in it ’.23 Benjamin thus refers 
to ‘expression’ as something that is not communicated through language, 
but rather something that communicates itself in language. For Benjamin, 
therefore, ‘communicating oneself ’ is more like revealing oneself. From 
this perspective it is understandable why Benjamin attributes language 
to things as well as people: they can both express something by revealing 
something about themselves. The lamp reveals itself by affording light. 
Unlike the concept of ‘communicating something’, therefore, the idea of 
‘communicating oneself ’ involves a unidirectional movement that is not 
geared towards reciprocity.
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But what does ‘communicating oneself’ mean when it refers to people? 
Benjamin’s cryptic idea is that people do not communicate themselves; 
rather, what is communicated is language itself: ‘All language communicates 
itself.’24 In other words, while the lamp expresses and reveals itself by emit-
ting light, people express and reveal themselves by naming. It has already 
been explained that according to Benjamin a ‘mental being’ communicates 
itself in language, but how is this ‘mental being’ related to ‘naming’? At this 
point I will turn to Benjamin’s concept of ‘communicability’.
(4) Communicability: ‘That which in a mental entity is communicable 
is its language. On this “is” […] everything depends.’25 If ‘mental being’ 
and ‘language’ coincide, therefore, it is because this mental being itself 
consists in communicability. That which expresses itself in language is 
not a communication (which is expressed namely through language), but 
rather it is communicability itself. Benjamin liked using the suff ix -able 
or -ability, such as the words ‘reproducibility’, ‘criticizability’, ‘citability’, 
translatability’, etc.26 Samuel Weber associated the use of the suff ix -able 
with a particular ontological mode: the communicable is not the same as 
the communicated or the communication.27 While the communicated and 
the communication refer to actual tangible operations, the communicable 
corresponds to another ontological mode, which is not real but rather 
virtual. This does not mean that it is simply possible and thus waiting to 
be realized; rather, by ‘virtual’ Weber understands that for Benjamin the 
communicable is an ability that is effective without mediation28 and thus 
does not depend on intervention from outside.29 Benjamin actually writes: 
‘[T]his capacity for communication is language itself.’30 Every language 
thus communicates not something but rather itself. According to Weber, 
it is precisely the immediacy of this effect that constitutes the mediality of 
language.31 I now come to Benjamin’s concept of media.
(5) Medium, Expression: Allow Benjamin to speak for himself: ‘The 
language of an entity is the medium in which its mental being is com-
municated.’32 And: ‘[A]ll language communicates itself in itself; it is in the 
purest sense the “medium” of the communication. Mediation […] is the 
immediacy of all mental communication.’33 As Benjamin here explicitly 
associates mediation with immediacy, it is clear that mediation is based 
precisely on not serving as means. Media offer the potential to communicate 
oneself, but they are not a means of communication. The immediacy of 
media is only another expression of their non-instrumentalizability for 
the purposes of communication and semiosis. The medium is not to be 
understood as a vehicle for transferring content; rather, it makes it possible 
for something to communicate itself. Mediation is thus the ability to express 
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oneself without the intervention of an external means. That is the basic idea 
informing Benjamin’s early approach to media. Benjamin also describes the 
immediacy of the medium as ‘magical’.34
(6) Magic, Translation: In light of Benjamin’s attempt to keep everything 
that has to do with instrument, means, or mediation away from the concept 
of media und thus also from language, it is important to understand his 
characterization of this immediacy as ‘magical’: ‘Mediation, which is the 
immediacy of all mental communication, is the fundamental problem of 
linguistic theory, and if one chooses to call this immediacy magic, then 
the primary problem of language is its magic.’35 The medium (and thereby 
language) thus has its own non-instrumental effect, which Benjamin 
calls the ‘magic of language’. But how can this non-causal effectiveness 
be understood?
I will reveal the answer up front: the magical effectiveness of language 
can be reconstructed as its translatability. Just as Benjamin sees the magic 
of language as the ‘primary problem of linguistic theory’, so is it ‘necessary 
to found the concept of translation at the deepest level of linguistic theory’.36 
But how can the idea of translatability explain the magical power of lan-
guage, which must at the same time also explain the process of mediation? 
And what does it mean to explain the process of mediation as translation?
In order to f ind an answer to this question, I will stop reconstructing 
purely conceptual relationships at this point and turn to a narrative di-
mension in Benjamin’s language essay. It involves the biblical story of the 
Creation and the Fall of Man, which Benjamin interprets as an illuminating 
linguistic-theoretical resource.
Making Language Mediate: On the Interpretation of Genesis
Benjamin notes that God’s creation of nature differs signif icantly from his 
creation of people. Nature emerges from the word, but people emerge from 
the Earth. ‘This is, in the whole story of the Creation, the only reference to 
the material in which the Creator expresses his will, which is doubtless 
otherwise thought of as creation without mediation.’37 As compensation 
for this ‘earthly’ origin, ‘man, who is not created from the word’ receives 
‘the gift o language’.38 For God, therefore, language ‘served him as medium 
of creation’,39 but for people this God-given gift becomes a mere instru-
ment. This reveals something about the role of naming: God creates by 
naming, yet people name themselves: ‘Of all beings, man is the only one 
who names his own kind, as he is the only one whom God did not name.’40 
With the transition from divine to human language, however, the function 
of naming changes: for people, naming is no longer a medium that causes 
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the immediate creation of the named, but rather it is ‘only’ a means of 
cognition. The human cognitive faculty, which depends on the instrumental 
use of language, becomes a focal point if you will: it becomes a form of 
compensation for the loss of a demiurgical potential. Language as cognitive 
organon represents people’s limited ability to create, and it is precisely the 
original divine creative power that people must renounce.
Benjamin clarif ies this idea with his interpretation of the biblical story 
of the Fall of Man: ‘[T]he Fall marks the birth of the human word, in which 
name no longer lives intact.’41 The difference between good and evil, which 
is now revealed to people, introduces a form of language usage that is no 
longer based on ‘creation through naming’, as there is no evil in paradise 
to refer to by name. Moreover, the human use of language now aims at 
forming judgements. In the judgement something is communicated through 
language, as the word becomes a sign. Because the word communicates 
something (besides itself) Benjamin – as already mentioned – considers 
this ‘the true Fall of the spirit of language’. If the word communicates 
something in this superf icial sense, Benjamin considers this ‘a parody – by 
the expressly mediate word – of the expressly immediate, creative word of 
God’.42 The Fall of Man marks the loss of linguistic immediacy, thus ‘making 
language mediate’.43 The cognitive judgement thus takes the place of the 
creating name. It is also the judging word of God that expels people from 
paradise with a sentence, yet at the same time the linguistic power of form-
ing judgements is left to the people. The world-generating creativity of God 
thus becomes the world-judging cognitive faculty of people. In cognition, 
language is no longer ‘spontaneous creation’, but rather it becomes a kind 
of conception, and this conception is translation. If people give names to 
things, this naming is based on the silent language of things and thus on 
how ‘the language [of things] is communicated to [man]’.44 For ‘conception 
and spontaneity together, which are found in this unique union only in the 
linguistic realm, language has its own word […] It is the translation of the 
language of things into that of man.’45 God thus creates by naming; this is 
an undisguised, ‘pure’ form of linguistic magic that is effective without 
mediation because it brings forth reality. People lost this form of linguistic 
power, and from that point on they were able to exercise their linguistic 
creativity (only) as translation.
The Medium as Translation
These ref lections now come full circle. A conceptual reconstruction of 
Benjamin’s reflections on language as a medium leads to the concept of 
‘translation’, which Benjamin continued to explicate throughout his life. 
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My supposition was that because ‘translation’ constitutes the foundation 
of Benjamin’s theory of language it also outlines his concept of media. 
Perhaps it has already become apparent in my discussion of Benjamin’s 
interpretation of Genesis how this can be understood.
According to the terms of the biblical narrative, God’s language cre-
ates but does not translate. Benjamin thus projects onto God the idea of 
language as a medium of undisguised non-instrumental creative power. 
That is the origin of the magic of language. Human linguisticality must then 
be considered, on the one hand, as a break with the divine language, but 
it can also be considered, on the other hand, as a form of its preservation.
The break is reflected in the linguistic divide between what can be com-
municated in language and what can be communicated through language. 
Henceforth, language is always twofold: as unmediated expression and 
as arbitrary sign, as ‘communicating oneself ’ and as ‘communicating 
something’, as a medium of immediacy and an instrument of mediation. 
The preservation is reflected in the compensatory creative power granted 
to people through language and naming: people do not actually create the 
world, but they are able to create judgements about the world. This ability is 
solely due to the fact that human language can be considered a translation 
of the communicability with which God originally distinguished things by 
naming and creating them.
For God as well as people, therefore, language is a medium. As language is 
humanized, however, a decisive metamorphosis in the function of mediality 
occurs: when God speaks, he creates; when people speak, they translate. ‘Trans-
lation’ thus becomes a trace and symptom of the dichotomous condition of 
being human. The creation of people already distances them from the rest 
of nature, as they alone emerge from a synthesis of the palpable, corporeal 
earth and the breath of God-given linguisticality. And this linguisticality 
is fundamentally ambivalent: language is a medium for people in creation 
and conception, immediacy and mediation, expression and sign, magic 
and technology.
It could also be said that God’s language creates because it is a ‘pure 
medium’46 and its performativity is complete. Human language is not a pure 
medium, but rather a hybrid of medium and instrument; it has become 
technical, an organon of cognition, and its performativity is only limited.
In light of Benjamin’s reflections, therefore, what a medium means for 
human practices is precisely misunderstood when the attribute of being 
an instrument or a sign is falsely included in the concept of media itself. 
In fact the reverse is true: the meaning and function of ‘media’ for people 
can only be def ined through the tension, difference, or even dissonance 
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between media and technical or symbolic means. And the concept of 
translation reveals how mediality surpasses technical production and 
symbolic representation.
I will return to the concept of translation later.
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Jean-Luc Nancy
‘This thought of “sharing” (partition, repartition, part, 
participation, separation, communication, discord, cleavage, 
devolution, destination) has started to unravel.’ 47
The Ontology of Being-With
Jean-Luc Nancy works on an ontology whose fundamental concept is not 
Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ but rather ‘Dasein-with’ (Mitdasein): our existence is 
being-with-others; we are always only individuals as a collective group. 
‘Being’ is ‘singularly plural and plurally singular’.48 In the context of this 
attempt to def ine our existence as ‘being-with’,49 the word ‘with’ acquires 
a philosophical meaning that allows communality to be understood as 
‘distant closeness’. The notion of ‘being-with-others’ as both neighbourly 
yet distant sheds new light on the concepts of ‘sharing’ and ‘communica-
tion’: sharing proves to be something that eludes consensus because it 
presupposes and reinforces the idea of a splitting and separation.50 And com-
munication functions without reference to heterogeneity and difference, 
without attributes to be shared with others and indeed also without the 
person of a mediator. It is not the concept of ‘medium’ but rather ‘mediation’ 
that is important for Nancy. I will now reconstruct a sketch of how this 
concept inspires a non-instrumental yet nevertheless materialistic notion 
of mediality. This inspiration becomes clear as soon as it is understood 
how ‘sharing’ constitutes the matrix that is ‘community’ – a matrix that at 
the same time also turns out to be a ‘milieu’ in which mediation can take 
place without a mediator.
What does ‘communality’ even mean after the end of communism? This 
is a question that Nancy raises and that worries him. He can still only 
conceive of the human condition as the common condition; however, the 
sociality of the human mode of Dasein can now no longer be understood 
as the common bond of shared attributes or an all-encompassing collective 
agency. Instead, it is necessary to think of community on the basis of a 
‘common existence’.51 To begin with, for Nancy commonality is common 
and ordinary. This is precisely Nancy’s characteristic way of thinking about 
community. It is based on a concept of communication or ‘sharing-with’ 
that does not represent the exchange or communication of ideas; rather, it 
is conceived as the splitting and fragmentation of bodies.
Nancy’s explication of our social existence in terms of ‘being-with’ 
(Mitsein) will thus show how his approach is able to inspire a philosophy 
of mediality.
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On ‘Sharing’ and ‘Communication’
There are three texts in particular that should be consulted: Corpus, ‘The 
Compearance: From the Existence of “Communism” to the Community of 
“Existence”’, and Being Singular Plural. Nancy’s texts are in no way inferior 
to the cryptic style of Benjamin’s essay on linguistic magic. These texts are 
based not on phenomena but rather linguistic expressions and philosophical 
concepts, and their purpose is to study words themselves. Nancy described 
his method of treating and considering hardly communicable words as 
objects as the signum of a poetic process.52 His philosophy of community 
could also be characterized as a ‘poetry of the common’. His intention to 
distinguish the ordinary and banal aspects of being-together as the matrix 
of the societal is in inverse proportion to his unusual and always artistic/
artif icial diction, with which he then implements this intention.
I will attempt – as mundanely as possible – to reveal Nancy’s philosophy 
of sharing in a more or less consistent sequence of thoughts, and I will begin 
by showing what ‘sharing’ does not mean:
(1) Sharing beyond communication and communal substance: Nancy 
observes that ‘“communicational” ideologies’ can profit from the space left 
behind by the failure of socialism.53 The ideology of communism has been 
replaced with the ideology of communication, in which the now-abandoned 
striving for historical telos, for a target- or goal-oriented notion of human 
affairs, has devolved into the development of ourselves as communicating 
members of a communicating community. Only this telos is not one, for 
‘communication is not an end, at least not in the way we might f irst mean’.54 
In the context of this critical attitude towards communication it becomes 
clear that if Nancy locates sharing at the centre of his idea of community, he 
is not referring to ‘the manner which we today designate as “communica-
tion”’.55 But what is sharing beyond communication?
To begin with, it is clear where the common condition is not to be found: 
it is not a substance, but rather – and this is already no longer entirely so 
clear – it is ‘the lack of a substance which essentially apportions the lack of 
essence’.56 Communication thus does not simply produce community, but 
rather it f irst registers a lack – the absence of a commonly shared substance: 
there is for Nancy no communal entity that consists of having or being 
something in common.
Nancy now maps out – and actually in conflict with Heidegger – three 
modes of ‘commonality’: f irst there is ‘common existence’, in which ‘com-
monality’ is meant in the sense of common or ordinary; then there is ‘the 
common reduction to a common denomination’; and f inally the ‘the condi-
tion of being absolutely in common’, which forms a collective.57 Nancy then 
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eliminates the last two options, insofar as they involve the recognition of 
our sociality or the specif ication of our existence as a ‘We’. For sharing 
constantly presupposes a separation.
(2) Sharing as separation and splitting, the materiality and corporeality 
of the separated: ‘This thought of “sharing” (partition, repartition, part, 
participation, separation, communication, discord, cleavage, devolution, 
destination) has started to unravel.’58 For Nancy, sharing reflects the fact 
that we originate from a state of dissociation without which association is 
inconceivable.59 We are isolated: that is the phenomenon of separation and 
splitting. And yet we still do not lead our lives as individuals: that is the 
phenomenon of sharing. Our existence thus takes the form of a co-existence. 
Nancy consciously plays with the mundane and unpleasant connotations 
of this word ‘co-existence’, in which he perceives an oscillation ‘between 
indifference and resignation’60 that signifies the form of a with-one-another 
(Miteinander) that is imposed rather than sought through extraneous 
circumstances. ‘Co-existence’ signals an extremely weak and perhaps 
even the smallest possible form of a ‘We’. With-one-another is a material 
next-to-one-another: ‘partes extra partes’.61
The fact that with-one-another f irst emerges as a next-to-one-another 
is rooted in the materiality and corporeality of existence: ‘The ontology of 
being-with can only be “materialist” in the sense that “matter” does not 
designate a substance or a subject (or an antisubject), but literally designates 
what is divided of itself, what is only as distinct from itself […] The ontology 
of being-with is an ontology of bodies, of every body, whether they are 
inanimate, animate, sentient, speaking, thinking, having weight, and so 
on.’62 With a peculiar indifference that completely undermines Nancy’s 
initial question concerning the givenness of community, the corporeal is 
described as separated things that exist next to each other and line up piece 
by piece, regardless of whether they are ‘made of stone, wood, plastic, or 
f lesh’.63 Being-with is thus conceived as a ‘being-with-all-things’.64
If sharing presumes separation into co-existing parts and if this 
separation is only possible at all because these parts that exist next to and 
apart from one another are material bodies, then a conceivable prosaic 
perspective has been obtained for the ‘essence’ of sharing. Sharing under 
conditions of separation means connecting, colliding, and making contact 
while being-together. This includes the transfer ‘from one to another’, which 
is not understood as meaning-carrying translation but rather as literal 
‘trans-lation’.65 A distant closeness is thus maintained in the act of shar-
ing. Dialogue loses its emphatic, meaning-saturated orientation towards 
consensus66 and gives way to ‘phantic, insignif icant remarks (“hello,” 
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“hi,” “good”…)’67 in everyday existence. ‘Idle talk’ is thus not opposed to 
the authentic word; meaningless and meaningful words are both forms of 
maintenance that keep the circulation of sharing flowing.
(3) Community as the common in its exteriority: In light of Nancy’s reflec-
tions, therefore, what kind of communality is being outlined? It is a radically 
purified form of communitas. It is no coincidence that the concept of ‘nudity’, 
which appears in many of Nancy’s phrases, becomes a main feature of his 
idea of sociality. Nudity does not refer to particular individuals, but rather 
to the community itself: our history is ‘that of stripping the community 
bare’.68 What becomes apparent about the community in this exposure is 
‘not the revelation of its essence but a stripping down of the “common” in all 
of its forms (the “in-common” and the “banal”), reduced to itself, despoiled 
of transcendence or assumption, despoiled as well of immanence’.69 We 
discover it in ‘the exteriority and its common division’.70 And: ‘what is 
left for us to hold onto is the moment of “exteriority” as being of almost 
essential value, so essential that it would no longer be a matter of relating 
this exteriority to any individual or collective “me” without also unfailingly 
attaining [maintenir] to exteriority itself and as such [l’extériorité elle-même 
et en tant que telle]’.71 This alignment of the common with the external chal-
lenges the emphasis on community as something communally internalized. 
Instead, commonality emerges in a purely external sense through various 
forms of numbers, such as masses, crowds, groups, distances, statistics, and 
enumerations of all kinds. Common causes and shared concerns do not 
(any longer) bind people together. Rather, the simple fact of co-existence, 
the next-to-one-another of different – animate and inanimate – bodies, 
and the vast multitude, which is the only place where individuals can ap-
pear. Nancy outlines – here citing Kant (‘unsocial sociability’) – a vision of 
an ‘asocial society’.72 But Nancy does not diagnose or lament this narrow 
definition of communality as the basis of the social following the failure 
of communist visions with the intention of being critical of society. On the 
contrary: it is precisely this basal and banal appearance as the many that 
necessitates our worldliness, for this co-existing multiplicity is the basic 
structure of the world in its materiality and corporeality. The ‘ego sum’ can 
thus be conceived as an ‘ego cum’.73 Moreover, the ‘ego sum’ becomes a ‘nos 
sumus’,74 insofar as we are only individuals as a multitude. However, this 
means that there is not an ego and an alter ego, there is not the subject and 
the intersubjective, there is not an individual and a society composed of 
individuals; rather, there is only co-existence, ‘co-ipseity’,75 out of whose 
dissociation and fragmentation the individual as such can be conceived. The 
individual emerges through separation, co-existence is a precondition of 
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existence, being-with necessitates the possibility of Dasein. ‘With’ becomes 
a basic constituent of everything that exists. Being is with-one-another.76 
Simultaneity thus becomes the def ining tense.77
I will now draw a preliminary conclusion: my assumption is that the 
‘with’ in Nancy’s philosophy bears a signature that sheds new light on the 
concept of ‘sharing’. Sharing is not oriented towards understanding or 
dialogically shared communication. Rather, sharing can be conceived as 
the soundboard of a primordial separation that precedes everything and – in 
a quasi-transcendental sense – makes it possible that anything exists at all. 
All sharing originates from this prior separation and at the same time bears 
witness to it. But how is this related to the other concept whose revisionary 
light was already anticipated in Nancy’s ‘philosophy of with’: ‘mediation’?
(4) Mediation without mediator: I will refer here to a passage from Being 
Singular Plural, in which the word ‘mediation’ (médiation) is used several 
times, albeit in an extremely cryptic way:
(i) At one point being itself is identif ied as mediation: ‘Being is directly 
and immediately mediated by itself; it is itself mediation; it is mediation 
without any instrument, and it is nondialectic […] negativity without 
use.’78 What does this mean? A preliminary answer is that the concept 
of ‘with’, which is the basic constituent of being as being-with, must be 
understood in a way that precisely does not assume any signif icant dif-
ference between the separated elements or those existing apart. This 
sounds like a philosophy of identity. Nancy also discusses the ‘principle 
of identity, which instantly multiplies’.79 There is therefore not the One 
as distinguished from the Other and between them both the abyss of 
inequality. Simply because everyone is divided and split and separated 
does not mean that everyone repels, negates, and remains mutually inac-
cessible to one another due to differences. Nancy’s thinking here is very 
different from Levinas’s notion of the elusiveness of the other. Must we 
therefore conceive of being-with-one-another not as heterogeneity but 
rather as homogeneity? Is plurality only one modality of unity? Does 
Nancy’s ‘with’ simply refer to synchronicity in multiplicity? Can ‘with’ 
itself be understood as mediation?
(ii) It is precisely these questions that Nancy poses and also aff irms: ‘Is 
mediation itself the “with”? Certainly, it is.’80 If an instrument of media-
tion is not necessary, this is because the being-together of many people 
with-one-another itself already constitutes a – no, the – communality. 
Sociality takes place in and as a mere ‘with’. It is therefore a mistake to 
imagine that mediators, media, and instruments are required in order to 
overcome the primordial separation that dissociates us. The situation is 
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actually the reverse: it is the separation that makes communality itself 
possible; community is being separated into many.
(iii) What this reveals is a ‘mediation without a mediator’.81 Nancy 
distinguishes this form of mediation from the Christian prototype of the 
messenger, or the notion of Christ as a mediator who performs and fulfils his 
function precisely through the fact that he is different from those between 
whom he mediates. For Nancy, there is no room whatsoever for a concept 
of otherness in the plurality of singulars connected by the ‘with’. Here 
we encounter once again the lack of heterogeneity and difference, which 
consequently leads us to the conclusion that in Nancy’s concept of mediation 
there is nothing at all to mediate in the traditional sense.
(iv) This kind of mediation thus turns out to be a milieu: ‘Mediation 
without a mediator mediates nothing: it is the mid-point [mi-lieu], the place 
of sharing and crossing through [passage]; that is, it is place tout court and 
absolutely. Not Christ, but only such a mid-point; and this itself would no 
longer even be the cross, but only the coming across [croisement] and the 
passing through, the intersection and the dispersal [écartement].’82 Nancy’s 
mediation emerges without a medium, and it is precisely for this reason a 
milieu. This is how Nancy’s ontology of ‘with’ offers a new perspective on 
the concept of mediation.
Mediation as Circulation
I will now attempt a concluding image. Like Benjamin, Nancy locates separa-
tion at the centre of sharing. Being separate from one another is thus part 
of the human condition, which raises the question of how mediation is 
conceivable under such conditions. Nancy’s surprising and rather original 
answer is that this being-split does not represent a problem at all. It does 
not denote a lack that needs to be overcome, but rather it constitutes our 
very essence as communal beings. We are only individuals as a collective. We 
should therefore not see this state of separation as dissonance, dissent, or 
difference, but rather we should interpret it within the context of a quasi-
homogenizing and mass dedifferentiating ‘with’. Nancy’s use of the term 
‘with’ thus reveals his philosophically unique way of working on and with 
poetically reif ied concepts.
In the context of the messenger idea mediation should be seen as 
something that connects heterogeneous worlds, but for Nancy the word 
‘mediation’ bears the stamp of homogeneity, alignment, and indifference. 
As a result, his thoughts can be inspiring for the question of how media-
tion between difference people takes place. This homogeneity is easier to 
conceive, not to mention banal, because it consists of nothing but its own 
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actual materiality, corporeality, and exteriority. It is therefore something 
that is separable – meaning separable from something that is dissected, 
that is divided with-one-another and that can also be shared.
Nancy thus transforms the question ‘What is a medium?’ into the 
question ‘Where is a milieu?’ And such a ‘milieu’ can be found wherever a 
being is constituted as being-with or wherever individuals exist as a plural-
ity yet do not need a mediator, because the milieu of ‘with’ represents a 
primordial connection or similarity between the singularities existing 
with-one-another, which consists of the materiality of their corporeality: 
‘the juxtaposition of pure exteriorities’.83 The concept of mediation without 
mediator can thus be conceived as a thoroughly bodily process, for Nancy 
treats the intellect as the punctum, which is extended and therefore not 
separable. ‘Mediation’ must be understood as radically extrinsic, as the 
back-and-forth of circulation itself.84
inTroduc Tions 55
Michel Serres
‘The intermediary writes himself out of the picture. He must not present himself or 
dazzle, or please…or even appear.’ 85
From Walter Benjamin and Jean-Luc Nancy I now turn to Michel Serres. 
This represents a huge leap in terms of disciplinary approaches. While 
Benjamin’s (earlier) work is influenced by metaphysics, linguistic mysticism 
and even revelation theology and while Jean-Luc Nancy dares to surpass 
Heidegger’s ‘Daseinanalysis’ with an innovative new ontological concept 
of ‘Mitsein’, Serres is modestly oriented towards mathematics, structural 
linguistics, and the history of science. And yet there is a point at which the 
ideas of these authors intersect or converge: for all three of them, sharing and 
communication are connected to the same process, which Benjamin calls 
‘translation’, which Nancy calls ‘mediation without mediator’, and which 
Serres calls ‘transmission’. In order to explain this point of intersection, I 
want to reveal why and in what way transmission is so fundamental for 
Michel Serres. I will do this in four steps that outline varying perspectives 
on Serres’s concept of transmission based on texts that correspond to the 
different phases of his work.
An Epistemological Concept of Transmission
In 1961, during the peak of structuralism, Serres wrote two texts that at-
tempted to legitimate the structuralist approach philosophically and situate 
it in the context of intellectual history. Serres thus begins historically: 
since the nineteenth century at the latest, after the classical period, which 
had been oriented towards order, science, and reason, had given way to 
the Romantic period, culture was no longer associated with rationality, 
but rather with symbolism. The distinguishing characteristic of human 
existence was no longer understanding but rather sense. The meaning that 
previously corresponded to the question of truth had shifted to the question 
of sense. ‘Since that time every methodological or critical question involves 
the concept of sense.’86 The language that expressed this sense was not 
organized in words and letters, but rather in ideograms, synthetic paintings, 
and overloaded images.87 And the archetype, which Romanticism derived 
from mythology, became the preferred way of ideogrammatically articulat-
ing the symbolic: Zarathustra, Ariadne, Apollo, Dionysus, Oedipus, Electra, 
etc. represented this cultural content.88 Symbolic analysis thus meant ‘the 
projection of a compactness of sense onto a unique compact archetype, 
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which in turn is situated in a historical origin that is as distant as possible 
(the most archaic)’.89 The archetype thus embodied both the origin and the 
essence of the Romantic conception of the symbolic. In the early twentieth 
century, however, this symbolism underwent a decisive transmutation, 
which – in a way – is linked once again to the classic principles of rational-
ity. The preferred form of articulating the symbolic analysis of culture is 
now no longer archetypes but rather structures.90 While the archetype is 
overloaded with sense, the structure-oriented approach looks to ‘empty 
the form entirely of its sense’ and ‘consider it solely in terms of form’.91 The 
archetype is a form that is saturated with sense, while the structure is a 
form that is entirely purged of sense. The ideography of the archetype is 
thus superseded by the ‘abstract language of structural analysis’, and the 
application of structural analysis becomes a secret code, which reveals that 
‘one best comes to grips with problems of sense when one empties the form 
of its sense’.92 Algebra is the discipline that both def ines and practices the 
idea of structure: ‘Their analyses are genuinely structural.’93 What matters 
most at this point is that it is in this algebraic form that the idea of structure 
f irst assumes a shape that allows it to be transferred as a methodological 
concept in mathematics and science to cultural analysis – just as Lévi-
Strauss did for anthropology and Dumézil did for the history of religion.
But how does sense return once again to form? In structural analysis, 
sense becomes comprehensible as a translation of formal language into 
a concrete model. This translation creates the connection between an 
abstract configuration of signs and its meaning. Such models always exist 
in abundance. ‘Structure is then the formal analogue of all the concrete 
models that it organizes.’94 Sense becomes apperceptible as the realization 
of a structure. For Serres, this relationship between abstract structure 
and concrete model, between an algebraic form and its meaningful con-
f iguration and interpretation, is the methodological basis of any science of 
cultural phenomena. Transmission thereby fuels the process that provides 
the nucleus of a structuralist approach: ‘It is now clear what transmission 
means. A methodological concept that is precisely defined and successfully 
deployed in one particular f ield of knowledge […] is also applied in other 
f ields.’95 Serres is thus concerned with the ‘epistemological meaning of 
transmission’.
To recap briefly: in cultural analysis, access to sense is only possible 
through form (structure), because sense can only be reconstructed as real-
ized form. So the analysis of cultural phenomena – from the structuralist 
perspective at least – is absolutely dependent on the method of transmit-
ting structures. What applies to cultural phenomena ontologically, so to 
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speak, is thus revealed methodologically through cultural analysis. There 
is no sense without transmission. In this perspective, the structuralist 
program championed by Serres proves to be an epistemological version of 
the insight that sensory processes are systematically dependent on modes 
of transmission, the characteristic function of which is precisely to dispense 
sense. But why is sense dependent on transmission? This is immediately 
understandable when it comes to distance communication. For Serres, 
however, the dependence of sense on transmission is not solely restricted 
to telecommunications. Rather, it involves a far more fundamental issue, 
which even applies to intimate conversation. I will thus consider Serres’s 
concept of communication in greater detail.
Communication: No Form without Interference
Communication requires symbolic-technical processes, regardless of 
whether they are ‘natural’, as in the case of language, or artif icial, as in 
the case of writing, print, and telephone: without information channels 
there is no communication.96 Yet something unique is revealed in their use. 
Information channels are realized in a more or less f ixed form, as they are 
designed to allow for the decoding or recognition of information, which is 
conventionalized through the more or less binding def initions prescribed 
for their use. However, the recognition of information only constitutes one 
aspect of the communication process. Information channels also convey 
accidental features, which become visible and operative as the trace of the 
special conditions of their creation. Regardless of whether this is due to the 
individual psyche or the regional culture, or whether it is due to ineptitude 
or passion, the conventionalized form is constantly being deformed through 
the individual conditions of its production. Communication pathologies of 
all kinds modify the channels of information. In writing this could consist of 
falsely placed dashes or orthographic mistakes, in speech this could consist 
of dialects or stammering, in f ilm this could consist of f lickering or lack of 
synchronization, etc. In all of these modifications, the accidental has left its 
mark on the necessary and the unique has left its mark on the conventional. 
In other words, the communicative form is only revealed in conjunction 
with noise, which for Serres ‘is essential to communication’ and cannot be 
eliminated.97 ‘Following scientif ic tradition, let us call noise the set of these 
phenomena of interference that become obstacles to communication.’98 
Every communication is therefore two different things: an ‘essential form’ 
and an ‘accidental noise’.99 If noise is inherent to communication, however, 
dialogue can be interpreted as a game in which the sender and the receiver 
are opposed to a third party who personif ies noise. Serres calls this third 
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party ‘the demon’.100 Every communication thus wears away at the channel’s 
resistance to the accidental or what is mere trace.
At this point Michel Serres presents an analogy. In an effort to separate 
the communicated from noise, the sender and the receiver behave in a 
way that is def initely familiar to all mathematicians and logicians: even 
the symbols used, which originate individually, always bear the traces of 
their unique and thus contingent origin, yet mathematicians and logicians 
handle these symbols in a way that is specif ically designed to remove this 
accidental individuality. They are no longer concerned with concrete, 
empirical symbols but rather with a class of objects (in Tarski’s sense) or a 
symbol type, whose realization is considered to be a token symbol situated 
in space-time. The mathematical use of symbols is thus based on the exclu-
sion of the empirical aspects of symbols as well as the underlying cause 
of these empirical aspects, as ‘no graph is strictly of the same form as any 
other’.101 This constitutes precisely ‘the f irst movement of mathematization, 
of formalization’, which is also the basis of structuralism.
It thus became apparent to Serres that there was a close resemblance 
between communication in general and mathematization in particular: 
‘The condition of the apprehension of the abstract form’ is at the same time 
‘the condition of the success of communication’.102 Just as communication 
attempted to exclude noise in order to make mutual understanding at all 
possible, mathematics attempted to abstract the sensual and empirical 
aspects of the symbol event so that it could refer to a universal symbol type.
There are many critical objections to this view of communication. It 
fundamentally fails to recognize how in each case the contingent trace of 
the symbol in our lifeworld is signif icant for that which is communicated. 
From the perspective of performativity, the concrete, singular execution of 
the communication act can be thematized as a source of meaning. Neverthe-
less, Serres’s structuralist view of communication reveals a dimension – and 
this is the point – that is illuminating. In the context of this approach, 
communication requires the ‘separation’ of meaning and interference: 
the necessary aspects of the symbol event must be distinguished from its 
accidental aspects, and its general features must be distinguished from 
its singular features. In this respect, formal processes, which become a 
special practice in mathematics and logic and thereby experience a radical 
stylization, constitute a dimension of every use of symbols that cannot be 
eliminated. The structuralist approach to symbols is even what makes 
it possible at all to separate symbol and noise, content and interference. 
Structures are transmitted, but in the course of their transmission these 
structures are inevitably influenced; they erode. In light of this inevitability, 
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the strategy of transmission consists in minimizing the erosion of order. 
‘Transmission’ is thus an operation that stabilizes and preserves the demar-
cation line between form and deformation. It involves not merely preserving 
an internal order against external interference, but rather more subtly 
maintaining the border between order and disorder (which is a dimension 
of order itself) in the ‘transmission substrate’. I will now draw a tentative 
conclusion, which will admittedly become clearer in the following section: 
the medium is the device that makes transmission possible by enabling 
distinctions between structure and interference, meaning and noise, form 
and deformation. And this is successful insofar as media themselves are 
designed to recede and become invisible at the very moment their messages 
are revealed. This disappearance of the transmission event behind the 
transmitted, or the disappearance of the communicator behind what is 
communicated, is pivotal to a later work by Serres, to which I now turn.
The Disappearance of the Messengers
It involves the 1993 text La légende des anges, in which the post-structuralist 
Serres actually incorporates the considerations of the structuralist Serres 
but also modif ies and transcends them in signif icant ways. Angels: A 
Modern Myth is not an academic text, but rather it is a work of literature 
and philosophy as well as a showroom for artistic and technical images: it is 
written as a dialogue between a female doctor at an airport hospital and a 
manager working for Air France, and at the same time it is also arranged as a 
‘dialogue’ between image and text. This dialogue concerns angels, which, as 
(mostly) invisible messengers, become allegories and symbols of transmis-
sion, exchange, and communication between distant worlds. For Serres, the 
angel represents the archetype for a universe of communication in which it 
is not enough to simply bridge distances; rather, transmission must succeed 
between worlds that are entirely different from one another. Serres suggests 
that the modern information society, with its technical networks, can be 
considered an objectif ication of this transmission archetype: the ancient 
god Hermes and the Christian angel live on in global computer networks.
Serres originally distinguished between a symbolic analysis of culture 
that assumes a Romantic attitude based on sensually overloaded arche-
types and one that assumes a classical attitude based on sensually purged 
structures.103 His 1993 text can be interpreted as a synthesis of both these 
approaches, as it examines the structures of transmission that def ine our 
age using of all things the archetype of the angel, which can be considered 
the incarnation of ‘transmissions of every kind’.104 Serres challenges the 
reader to learn ‘why it was that, in talking of angels, we had a wonderful 
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paradigm for talking about men and things’, and he goes on: ‘certain sche-
mas stay with us’.105 The f igure of the angel can be understood as the code, 
key, and symbol of a model. What constitutes the weave of this model? In 
other words: how does the angel model help to explicate the concept of 
transmission? It comes down to four points:
(1) Angels do not create, but rather transmit: ‘The act of transmission in 
itself cannot create!’106 Serres thus distinguishes clearly between transmission 
and production, though they are – albeit temporarily – closely connected. 
Transmission must be conceived here as a process whose goal is incarnation. 
A paradigmatic example is the Annunciation, perhaps the most frequently 
painted Christian scene in Western culture: the angel’s mission is fulf illed 
and ‘the end of the reign of angels sounds’107 as soon as God’s word becomes 
flesh in Mary’s body.108 ‘Angels […] transmit […] When these messengers 
finally fall silent, the Word becomes flesh. The true messages are human flesh 
itself. Meaning is the body.’109 For Serres, therefore, the goal of transmission 
is materialization or reif ication: to ‘create’ is to ‘make meaning with flesh, 
or make flesh with the Word’.110 For Serres, creation is synonymous with 
incarnation in a double sense, as something immaterial materializes and is 
incorporated into something else. And although it is not corporeal, transmis-
sion through angels is what makes this incarnation possible in the first place. 
Transmission increases productivity without itself being productive.
(2) Angels are invisible, for the meaning of the message depends on the 
disappearance of the messenger.111 The messenger ‘must also disappear, or 
write himself out of the picture, in order that the recipient hear the words 
of the person who sent the message, and not the messenger’.112 If the goal of 
creation is incarnation, then transmission is based on a kind of disembodi-
ment: ‘The body of the messenger appears or vanishes. The intermediary 
writes himself out of the picture. He must not present himself, or dazzle, 
or please…or even appear. That’s why we don’t see angels.’113 But isn’t the 
invisibility of the messenger somewhat paradoxical? The angel must appear 
in order to become a messenger for someone, yet it also disappears? What 
is it that appears when the angel speaks? Serres recalls the sixth chapter of 
the Book of Judges: when Gideon addresses the angel of the lord, the angel 
does not respond but rather God himself speaks to him.114 What appears is 
not the transmitter, therefore, but rather that which is transmitted on behalf 
of someone else, for the ‘f irst duties of the transporter’ are to ‘withdraw’ 
and ‘step aside’.115 The embodiment of the message is only made possible 
through the disembodiment of the messenger. The disappearance of the 
messenger in the media function is thus also seamlessly interwoven with 
the topos of the dying messenger.116
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(3) The cherubim – a special class of angels – function as ‘exchangers’ 
between two worlds. Serres’s allegory not only applies to the kind of transmis-
sion that bridges spatial distances. Even more essential is the fact that it 
involves mediation between extremely different kinds of worlds. It thus 
privileges the work of the ‘exchangers’ or distributors. In the realm of angels 
they appear as the human-animal hybrids of the cherubim: ‘Angels trans-
port messages […] but cherubim are amphibious and embody a connection 
between two worlds.’117 And: ‘These days, unless we have these amphibious 
keys […] how can we hope to make anything function at all? […] [S]emi-
conductors, inverters, transformers, commutators, rectif iers, transistors, 
silicon chips, microprocessors.’118 The ‘interchanger provides a key for us to 
pass between two worlds’, as they combine a variety of mediators.119 Unlike 
the ‘messenger-angels’, the cherubim do not connect stations, but rather 
entire networks.120 They can do this because they have ‘two bodies’,121 and 
therefore they participate in the worlds between which they communicate 
and mediate in an entirely material sense as hybrids.
(4) Ethics of mediality, ‘deontology of the messenger’: the messenger’s 
principle function of disappearing for the benefit of the message is based 
on a deontology of the mediator or a kind of ‘law’ of transmission.122 ‘If the 
transmitter does his job properly, he disappears. A true transmission is 
characterized by elimination, a false one by presence.’123 A transmission 
goes astray as soon as the transmitter obscures the message, comes to the 
fore and becomes the meaning of the message itself,124 thus arrogating an 
authority to itself that it actually only ‘represents’.125 For ‘if the messenger 
gets pleasure, the transmission becomes obstructed’.126 When the moderator 
is admired, it threatens to derail communication and transmission. This is 
how the ‘misuse’ of the transmission function is registered, which provides 
a criterion for the ethics of withdrawal.
The Reverse Side of the Exchange: The Parasite
At this point I want to go back to another text by Serres: La Parasite, which 
was published in 1980. Everything developed up to now suggests that media-
tors, which ensure that something ‘f lows’ between two different worlds, 
are the hinges of a connection that is informed by the ‘logic’ of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity, equivalence, balance, and equilibrium seem to be the attributes 
that fulf il the exchange function of the mediator. However, reality looks 
– for Serres – completely different. The global f low of information ends in 
disparity, inequality, imbalance, and disequilibrium. This is also how Serres 
basically formulates the reciprocal, two-dimensional exchange between 
systems, people, and worlds: for him, the f igure of the angel is inconceivable 
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without its counterpart in the parasite: ‘The parasite is a creature which 
feeds on another, but gives nothing in return. There’s no exchange […] there’s 
no reciprocity in the relationship, which is one-dimensional.’127 According to 
Serres’s understanding of the term, the parasite does not simply constitute 
the opposite of exchange, but rather it is an ineliminable dimension of 
exchange. Just as there is no structure without disorder, there is no exchange 
with the parasite. The angel and the parasite not only complement each 
other; rather, to be more precise, it is necessary to recognize that one-
sidedness and non-reciprocity are inherent to two-sidedness and reciprocity 
and even constitute their reverse side.
The parasite is therefore not a peripheral f igure, but rather it lies at the 
very core of ‘intersubjectivity’ and can be conceived as sociality. According 
to Serres, the ‘parasitic relationship’ is ‘the atomic form of our relations’.128 
And it appears whenever there is an exchange between disparate worlds. 
Parasitism ‘switches the changes between what is not equivalent’129 by mak-
ing them equivalent. Parasitism ‘is thus the most general equivaluator’.130 I 
will return to this idea in a later chapter about money as a medium.
Is it blasphemous to view the angel of the Annunciation, as soon as it 
fulf illed its task of implanting the divine in Mary’s body, as establishing 
and embodying a parasitic relationship between God and Mary? And does 
this mean that the communication instituted by angels is not as abysmally 
one-sided as the word of God?
In any case, parasitism constitutes the reverse side of exchange. Ac-
cording to Serres, this ambivalence is fundamental to all transmissions. 
There is no reciprocity without the implantation of one-sidedness. If this 
one-sidedness is dismissed, reciprocity becomes an illusion. Social relations 
are parasitic.
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Régis Debray: Mediological Materialism131
‘All indications are that the human miracle consists in making meaning material.’ 132
‘Only bodies can deliver the message.’ 133
The notion that communication constitutes the foundation of society 
and culture has become a truism of contemporary analysis. Nevertheless, 
Debray’s mediology argues that transmission rather than communica-
tion must be recognized as the true force shaping society and culture. 
Unlike communication, transmission does not depend on the ‘illusion of 
immediacy’, but rather it obviously requires media and mediatized bodies.134 
Reflecting on transmission can also shed light on communication, though 
the opposite is not true.
Culture and the Art of Transmission
According to Régis Debray, the origin of culture emerges from the spirit 
of transmission. The ‘art of transmission’ and the ‘making of culture’ thus 
become synonymous. But how is this plausible?
To begin with a religious image: the immediacy of our relationship to 
the world was lost with the ‘exile from paradise’. Mediation has been our 
fate ever since.135 However, mediation is essentially a transmission process, 
and for Debray ‘transmission’ means not simply transportation, but rather 
the transformation of what is transmitted. That which is transmitted does 
not simply precede transmission, but rather it is simultaneously created in 
the act of transmission. In order to understand cultural productivity, the 
process of instrumentally producing something is less important than the 
process of mediating between something. But how can this ‘mediation’ be 
described and understood? For Debray, the answer to this question is ‘medi-
ology’. This term avoids a technicistic reduction of the medial as well as its 
hypostatization into an autonomous agent or even its absolutization into a 
methodological a priori. This is not the place for an extensive theoretical and 
critical discussion of mediology. What matters most is how the assumption 
of a convergence of culture and transmission is plausible and what role 
Debray’s materialistic approach plays in the description of ‘mediation’. This 
‘mediological materialism’, which becomes a wellspring of ideas, can also 
be groundbreaking for my project of rehabilitating transmission.
How is it that Christianity can refer to statements made by Jesus of 
Nazareth 2000 years ago? How is it that the music of Johann Sebastian 
Bach can still be heard today and his musical ideas can still influence us? 
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The ready availability of a cultural inheritance is so self-evident to us that 
we are hardly conscious of the complexity of the transmission methods 
necessary for this succession to take place. Human beings are entities who 
not only leave traces behind as a result of their activity, but who also record, 
archive, circulate, and thereby transform traces.136 The trace, in which the 
material and the immaterial intersect, is interesting here because for Debray 
meanings and ideas are only transmissible by virtue of their materializa-
tion: the miracle and enduring fascination of human existence does not 
consist in its ability to ‘mentalize’ but rather to ‘materialize’.137 Ideas can 
only be removed from their authors and made to survive because they 
are embodied in manageable, transferable, and circulatable objects: the 
dynamics of thought are thus inseparable from the physics of the trace.138
Debray conceives of the materiality of the trace as the interaction be-
tween organized matter and materialized organization.139 And instances 
of transmission crystallize in this interaction. The religion and theology 
of Christianity is impossible without the organization of the church, just 
as Bach’s music is inseparable from the networks of music distribution 
and the ingenuity of his performers. Materiality is the joining of objects, 
which incarnate ideas, and organization, which materializes them, and 
this union is inconceivable without the activity of mediators. Mediological 
materialism thus focuses not only works and objects, but rather on the 
activity of transmission.140
Materialization: The Reversal of Perspective
What does it mean to understand transmission as mediation? The f irst step 
is to understand Debray’s idea of transmission as materialization.
Culture is usually associated with the domain of the symbolic. Whenever 
we behave as if phenomena ‘have’ a meaning for us, we experience our world 
as a world of culture. According to the logic of this symbolically constituted 
relationship to the world, things and objects are considered to be surfaces 
whose deep structures constantly need to be revealed. When something 
functions as a sign for something else, it possesses only a transitory ma-
teriality and its opaque objectivity is left behind in favour of something 
nonsensual that is simply represented in the sign. The emergence of ‘cultural 
matter’, which simultaneously evokes a tendency towards immateriality 
and abstraction, thus results in a process of disembodiment that is opposed 
to the sensual. The usual cultural-semiological approach thus points from 
the material towards the non-material.
Debray’s primary concern is the reversal of this direction. Is it not true 
that our ability to materialize and concretize the immaterial and the 
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abstract is much more basic than our competence with immaterializa-
tion and abstraction? What is most important for cultural creativity is not 
simply the ability to distil ideas and meanings, but rather to embody the 
ideal and the meaningful and thus make possible a somatization of the 
senses, a concretization of the abstract, an incarnation of the intellect. 
The mediological perspective leads from the idea to its objectif ication and 
reif ication: Debray thus begins where traditional symbolic-hermeneutical 
analysis ends. The result of this reversal of perspective is an altered view of 
the ideal. In the traditional semiological approach the ideal exists behind 
the material; the material signif ier functions as a sign that stands for the 
signif ied – and thereby becomes transparent – but it is not the signif ied. 
However, when the material is conceived as materialization, then the ideal 
exists not beyond but rather in the material. The concept of materialization 
thus shows that the corporeal and the intellectual are no longer disjointed; 
rather, the intellectual exists in the form of the corporeal.
What Debray achieves with this approach is that he does not need to pit 
matter against ideas, as Kittler does with his strained media-technological 
approach, but rather he is able to trace the interconnection of both. Wherever 
culture is found there is obviously both and – if you will – the traditional, 
hermeneutic-semiological dematerialization, which proceeds from the 
tangible to the intangible, is thereby put in its relatively proper place. The 
funny thing about this mediological reversal, which consists in transform-
ing things and objects into ideas, is precisely that it thematizes a movement 
that lies at the heart of any transmission and even constitutes its very logic. 
To transmit something means to embody the immaterial.141
A misunderstanding of this incorporation approach immediately sug-
gests itself: must it not be accepted that ideas precede their materialization, 
so when one speaks of the ‘materialization of an idea’ the primacy of the 
ideal is thereby nevertheless restored? This question leads to a conceptual 
hinge of the mediological concept of transmission. The ingenuity as well as 
the diff iculty of this concept lies in the fact that the immaterial is actually 
created by the mechanism of its embodiment: ‘The object transmitted does 
not preexist the process of its transmission.’142
How is this possible? Debray provides the answer to this question with 
his concept of the dual character of materiality: it is technological and 
sociological, material and organizational, medial and institutional, in short: 
‘organized matter’ and ‘materialized organization’.143
The Christian religion always serves as a reference point for Debray: 
the idea of the ‘resurrection of Jesus’ can be explained psychologically 
out of the disciples’ sorrow over his irretrievable loss. However, the fact 
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to be explained is not whether such a resurrection actually took place, 
but rather how such a belief could be preserved for centuries in Christian 
congregations. This cannot be explained without taking into account the 
networks of Christianity, in whose chain of transmission Paul became a key 
f igure. Paul never met Jesus personally, yet he saw the resurrected Jesus on 
the road to Damascus. What he saw thus embodied what he believed, and 
Paul subsequently became an apostle or mediator. He was subjected to a 
radical metamorphosis that transformed him from the Jewish Saul into the 
Christian Paul, and this metamorphosis in turn led to the conversion of 
others. As a convert and missionary he established Christianity as a church 
and became part of a chain that continuously reproduces embodiments over 
time, which naturally includes texts, relics, and practices as incarnations 
of Christian ideas. In this sense, it is the institution of the church that f irst 
made ‘Christ’ out of Jesus of Nazareth.144
Mediation
So what does it mean to be a ‘mediator’? I will begin with a distinction that 
is pivotal for Debray: it does not involve ‘media’ but rather ‘mediations’. 
Debray’s concept of media already incorporates a systematic perspectives 
insofar as the term ‘medium’ refers to the interaction between (i) symboliza-
tion procedures, like words, writing, and images, (ii) communication codes, 
like English or German, (iii) inscription materials and storage devices, like 
papyrus, magnetic tape, and monitors, and (iv) recording dispositifs as 
dissemination networks like the printing press, television, and informat-
ics.145 Nevertheless, this is only one side of the ‘program’ of mediological 
circulation, for media are a necessary but not suff icient condition for such 
circulation.146 The other side consists of the environment or milieu. Only 
the causal circularity between medium and milieu can become a source 
of cultural dynamics. Only this socio-technical complex of medium and 
milieu constitutes the historical object of mediology, which avoids an over-
emphasis on the medium as well as an underestimation of the milieu.147 
The distinction between medium and milieu thus makes sense precisely 
because it focuses on the intersection of both sides, which can only become 
culturally productive through this interaction. What applies to mediology 
in general also pertains to the mediator in particular. The mediator must 
be conceived as a f igure at the intersection between the material and the 
immaterial.
A further distinction becomes relevant here: for Debray, the mediator 
is precisely not a messenger, but rather it displaces and replaces the mes-
senger.148 How so? Debray recalls Michel Serres’s commentary on Lauretti 
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Tommaso’s The Triumph of Christianity149: the crucif ied Christ, the mediator 
between God and humankind, is ‘enthroned’ over the smashed statue of 
Hermes, the messenger of the gods. For Debray, this fresco becomes a symbol 
of his concept of ‘transmission through embodiment’: the Christian media-
tor is not an ethereal f igure, but rather it is radically subject to the forces 
of gravity; Christ has no wings to f ly away from the cross. Embodiment 
therefore does not mean glory, but rather affliction, suffering, and expul-
sion. In Christian mediation it is literally conceived as incarnation, which 
represents a condensed symbol of a universal law of mediation: it is bodies, 
not spirits, that transmit messages.150
However, there is yet another aspect that goes together with the gravita-
tional force of embodiment. According to Christian mediology, the mediator 
disappears behind its message. Consider, for example, the angel of the 
Annunciation. It conveys the impression of immediacy, it strives to leave no 
traces of the transmission behind, and it thus aims for a traceless, ethereal 
transparency.151 The more essential the materiality of transmission is, the 
more the mediator strives for immateriality.152
The materialization of transmission thus corresponds to the immateri-
alization of the transmitter. But therein lies a problem. If the good mediator 
is the one that makes itself invisible in the transmission event, and if this 
striving for transparency is a function of all mediators, then the possibility 
of obstruction is also inherent in this functional principle. Mediators may 
no longer be prepared to stand aside. What does it mean if the angel proves 
to be a demon? This risk is inherent in every mediation.153 Demonology is 
therefore only the flip side of angelology.
I will return to the f igure of the angel later, but for now it should be clear 
that ‘perverseness’, misuse, and interference are always inherent to the 
process of transmission precisely because it is corporeal.
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John Durham Peters
‘Communication as a person-to-person activity became thinkable only in the 
shadow of mediated communication. Mass communication came first.’ 154
A study of communication could hardly begin in a more provocative way: 
the key to understanding ‘communication’ is not conversation, dialogue, 
or two-way communication between people, but rather mass commu-
nication or the non-reciprocal dissemination of a message to countless 
anonymous recipients, who can – but are not required to – receive this 
message in their own way. This is the basic thesis of John Durham Peters’s 
Speaking into the Air.155 This notion would be perfectly appropriate for 
a study devoted to the phenomenon of mass communication, but for a 
text that wants to treat the ‘problem of communication’ from a more 
general, philosophical, and historically sweeping perspective such a 
privileging of distance communication is unusual and intellectually 
provocative. It is provocative because it challenges our usual image of 
communication, which ennobles dialogue as the unconditional model of 
successful communication and intersubjective connection. For Peters, 
however, distance communication does not represent a particular type 
of communication, but rather an alternative to the dialogue model that 
is of equal value. Moreover, it reveals that the opposite of dialogue is 
already implicit in dialogue itself in the form of dissemination. This is 
revealed when people become aware of how much they (must) remain 
foreign to one another in their own inner worlds. In personal encounters 
they do not meet people they can freely understand or even identify, but 
rather these people are and always remain other. This approach, which 
is inspired by the constitutive inaccessibility of the communicants to 
one another, thus leads to an ethical appeal: we should not expect the 
people with whom we communicate to adapt to the matrix of our own 
understanding, but rather we should respect their otherness and thereby 
encounter them with love. The problem of communicative understanding 
thus proves to be a political or ethical problem rather than a semantic 
problem.156 If a metaphor is permitted here, it could be said that John 
Durham Peters is the ‘Levinas of communication theory’. In the following, 
however, I will not focus on this ethical dimension but rather on the 




There is a key scene from which this reconstruction can proceed157: in a 
lecture circa 1873 James Clerk Maxwell demonstrated the phenomenon of 
‘action at a distance’.158 By pressing two lenses on top of one another, shining a 
light through them, and then projecting the resulting light effects on a screen, 
Maxwell was able to demonstrate that there was an optical interference 
between the lenses, but a distance between both lenses remained – even 
when the lenses could no longer be separated from one another – and he 
concluded that it was impossible to eliminate the distance between the lenses 
(this distance could even be calculated using light rings and their colours). 
Maxwell thus demonstrated a reciprocal action without physical contact.
For Peters, this experiment serves as a theoretical metaphor for com-
munication in two ways: either it qualif ies as a positive confirmation that a 
communicative interrelation can dispense with physical touch and interac-
tion, which implies that what actually interacts can only be found in the soul, 
mind, understanding, or senses (what is exchanged through communication 
is something ‘spiritual’, cleansed of bodily f ilth), or – in opposition to this 
spiritualistic pathos – the experiment demonstrates that the phenomenon 
of making contact or even touching is illusory due to the limitations of 
our senses, which are not able (or willing) to recognize the distance – in a 
corporeal as well as intellectual sense. If that is the case, however, then the 
problem of communication does not begin when communicating across 
spatial distances: ‘The problem of communication becomes […] one of 
making contact with the person sitting next to you.’159 It is thus clear which 
interpretation Peters wants to follow: regardless of the degree of mediation, 
communication always involves distances, especially in the close proximity 
of personal conversation. In other words, the problem of communication is 
rooted in the unbridgeable divide between the self and the other.
But how is communication nevertheless possible under these conditions? 
Peters’s answer is that it is necessary to recognize the illusory dimensions 
of the idea of reciprocal dialogue and at the same time acknowledge that 
non-reciprocal, non-dialogical dissemination – understood as sending, 
scattering, sowing – provides a model of communication that should taken 
seriously. I will now attempt to recap what this means in three steps.
Dialogue and Dissemination
Isn’t there something tyrannical about the celebration of dialogue, especially 
when its goal is to promote the concept of reciprocal speech acts between 
communicants who are unified through their physical co-presence? Doesn’t 
the emphasis on dialogue result in the stigmatization and misunderstanding 
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of the culture-endowing meaning of countless practices that are based on 
the use of language but are far from dyadic and reciprocal?160 Doesn’t our 
cultural life depend as much on non-reciprocal forms of action and ritual 
performance as on the reciprocity of dialogue? ‘Reciprocity can be violent as 
well as fair’, Peters notes laconically.161 Imagine if life and social relations were 
only guided by reciprocity: wouldn’t this result in and amount to nothing 
more than a monotonous cycle of ‘quid pro quo’?162 Isn’t it even characteristic 
of mortal beings that we are not able to return everything we have received?
This ‘blow to non-reciprocity’163 constitutes the conceptual framework 
through which Peters explains the difference between dialogue and 
dissemination, and he refers to two people as symbols of this difference: 
Socrates and Jesus. They are both martyrs and moreover models for the 
Western self-conception of morality, but above all they represent alternative 
modes of communication.
Based on an analysis of Plato’s Phaedrus, Peters claims that for Socrates 
speech is a kind of erotic encounter: it is specif ically directed towards a 
particular individual recipient, and it attempts to establish an intellectual 
union: a shared insight, a common grasp of language and a reciprocal 
understanding thus constitute only the f lipside of a mutual desire.164 This 
makes dialogue an intimate as well as a unique event. It is therefore only 
logical that the interference of a medium like writing threatens, if not com-
pletely precludes, the intimacy and eros of the dialogical when it exceeds 
its function as a mnemonic device and has communicative aspirations 
instead. The discursive approach of Jesus of Nazareth, as it is passed down 
in the gospels, appears to be so entirely different that it is practically the 
antithesis of Socratic dialogue. Jesus is engaged in dissemination: the send-
ing of a text that is no longer selectively directed to particular individual 
receivers. Jesus describes the mode of his speeches through a parable165: the 
sower casts seeds, a few of which fall on good, fertile soil and a few of which 
dry up on infertile soil. The speaker no longer has control over the effects 
of his speech, but rather the responsibility now lies with the receivers. He 
who has ears to hear, hears, and he who does not have them, fails to hear.
Socrates’s ‘fertile coupling’ thus stands in opposition to Jesus’s ‘spilled 
seed’.166 Plato’s esoteric mode of reciprocal communication, which is al-
ways only aimed at selected addressees and places the responsibility for 
the speech on the speaker, entirely contradicts Jesus’s exoteric mode of 
asymmetrical public speech, in which reciprocity is suspended and the ef-
fectiveness of the speech ultimately depends on the recipients’ own activity.
Peters is not concerned with the historical accuracy of his interpretation 
of this binary configuration; rather, he wants to present another perspective 
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on ‘broadcasting’, or the transmission of a message, using ‘sowing’ as a 
model: ‘There is […] no indignity or paradox in one-way communication.’167 
By addressing a uniform message to a diversif ied, anonymous audience, 
dissemination effectively suspends dialogicity, which Peters presents as 
a productive, culture-endowing dimension of human communication. It 
is productive because it provides an answer to the ‘morally intractable 
condition of plurality’: we can live together with people whose personal 
perspectives remain hidden and are never identical to our own.168
The Insight Potential of Media
The Socratic model of individualized two-way speech reflected a desire for 
communication based on disembodied, immaterial, intellectual contact, 
which has become an enduring part of the history of communication in 
the Western world. Speech, bodies, media are thus demoted to the rank of 
mere vehicles, and moreover they fall under suspicion as the root cause of 
all communication problems: if people could penetrate the corporeal and 
see directly into the inner world of the other, then communication would 
be truly unambiguous. Peters refers to this dream of a bodiless union in 
the spirit as the ‘spiritualist tradition’, and he shows how this idea can be 
found in the philosophically demanding considerations of Augustine and 
Locke, the Romanticizations of ‘animal magnetism’ and mesmerism in the 
nineteenth century, and the visions of ‘telepathic’ contact and influence 
from psyche to psyche, which were bolstered by the discovery of electricity.
The paradox of the spiritualist tradition is that the media it exposed made 
this ‘disembodiment’ possible in the first place, and this in turn constitutes 
the phantasm of the tradition. The media actually achieve this in a way that 
demonstrates and reveals the disseminative, non-reciprocal pull against the 
dialogical. For Peters, the dialogical ideal of two-way speech in the living pres-
ence of the interlocutors is always already interrupted and subverted through 
a telos of asymmetrical references, whether in the form of communication 
with God, with the dead, with the absent, with animals or artificial creatures, 
which in our culture is no less practically effective. In addition to literature and 
philosophy, which repeatedly express and reflect on the problems of dialogi-
cal communication, it is the development of media that reveals the degree 
to which dialogue itself is already based on a suspension of the dialogical. 
Technical media do not simply distort communication, but rather they shed light 
upon it. This insight potential, which is inherent to the development of media, 
consists in revealing and bringing to light the problems that are implicit in the 
dialogical. Media make manifest and apparent the often latent configurations 
that are part of any communication. I will explain what this means using two 
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examples: the telephone, which enables the extrapolation of dialogue across 
spatial distances, and the radio, which technically radicalizes dissemination.
Telephone
Is a telephone conversation a dialogue? Even though the genesis of the 
telephone was not originally point-to-point communication, but rather the 
‘party line’,169 it is taken for granted today that the telephone is an obvious 
extension of conversation in situations of bodily absence. Unlike radio or 
television, which are directed towards a dispersed public, the telephone – at 
least since the technical substitution of switchboard operators170 – offers an 
intimate connection between the caller and the receiver that is confidential 
and inaccessible to the public.171
Isn’t the interaction of telephone voices in a state of personal absence 
thus an incarnation of the spiritualist vision of bodiless communication? It 
certainly is, but at the same time it also embodies the disruptions that reveal 
the non-dialogical aspects of dialogue. Telephoning without a partner who 
agrees to be phoned is undeniably impossible, yet in the process of telephon-
ing the ‘one-dimensionality’ of this communicative two-sidedness becomes 
very evident: ‘Two one-sided conversations that couple only in virtual space: 
This is the nature of speech on telephone.’172 The activity is one-sided and 
depends on the caller, who disturbs the receiver’s situation and environ-
ment without displaying the kind of consideration that Socrates claimed 
was necessary for a successful conversation.173 The receiver’s freedom and 
autarchy lies ‘only’ in the possibility of hanging up. But how liberating is 
this act if the phone rings again? How nerve-shattering is the resignation 
to pick up the phone? For Peters this tyranny, which always neglects the 
individuality of the other, becomes in a sublime way the compulsion to 
talk and talk back, but it can also escalate to terror when the call does 
not communicate a voice but rather only silence. Is there anything more 
uncanny or frightening than a call that does not transport words but rather 
only breath?
The dialogical presumes that personality can be individuated, but this 
individuation constitutes precisely the obstacle of communication ‘with-
out bodies’. The telephone apparatus suspends – at least potentially – the 
identif iability of the speakers and requires culturally varying practices of 
personal identif ication. This easing of personal accountability makes the 
telephone – despite its interactive dimension – more like writing.174 And just 
as the monological character of writing already poses the question of range 
and limits, so too does telephone communication become a metaphor for 
the question: ‘Is communication anything but overlapping monologues?’175
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Radio
The ontology of the radio signal is curious: no matter where we are, we are 
always surrounded by streams of strange voices that remain inaudible as 
long as we do not have a ‘receiver’, or technically aided ‘ears’, to hear. And 
if we have a receiver, it always combines the f lashes of pure voices and 
sounds transmitted by senders – in the case of analog radio at least – with 
the decentring noise of the invisible worlds around us, the murmuring of the 
universe; in short, a ‘celestial caterwauling’.176 Hardly any medium provides 
an experience that can seem as ethereal as that of a wireless epiphany of 
voices with the aid of electromagnetic waves.
The radio is thus logically a public medium that transmits to everyone, 
although its omnipresence was originally perceived as a defect and an 
obstacle. It appeared to be a problem that ‘radio telephone messages can 
never be secret’.177 As with phonographs, the invention of radio was originally 
guided by the technical extrapolation of dialogue between individuals, 
and the potential of dissemination was only gradually discovered.178 This 
discovery is related to the realization that there is a difference between a 
mediator (‘common carrier’) and a radio transmitter: while the transporter 
of a message remains blind to its content but accurately reaches its intended 
addressees, the transmitter remains indifferent towards the receivers but 
bears responsibility for what is transmitted.179 Peters recalls the agricultural 
origins of the word ‘broadcasting’: the scattering of seeds.180 The relationship 
between the listener and the radio is equally as loose. Radio is known as the 
classic ‘background medium’ because concentrated attention is not neces-
sary at all. Isn’t the radio announcer to a certain extent in the situation of 
speaking with the dead? Doesn’t the radio studio – Peters asks – resemble 
the scenario of idealistic philosophy: ‘communicating deaf and blind through 
impermeable walls’?181 The desire to compensate for the distance between the 
radio transmitter and the audience and the impossibility of interaction thus 
becomes the driving impulse of radio communication. How can a connection 
be established with absent listeners? A wide range of new discursive strategies 
were developed, which enabled intimacy, authenticity, and contact across 
distances, thereby transforming the anonymity of a disinterested audience 
into a community of participating listeners: ‘Radio audiences were distinctly 
“consociate” rather than “congregate” assemblies: united in imagination, not 
in location.’182 One of the main ways of positioning radio between ‘dead’ and 
‘alive’ and transforming listeners into witnesses became the live broadcasts, 
which brought temporality and contingency back to radio communication 
and transformed the audience into a community of living ear-witnesses to an 
actual event.183 Adorno feared and condemned this possibility. His resistance 
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to radio as a fetishizing and retarding medium of mass communication is 
actually historically understandable in the context of fascism as a ‘com-
munity of listeners’,184 yet Adorno does not do justice to the medium itself.185 
Robert Merton comes much closer to understanding the culture-endowing 
potential of radio,186 as he recognizes that listening to live broadcasts can be 
a ritual act that produces a social body for which individual interaction is 
no longer necessary.187 Adorno’s critique can be attributed to the unbroken 
ideal image of individualizing dialogue, which he sees as being corrupted 
by radio. In order to return to the key scene of Maxwell’s experiment with 
the two lenses that interact without contact: Adorno only sees that mass 
communication cannot bridge the distances between individuals, while 
Merton recognizes that communal actions are possible across distances.188 
However, this means that relationships and communities are formed not only 
through the reciprocity of dialogical speech, but also through disseminative 
speech. It also suggests that the bonding force of speech might already begin 
much more fundamentally with the ‘salutation’.
Dialogue as Dissemination
Peters deprivileges dialogue as the ideal form of communication. A conver-
sation that takes place in the close proximity of an interacting encounter is 
no less affected by the problems of communication than communication 
across distances: ‘[F]ace-to-face talk is as laced with gaps as distant com-
munication.’189 Couldn’t dialogue thus be seen as two people ‘taking turns 
broadcasting at each other’?190 Dialogue and dissemination then become 
indistinguishable.191 In the context of this disseminative inf iltration of 
dialogue, the listener or receiver is structurally more important. This is 
the point of the emphasis on dissemination for communication theory: 
it is no longer the speaker but rather the listener who is ‘boss’. For Peters, 
the increased signif icance of the recipient made Peirce’s semiotic theory 
unmistakably clear: no communication from one person to another can ever 
be definitive,192 as it is always complemented by the listener.193 However, this 
listener does not share the inner world of the speaker. Communication is 
therefore less like an encounter between ‘cogitos’ and more like a dance. 
Contact is occasionally possible, but trust is also necessary.194 The aim is not 
to achieve harmonious mental states but rather to successfully coordinate 
behaviour, as everything that can be known about other people is conveyed 
through words, gestures, and actions, which endow people with a certain 
public signif icance. Communication is based on showing.
 The Messenger Model
An Initial Summary
The texts by Benjamin, Nancy, Serres, Debray, and Peters are all extremely 
different. It may seem peculiar to invoke these authors as ‘introductions’ to 
the theme of mediality when only the last one actually discusses concrete 
media, yet this is quite deliberate. I want to debate the question of ‘What is 
a medium?’ from the very beginning in the context of mediality. ‘Mediality’ 
does not refer to media that are distinct from each other, like sound, text, 
and image, but rather its aim is to describe an elementary dimension of 
human life and culture.1
Consider, therefore, the following question: Is there a vanishing point at 
which all f ive authors meet, regardless of the fact that their approaches are 
all so divergent? This point of convergence actually stands out. It is their 
mutual consideration of the way in which the relationship of the self to the 
other and to the world is fundamentally mediated through transmission 
processes, and because these processes tend to be invisible their mediation 
appears to be ‘immediate’.
This idea can be divided into a series of distinct but related statements:
(1) The starting point for a reflection on mediality is the assumption of 
a difference between the communicants, which can be understood 
qualitatively as their diverseness or quantitatively as their distance 
from each other.
(2) Media do not transform this difference into identity by simply replacing 
diversity with agreement, but rather they make communal existence 
possible while maintaining this difference.
(3) The primary function of media is transmission. Media do not directly 
produce anything; they do not possess any demiurgical power. Meth-
odologically it makes more sense to describe them as middle, mediator, 
and milieu rather than an instrument or a medium.
(4) The conditions of transmission constitute the source of culture.
(5) Transmission is an external, corporeal, and material process that can 
be conceived as a kind of embodiment while at the same time it is also 
associated with a ‘disembodiment’ – namely, the way in which media 
‘become invisible’ in their (interference-free) usage.
(6) Non-reciprocity is a structural feature of communication under condi-
tions of difference.
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Traces of this web of ideas can be found among each of the authors:
For Walter Benjamin the Fall of Man was a symbol of the origin of differ-
ence between people, which was revealed in the form of gender differences. 
Not only was it possible to distinguish between good and evil, but they were 
also split, which was conducive to mediatization. While the divine word 
possessed a demiurgical power, as God created by naming, human words 
lost this creative power and language became a medium of denotation and 
recognition. It is therefore this loss of genuine creative power that reduced 
media for the f irst time to mere instruments and sensory organs and made 
them congeneric to the technical and symbolic: The performativity of divine 
language did not distinguish between the technical and the semiotic, as 
the act of naming directly brought something into existence. A reflection 
of the original creativity of the medial can emerge (once again) only when 
the human is hypostatized precisely not as a demiurge and media are 
stripped of their instrumental character in the sense of their technical 
and/or semiotic functionality and transmission is readily appreciated as a 
genuine form of productivity. I will later investigate Benjamin’s own version 
of transmission, namely translation, in more detail. It is suff icient here 
to clarify that Benjamin, more than anyone else, was a forward thinker 
concerning technical media, as his early writings on the philosophy of 
language blazed a trail to a non-instrumentalized concept of media.
For Jean-Luc Nancy, unlike Benjamin, there is no longer any memory of a 
condition prior to ‘difference’. Humans only exist as individuals together with 
others, and they are therefore always already divided into singular exteriori-
ties that are situated at a distance from each other. Difference is nevertheless 
‘defused’ for Nancy, as it has become a next-to-one-another, which can be 
revealed thus far as being with-one-another, as it involves circulation and 
exchange between co-existing people. ‘Communicating’ is therefore necessary, 
but in an entirely unspectacular sense. It refers not to the sharing of com-
mon beliefs or identical meanings, but rather to an external sharing of places 
that become a milieu in the sense of an intermediate space that enables the 
separation of individuals while at the same time connecting them. Mediation 
can thus be conceived as a virtual connection or an external and corporeal 
co-existence that does not (any longer) unify the collective into a whole.
As with Nancy, Michel Serres also sees connection as a basic process – im-
aginarily modelled in the f igure of Hermes and the angel – that is essential 
to medial transmission. For Serres, however, the multiplicity into which 
societies are divided loses the homogeneity that Nancy still maintained and 
becomes heterogeneous instead. A trace of this heterogeneous starting point 
is preserved and becomes apparent in the fact that the community-forming 
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moment of transmission presupposes that order must be maintained against 
interference from outside, against the accidental, and against the influence 
of third parties. Serres describes the power of transmission to immunize 
against external influences as the inner mechanism of our use of symbols, 
which applies equally to a mathematician’s theoretical practice as well as 
a community’s ability to establish a connection by excluding third parties. 
The f igure of the third nevertheless returns in the form of the parasite, 
which becomes an actor in an unequal exchange and thus a one-sided 
connection: the streams of global transmissions do not correspond to the 
model of reciprocal exchange, but rather they lead to inequality and imbal-
ance. Media – precisely because their performance is based on transmission 
and mediation – do not simply facilitate encounters with non-reciprocal 
situations, but rather they literally give rise to non-reciprocity itself. This 
marks a radical departure from the assumption that mediation is based on 
or results in the communal sharing of something.
For Régis Debray, culture is also based on a spatial and temporal dif-
ference, which poses the question of how the formation of tradition is 
possible at all. Transmission is also central to his work, as his mediological 
materialism posits the fundamental exteriority and materiality of trans-
mission processes. Transmission is conceived as an act of embodiment or 
the formation of traces, as its power enables the spatial transmission and 
temporal preservation of the spiritual and the ideal. This materialization 
of the ideal is also understood as an act of production, as the object does 
not precede its transmission. Transportation is always at the same time 
understood as a form of transformation, and transmission is always also 
understood as a form of transubstantiation. Debray’s materiality is therefore 
not opposed to the ideal, but rather it is the only possible way of realizing 
the ideal, as it involves circulating ideas across space and time. Circulation 
and communication converge.
The idea of communication as dialogue thus becomes problematic for 
each of these thinkers in their own way: Benjamin challenges the view 
that the decisive factor in communication consists of the fact that people 
communicate something through language; Nancy does not identify the 
sharing of something with-one-another as part of the traditional notion 
of communication as agreement; Serres sees non-reciprocity as the basic 
condition of the social; Debray subordinates communication to transmis-
sion from the very beginning, insofar as transmission can illuminate what 
communication means, but the reverse is not true.
The terrain is thus prepared for John Durham Peters’s thesis that 
one-sided dissemination, the sending of messages, does not constitute a 
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subvariety of communication, but rather it is equally as worthy as dialogical 
‘near communication’. Moreover, the distancing unfamiliarity between 
the communicants is already a constituent element of dialogue itself. The 
point is that the disseminative structure of interpersonal communication 
valorizes the listener: It is the receivers, the recipients, and not simply the 
speakers who carry the responsibility for uttered speech to fall on fertile 
soil. In addition, communication is no longer conceived as the confluence 
of mental states, but rather it is accepted as a kind of dance where contact 
is only temporary.
The Messenger as a Topos
The messenger appears to be an extremely archaic f igure; a relic of an epoch 
when non-personal communication was not yet available. The f igure of 
the messenger may appear misplaced and obsolete in a systematic media-
theoretical study written in an age of split-second connections through 
worldwide data networks. Nevertheless, I want to employ the messenger 
hereafter as a ref lection f igure,2 and I present the following analogy to 
explain its methodological signif icance: The idea of the errand functions 
as the ‘zero point’ in a coordinate system in which different modalities 
of transmission can be listed from many different f ields, like religion, 
medicine, economics, linguistics, psychoanalysis, and law. Within this 
coordinate system – it is assumed – it then becomes clear how media can 
be understood from their position in the middle as mediators. But to start 
with it is f irst necessary to explicate this ‘zero point’, which I would like to 
call the ‘messenger model’.3
In a distant echo of the deductive sciences it could also be said that the 
messenger perspective alters our ‘axiom system’ insofar as the ‘primal scene’ 
of communication is no longer interactive, voice-based dialogue in close 
proximity to the body, but rather communication between parties who 
are separated from each other in time and space. Benjamin, Nancy, and 
Serres have already suggested that communication presupposes separation, 
division, and difference between the communicants. Debray and Peters 
have also called attention to the fact that due to this distance transmission 
proves to be an elementary dimension of communication itself.
I therefore take as my starting point the idea that the mediality of 
communication will become clearer in the ‘laboratory conditions’ of 
communication in absentia. At the same time, however, referring back 
to the messenger involves more than simply a media-theoretical thought 
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experiment that focuses on an extreme case in order to better understand 
its signif icance under normal conditions. My assumption is that reflecting 
on messenger-mediated ‘absence communication’ will also change our un-
derstanding of ‘presence communication’. The messenger idea only becomes 
interesting when it is assumed that being distant from one another – in 
either an internal or external sense – constitutes a fundamental aspect of 
all communication.
Dimensions of the ‘Messenger Model’
So what does the messenger do? He mediates between heterogeneous 
worlds by transmitting messages. This fact is extremely straightforward, 
but it is more revealing to distinguish between the f ive dimensions of the 
‘messenger model’: distance, heteronomy, thirdness, materiality, and f inally 
indifference.
(1) Distance as Heterogeneity: Whenever communication is described 
using the messenger perspective, it always involves communication that 
is informed and shaped by distance. This distance is not at all limited to 
spatial distance, but rather it also encompasses other forms of diversity that 
make communicants entirely foreign and incomprehensible to one another, 
such as their different histories, singular experiences, varying opinions, 
different bodies of knowledge, and practical orientations. Communication 
– if you recall Benjamin and Nancy – presupposes separation and division. 
People are always with one another at the same time that they are apart 
from one another and thus individuals.
Emmanuel Levinas emphatically thematized this irresolvable distance 
from one another as the basis of all communication. According to Levinas, 
the fact that communicants are identif ied as ego and alter ego is already 
proof of the egocentricity of understanding, which is inscribed in Western 
self-consciousness insofar as it is oriented towards understanding others 
using the model of Odysseus’s voyage, which is a return to the self.4 For 
Levinas, on the other hand, a conversation represents an encounter that 
does not treat the being of the other as an egological projection of one’s own 
consciousness; rather, it is able to recognize and maintain the otherness of 
others. And it is no surprise that this refusal to minimize the strangeness 
and mystery of others culminates in a concept, namely the ‘trace’, that bears 
a subtle resemblance to the idea of the messenger. I will later address the 
‘involuntary messenger of the trace’. What matters here is that distance is 
inherent to any communication.
The messenger bridges distances but does not eliminate them; mediation 
and separation are intertwined in the f igure of the messenger. Doesn’t this 
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ambiguity – the simultaneous overcoming and preservation of distance – 
resonate in the German word ‘Ent-fernung’?5
Distance, heterogeneity, difference between communicants thus marks 
the starting point of my discussion of the errand. I will thereby forego a 
metatheoretical consideration of the philosophically provocative question 
of whether it is possible to talk about the meaning of ‘difference’ at all, 
insofar as this precedes all different ways of speaking. My reflection on 
the errand is intended to address not the question of what heterogeneity and 
difference are, but rather ‘only’ how to deal with them.
From the perspective of ‘distance communication’ the messenger is situ-
ated in an intermediate space between heterogeneous worlds (systems, 
f ields, etc.). His operative function is to be a mediator between these worlds; 
in light of this operative function he represents the nucleus of a media 
theory. But how does this mediation take place? To start with, the messenger 
speaks – but with a foreign voice.
(2) Heteronomy as Speaking with a Foreign Voice: This is one of the pro-
vocative – and at the same time essential – aspects of the messenger model: 
the messenger is heteronomous, which is understood here in opposition 
to ‘autonomous’.6 He is not self-activating, he is subordinate to a ‘foreign 
law’, and he acts on behalf of another: he has a mission. The messenger is 
‘guided by outside forces’.
Whenever messengers are thematized, one is confronted with the 
difference between vertical/sacred transmission and horizontal/secular 
transmission. An example of vertical transmission is Hermes, who delivers 
the messages of the gods to mortals. It is advantageous for this task that he is 
the protective deity of streets and businesses, that he combines scholarship 
and trickery, and also that he is not averse to thievery. He thus maintains 
his close proximity to the all-too-human, which is essential because he 
must translate the divine messages in a way that will be accessible to the 
people.7 As Schniewind noted, the biblical words ‘angelos’ (messenger) and 
‘angelia’ (annunciation and message) are not derived from the language of 
religion, mysticism, or philosophy, but rather from the language of public 
life.8 Bernhard Siegert also pointed out that the angel as messenger of God 
(angeloi) is etymologically derived from the ‘angaréion’, the attendants of 
the Persian relay post system.9 The mythical and religious connections 
between God and man are etymologically drawn from the prose of a postal 
principle.
Other vertical messengers include poets, the ‘interpreters of the gods’, 
and rhapsodists, the ‘interpreters of the poets’, whose task is to bear wit-
ness. It is precisely this task – bearing witness to a knowledge acquired 
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through divine inspiration rather than effort, for which the messenger is 
not responsible – that reduces poets to ‘unconscious’ mediators in the sense 
of Plato’s Socratic dialogue,10 and the criticism of these poets thus becomes 
the genuine task of philosophy: the overcoming of angelia through logos 
represents the origin of a philosophical discourse oriented towards truth. 
In this context, the messenger becomes an inauthentic speaker.
It is also evident in the horizontal dimension of mediation that the 
messenger serves as a proxy for foreigners, as in the case of ambassadors, 
nuntius, and legatus.11 Many aspects of the messenger function originate 
here. Isn’t the messenger at the same time also an extension of the body of 
his employer, who is not only represented by the messenger but rather also 
made present in time and space? Aren’t messengers always also visualiza-
tions of an authority in absentia insofar as whoever can be represented as 
if they were present in their representative is sovereign?12
Indeed, messengers are always also part of a ‘telecommunications of 
power’ insofar as they not only communicate but also secure territory 
through their dissemination of the word.13 The Old High German word 
‘biotan’ and the Middle High German word ‘bieten’, from which the word 
‘Bote’ (messenger) is derived, take on the connotations of order, command, 
and prohibition and emerge as both ‘decree’ and ‘interdiction’.
In an entirely different way, the nature of being-sent becomes apparent in 
the smooth transition between the messenger and impersonal transmission 
technologies like the letter: it is no accident that in Middle High German 
the words ‘Bote’ (messenger) and ‘Brief ’ (letter) can be substituted for each 
other.14
The institution of the messenger thus encompasses a variety of dif-
ferentiations, from the medial extension of the body of the employer to 
the borrowed authority of the personal representative to the simple act of 
delivery as well as the privileged interpretation of the messages, and all of 
these roles are tied to a common assumption: the activity of the messenger 
does not arise from self-conscious spontaneity, but rather it is subordinate 
to foreign directives; his ‘sovereignty’ can simply explore the space of 
heteronomy. There is therefore always an outside of media.
(3) Thirdness as Nucleus of Sociality: The messenger establishes a rela-
tion. The messenger makes a social relation possible between people who 
are distant from one another insofar as he is not only sent but rather also 
directed to someone to whom he has something to ‘offer’. It is no accident 
that the concept of ‘relation’ refers etymologically to reporting (‘relatio’ 
in Latin and ‘Bericht ’ in Middle High German). The messenger’s interme-
diary position between the addresser and the addressee gives rise to an 
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elementary ‘communication community’. The messenger is essential for the 
formation of this community, but he does not appear as its subject. We are 
accustomed to thematizing intersubjective relationships in dual or dyadic 
structures: speaker and listener (Searle, Habermas), sender and receiver 
(Shannon), ego and alter ego (Parsons, Luhmann), producer and recipient, 
master and slave (Hegel), me and you (Buber). From the standpoint of these 
binary-oriented theories of intersubjectivity, the emergence of a third ap-
pears to be disturbing, parasitic, and alienating. But, as Joachim Fischer 
asks, aren’t ‘dyadic f igures also latent triangles’ so that a third f igure is 
also combined with the binarity of the one and the other?15 Our personal 
pronouns (I, you, he/she, we, they) testify to how deeply engrained the third 
is in our everyday practices. The social sciences and social theories focus 
on the third as a f igure of analysis between alterity and plurality. Doesn’t 
this transition to the third represent the point at which interactions (can) 
transform into institutions?16
This reveals a wide and colourful spectrum of trinities, which includes 
spectators, translators, mediators, judges, scapegoats, parasites, arbitrators, 
traitors, etc. Most importantly, the messenger also emerges in this series 
of triadic actors. And it is Joachim Fischer who f irst drew serious attention 
to the messenger in the course of a general social theory of the third, from 
which he developed a social theory of the medium: insofar as the messenger 
is conceived as a f iguration of the third, the ‘social potential of the medium’ 
is foregrounded as opposed to its ‘technical potential’.17
The fragility of the messenger institution is also embedded in this social-
ity of the messenger from the very beginning, which makes it predestined to 
be an unstable f igure.18 Because the communicants are inaccessible to each 
other, the relevant question becomes whether the messenger will maintain 
his heteronomous status and the neutrality it implies or whether he will 
‘go wild’ as the sovereign and manipulator of ‘his’ messages by omitting, 
distorting, or inventing. As a f iguration of the third, the medium is always 
also an interruption and thus a breaking point: it can breed ill blood, sow 
the seeds of discord, contrive intrigues, play people off against each other, 
betray, and agitate. Mediation is thus symbolically and diabolically two-
faced: it can be a symbolic act (throwing together) as well as a diabolical 
intrusion (dividing apart). The diabolical misdeed is always inscribed as an 
option in the function of the third and the messenger.
(4) Materiality as Embodiment: The purpose of the messenger is to elimi-
nate distance through his own movement, a movement whose meaning 
consists not in bearing correspondences but rather in producing them. 
Historically, the verb ‘to correspond’, in the sense of ‘agreement’, refers 
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to the noun ‘correspondence’ as reporting or exchanging letters. There 
is a peculiarly tense relationship between the mobility of the messenger 
and the expected identity and stability of the messages entrusted to him. 
The messenger is supposed to not only convey the message, but also at 
the same time preserve it from potential interference over the course of 
space and time. The message is only mobile in the sense that it is externally 
embodied in a material carrier, but its internal contents are supposed to be 
kept as immobile as possible. Is this the birth of the separation of signif ier 
and signif ied from the spirit of the errand? This is what a message always 
is: regardless of its origin, it must always be separable and transport-
able. Linguistic statements congeal into physiognomic texture; meaning 
materializes in the sensuality of the body. Speech becomes something 
‘external’ to the messenger. The statement crystallizes as a recitation, an 
imitatio soni.
The message belongs to a continuum of materiality that also encom-
passes the corporeality of the messenger. The message is entrusted to and 
incorporated into his mimesis or ‘physical memory’.19 Incorporation and 
excorporation thus intersect in the messenger. To safeguard the message 
it was customary not only to insure its authentic reproduction but also to 
authenticate the messenger’s body through signs or tokens.20 To return once 
again to the embodiment of the employer: the nuntius was considered to be 
‘the body of the ruler suspended over his borders’.21 Through the delivery of 
his message the messenger also represented at the same time the coming-
to-appearance of his employer, a kind of profane epiphany.22 And it is no 
surprise – as Horst Wenzel notes23 – that the immunity of the messenger 
was constantly at risk, as it was not uncommon for the messenger to be 
rewarded or punished depending on ‘his’ message.
As a part of a continuum of materiality, the messenger therefore moves in 
an intermediate space that is an ‘extension of the senses’.24 In other words, 
the exterior space of the senses is the messenger’s base of operations. The 
phenomenon of the separation of sense and sensuality, text and texture, and 
form and content take on a palpable form in the figure of the messenger.
(5) Indifference as Self-Neutralization: When messages are sent, they 
usually involve important communications. Messages are emotionally mov-
ing, they are surprising, they bring their receivers happiness or sorrow. Yet 
the messenger behaves indifferently towards the content of his message. He 
remains apathetic with regard to what he says. After all, he is a sign carrier 
precisely because he ignores and is exempt from the meaning of the signs 
he carries. He is able to remember signif iers so well because he is allowed 
to forget what they signify.
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The messenger occupies the middle, which means that he is not biased. 
The neutrality of the middle is the basis of the mediator’s position.25 This 
indifferent position becomes evident in the messenger’s tendency to 
withdraw or recede, thereby foregrounding his message. The embodiment 
of a foreign voice is only possible by surrendering one’s own voice through 
a form of self lessness that is inscribed in the functional logic of the mes-
senger and for that matter also constitutes the ethos of his off ice: the 
visualization of the foreign through self-neutralization. What is different 
or surprising about a message only takes shape against the background 
of the messenger’s own indifference. Remember: the disappearance of 
the medium in the syllogism and the motif of the dying messenger both 
refer etymologically to this self-withdrawal, on which the mediality of 
the messenger off ice is based. It is also a prerequisite for the magical real 
presence of the absent employer, who can become operative through the 
messenger.
Is it necessary to emphasize that this ‘symbolic withdrawal’ of the 
medium also enables its ‘diabolical inversion’?
There are therefore f ive important attributes of the messenger model: 
(1) He connects heterogeneous worlds and allows them to ‘f low’ into one 
another. (2) He is not self-determined but rather heteronomous and thus 
speaks with a foreign voice. (3) He embodies the f igure of a third and thus 
enables the formation of sociality. (4) He is embedded in a continuum of 
materiality, operates in an intermediate space that represents an extension 
of the senses, and thus draws on the separation between text and texture, 
sense and form. (5) He is a self-neutralizing entity that makes something 
else appear through his own withdrawal.
The messenger model thus appears to be a contrasting foil if not a ‘counter 
model’ to the general understanding of ‘communication’ – consider, for 
example, the aspects that have to do with heteronomy, the extension of 
the senses, and self-neutralization. It can hardly be denied that the ‘good’ 
messenger is discursively powerless.26 I will now attempt to delve into this 
provocative aspect.
On the Discursive Powerlessness of the Messenger
Almost all of the facets that we have extracted from the speech of the mes-
senger conform to an image of language use that contradicts the meaning 
of ‘communication’ and ‘linguisticality’ in philosophical discourse. When 
considered philosophically, the messenger represents a repulsive f igure: 
He speaks not on his own behalf but rather on the behalf of foreigners. He 
does not think and mean what he says. He is not allowed to produce what 
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he says himself; he is not even permitted to understand what he says. The 
messenger is not responsible for the content of what he is assigned to say.
Already this list – and it could surely be expanded – shows in an obvi-
ous way that the f igure of the messenger counteracts everything that we 
usually associate with speech from a theoretically ambitious perspective. 
The self-image of philosophy involves the practice and encouragement of 
a kind of speech that fundamentally overcomes and disavows the kind of 
communication practiced by the messenger. I will recall two paradigmatic 
deliberations on this issue from the beginning of ancient philosophy and 
modern philosophy.
The beginnings of classical philosophy in Greece were accompanied by 
the replacement of the concept of ‘angelia’ (message) with the concepts of 
‘logos’, ‘idea’, and ‘nous’.27 Poets and rhapsodists were disparaged in Plato’s 
Ion as part of a general discrediting of those who ‘only’ function as mes-
sengers, for poets were considered to be the interpreters of the gods and 
rhapsodists were considered to be the interpreters of the poets.28 Plato 
describes the kind of connection created by poetic mediation using the 
symbol of the magnet, whose powerful influence holds magnetized iron 
rings together. Whenever divine messages are delivered, their mediators 
remain dependent and ignorant. Philosophy can therefore only f ind its own 
form of speech, based on autonomous thought and knowledge, by critiquing 
and overcoming the messenger model of communication.
I will now shift to modern philosophy. In his Discours de la Méthode 
Descartes reflects on the difference between humans and machines, which 
also represents the difference between humans and animals because for 
Descartes animals are living machines. Humans and machines are dif-
ferentthrough language and reason, which also distinguish humans from 
animals. However, there are birds that speak without thinking. Descartes 
writes: ‘For we observe that magpies and parrots can utter words like our-
selves, and are yet unable to speak as we do, that is, so as to show that they 
understand what they say.’29 Doesn’t the speech of the messenger resemble 
the automaton-like speech of Descartes’s speaking birds? This is undoubt-
edly true and Bernhard Siegert, who calls attention to this connection, cites 
Azzo’s Summae Institutionum: ‘A nuncius occupies the position of a letter; 
and he is just like the magpie […], and he is the voice of the ruler who sends 
him, and he repeats the words of the ruler.’30
It is therefore apparent that the messenger is not in command of his 
speech, and it is not surprising that in his function as a transmitter he can 
also be easily replaced with non-human entities. Neutrality and indifference 
are inherent to the impersonal transmission event, and this is not only 
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invoked in the topos of the dying messenger but also culminates in the 
fact that messengers can be easily substituted by symbolic and technical 
information carriers. There is hardly anything as transmissible as the mes-
senger function of transmission. The messenger is a person who fulf ils his 
role by acting as if he is not a person. Messengers embody tasks that can 
often be accomplished just as well by the circulation and functionality of 
things. It could also be said that the messenger function is ‘ontologically 
neutral’: it can be performed personally, semiotically, or technically, and it 
usually involves the interaction of all three of these components.
 Transmissions
Angels: Communication through Hybrid Forms
In religion, myth, legend, and above all in the arts there is an imaginary 
space populated with messengers: It is the world of angels, of placeless 
mediators between heaven and earth. The study of angels (‘angelology’1) 
is an epiphenomenon of monotheism: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
have added a more or less extensive army of angels to the statuary isola-
tion of their God; the constitutional invisibility, unrepresentability, and 
remoteness of God is therefore supplemented with the offer of something 
holy that is visible, representable, and close, which takes on an allegorical 
form in angels. Angels are not simply there, but rather they are active, 
as Augustine notes: ‘angelus enim officii nomen est, non natura’.2 ‘Angel’ 
is therefore the name of an off ice, a function. The Greek word ‘angelos’, 
the Hebrew word ‘malakh’, the Arabic word ‘malak’, and the Persian word 
‘fereshteh’ all denote ‘ambassadors’.3 The primary duty of angels is thus to 
serve as holy messengers. In addition – as Siegert points out – the Greek 
word ‘angeloi’ is derived from the ‘angaréion’, the attendants of the Persian 
relay post system.4 As Horst Wenzel notes laconically, ‘The establishment 
of the postal system preceded the heavenly messenger.’5 In the word ‘angel’, 
therefore, a predictor becomes a name, which is the process of allegorical 
formation par excellence. The following considerations focus on the angel 
as an allegory for the off ice of the messenger and question whether this 
form can shed an interesting light on the mediality of the ‘messenger’s 
errand’.
An Archaic Vision of the Information Society and a Nebulous Form of 
Mediology?
I will begin with a perspective that is already familiar through Michel 
Serres’s work: In a world that revolves around the axis of the information-
technical exchange of messages, angels can serve as a model for a network 
that does not consist of things or living entities but rather of channels 
for the transmission of messages. ‘Each angel is a bearer of one or more 
relationships; today they exist in myriad forms, and every day we invent 
billions of new ones. However we lack a philosophy of such relations […] The 
angels are unceasingly drawing up the maps of our new universe.’6 Angels 
create relations precisely because their transmission activities establish 
an intermediary space situated between the realms of the divine and the 
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human, and they connect these worlds by literally opening a channel 
between them.7
Michel Serres’s standpoint also resembles that of sociologist Helmut 
Wilke, who sees angels as the legendary anticipation of a method of trans-
mitting messages of any kind to any place, which has since passed to the 
megamachines of information processing.8 For the f irst time data can be 
sent from any point on the globe to any other point: The invisible hand 
of the market described by Adam Smith thus returns once again in the 
form of the invisible hand of communications machines and networks.9 A 
utopian society is emerging, for which the principle of location has become 
irrelevant, and this society is approaching – according to Wilke at least – our 
visions of angels.10
Nevertheless, ‘space’ is not ‘place’. And if location is not an issue for 
angels, then neither is the spatiality of a world in between, which they 
create through their errands.
The analogy between this imaginary space and the contemporary glob-
ally expanded space made possible by information transmission machines 
makes evident the messenger angel’s ability to be able to establish connec-
tions and correspondences between distant parties by not being tied to any 
particular place. The texture of the border-crossing network of pathways 
formed by the angels’ errands is thus grounded in the very meaning of 
‘space’, which is not based on the principle of location: Angels are homeless 
and placeless.
Régis Debray goes the furthest in exploring the information-technical 
aspects of angelology, as he believes it represents a media theory avant la 
lettre, a still nebulous stage of a mediology.11 The angels, ‘the Almighty’s 
petty telegraphers’,12 reveal three principles that are fundamental to his 
mediological approach: the structure of the mediatizing third between the 
sender and the receiver of a message, the hierarchical organization of this 
world in between, as well as the diabolical inversion of transmission into an 
obstruction. Debray also refers to an ideological problem: The ethnological 
analysis of ‘foreign myths’ – like the work of Lévi-Strauss or Malinowski 
– is considered very prestigious, yet the ethnology of our own European 
mytho-religious beliefs, to which the angels signif icantly belong, is (still) 
hardly acceptable and thus avoided.13
I am therefore turning to the theme of angels because they represent the 
imaginary embodiment of the messenger and the activity of transmission 
more than any other phenomenon, yet I am only concerned with angels as 
f iction and idea, as permanent residents of symbolic worlds and enduring 
f igures in our collective imagination. There are no angels, but there is a 
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multitude of religious as well as artistic representations and conceptions 
of angels, which are the subject of the following considerations.
What Do Angels Do?
Is there anything more distant and different from one another than God and 
man? What truly distinguishes heaven from earth is not only distance per 
se, but rather the divide between two worlds that are apparently conceived 
to be as different from one another as possible. The divine is related to 
the human like the unconditional to the conditional, the ineffable to the 
effable, the invisible to the visible, the absolute to the relative, the inf inite 
to the f inite. The monotheistic God is the incarnation of everything that 
eludes visibility and therefore also representability. It is thus no surprise 
that the empty distance separating God and man is f illed with messengers 
and mediators who offer their own solutions to the problem of how the 
invisible nevertheless manifests itself and how the infinite can be effective 
in the f inite world. I will now look more closely at this ‘solution process’:
The purpose of an angel’s existence is to be a messenger; angels are sent 
from God, and they are destined to transport divine messages.14 Angels are 
dependent; they do not act on their own impulses. They are instantiations 
of a task. Angels act in the name of a foreign authority. This is why they 
are preferably called ‘Angels of the Lord’ in the gospels. The Old and New 
Testaments are thus ‘ultimately less interested in the being of the messenger 
than the appropriate alignment of the message’.15
The power of this message is borrowed from or delegated by the ‘almighty’. 
Angels do not create anything, they do not leave anything behind, they 
have no success and also no history16: The hands of angels remain empty. 
Their existence is fulf illed in the act of speaking on behalf of someone 
else. In this capacity they can nevertheless participate in the primordial 
‘creating’ performativity of the divine word, which recalls Benjamin: the 
angel’s annunciation coincides with Mary’s conception. Moreover, it is also 
the angels’ duty to bear witness; they bear witness to God in the presence of 
humans so that God manifests through them.17 Angels represent the trace 
of God in human reality.
They populate a world in between; they are only present to humans in 
the moment of their proclamation; their appearance as messengers of God 
is always characterized by their disappearance and withdrawal: ‘The f irst 
duties of the transporter are: eclipse, stepping aside, flight and withdrawal.’18 
This placelessness and the ability to withdraw predestine angels to be border 
crossers who can mediate between positions without themselves taking 
or having a home. And it is entirely consistent that these border crossers 
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should assist humans precisely during the borderline situations of their 
lives. In the New Testament angels tend to appear in situations of f light 
into exile, birth and death.
On the Angels Themselves
The angel is a virtually crystalline ‘materialization’ of the concept of the neu-
tral, dependent, border-crossing messenger who fulfils his task and thereby 
makes himself obsolete. These facets of the mediator and transmitter are 
familiar enough through the messenger model, but how does the transmission 
of divine messages through angels reveal new aspects of the mediality of a 
transmission event? I will concentrate on four such aspects: (1) embodiment, 
(2) hybridization, (3) demonic inversion, and (4) hierarchical multiplicity.
(1) Embodiment: Angels are considered ‘fundamentally immaterial’,19 yet 
this immateriality obscures the important fact that their corporeality – and 
here I am in agreement with Petra Gehring20 – is a conditio sine qua non of 
their position as messengers. This corporeality undoubtedly has paradoxical 
features: It is the embodiment of ‘incorporeality’, an ethereal ‘spiritual 
physicality’ that tends to dissolve into light or air. Nevertheless, this special 
form of corporeality could be considered the most suitable way of material-
izing the messenger function. Angels substitute the incorporeality and 
invisibility of God, which implies the impossibility of direct communication 
with humans, for human-like corporeality and visibility: ‘Because angels are 
transmitters, they must communicate according to human standards. They 
must be physically and verbally active […] Without bodies they would not 
be angels at all, but rather like God himself.’21 The corporeality of angels is 
the incarnation of their ability to be seen and heard. The body of an angel 
has no weight of its own; it is – in a way – ‘an impossible body’.22
In his philosophical reflections on the f igure of the mediator, Christoph 
Hubig emphasized that a mediating instance can be understood in two 
ways: the ‘forms of the mediator’ are either conceptualized as ‘impersonal 
instances of mediation’ or they are represented ‘in the form of a messenger of 
the gods, of the savior, of the redeemer, which is shown in the world religions 
as a personal instance of mediation’. Hubig continues: ‘This last-mentioned 
approach represents the essence of every theology of incarnation.’23 This 
idea of embodiment also applies to the in-between world of the angels: it 
is no accident that Christ is also equated with angels as Christos Angelos.24
The theological doctrine of God’s incarnation in Jesus himself now 
constitutes an ongoing dilemma for the theo-christological interpretation. 
‘The Word became flesh’ (John 1:14): This appears to be a mystery, a paradox 
that bears witness to the fact that faith rather than reason is the medium 
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that brings one closer to God. And enlightened-philosophical proponents 
of Christianity like Lessing have also consequently avoided the concept of 
‘incarnation’ as much as possible.25 Luther even refers to Jesus as a mediator 
in the course of the Reformation, and Zwingli emphasizes that this position 
requires Christ to adopt characteristics of both of the spheres to be medi-
ated. This brings me to a fundamental attribute: the hybridity of angels.
(2) Hybridity: Jesus is a mortal human, and thus f lesh, as well as im-
mortal God, and thus spirit. When these dimensions blend together they 
do not become unrecognizable; rather, the uniqueness of these qualities 
is retained.26 Christ does not represent the synthesis of two worlds, which 
gives rise to a third, ‘higher’ world; rather, the resistant features of these 
opposing worlds continue to persist in parallel to one another, which is 
precisely how a connection is established. What emerges is an in-between 
world where – in the words of H.J. Hamann – ‘Christ is the speech of God’.27
This incarnation, which achieves its paradigmatic religious form in the 
f igure of Christ, also holds true for the angels. Angels are hybrid entities. 
This is meant, f irst of all, in an entirely ‘profane’ sense. Angels are – not 
unlike Hermes – winged creatures, which carries a ‘fundamental mythic 
signif icance’ and implies a ‘similar origin for birds and angels’.28 Massimo 
Cacciari notes: ‘Mehr Vogel […] is the title given by Klee to one of his draw-
ings on the theme of the angel: more bird […] than Angel.’29 In the prosaic 
words of Thomas Macho: ‘Angels are intermediate beings, and they appear 
as a blending of birds and humans […] archaic aviation pioneers; they can 
ascend to heaven and hover over land and sea. After subtracting metaphys-
ics and the scholastic art of speculation, all that remains are feathers and 
wings.’30 Their airworthiness predestines the angels to eliminate spatial 
distance in a literal sense.
Yet the wings of angels represent only the profane side of the sacred 
hybridization that constitutes their ‘mode of existence’. Their immortality 
and weightless mobility exist in parallel with their human-like corporeality 
and their ability to speak. Angels participate in the divine and human 
spheres: ‘The world of angels unites on the same plane that which is ir-
reconcilably distant and opposed.’31 The fact that opposing forces can join 
together in one form is crucial to understanding the ‘mechanisms’ of angelic 
transmission. Communication via holy messengers is possible only insofar 
as they share something with both of the worlds to be mediated. The most 
interesting aspect of the angels’ function as messengers is thus the fact that 
they transmit messages through hybridizing embodiment.
Angels allow the divine ‘to emerge from the shadows of distance’ and 
manifest itself as something close to human, and they are able to do this 
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because as hybrid creatures they combine the attributes of the divine and 
the human in a subtle conflation of incorporation and excorporation.32
(3) Demonic Inversion: In their hybridity, angels literally occupy the 
middle. They are mediators insofar as they are intermediary members. 
And they fall as soon as this middle position is no longer readily available. 
The demonic suspension of the mediator’s position is condensed in the 
image of the ‘fallen angel’: the closer the angel is to God the more likely 
it is that he also wants to be like God,33 yet those who aspire to be equal 
to God are hurled to Earth. Lucifer’s diabolical fall bears witness to the 
fact that forsaking the hybrid world situated between God and humans 
also entails a repudiation of the angel’s messenger function. While the 
Hebrew Bible does not recognize ‘Satan’ as a fallen angel, Satan, Beelzebub, 
or Belial has a central importance for the followers of Jesus.34 And it is 
no accident that it is precisely corporeality that becomes the gateway 
of the demonic fallen angel: According to St. Teresa of Ávila, the soul 
can only be inf luenced through the body; angels possess such a body, 
but not God.35 At the same time the relativization of the absolute in the 
perceivable corporeality of angels also gives rise to the phenomenon of 
the lapse, of ambivalence. ‘Evil’ emerges as an inversion of ‘good’. What 
Satan is ultimately left with – from a modern perspective – is no longer 
the transmission of divine messages, but rather the purchasing of souls 
through the exchange of services in a demonic pact. This is also a form 
of transmission, incidentally, which will become more revealing when 
money is seen as a medium of exchange.
(4) Hierarchical Multiplicity: Angels only exist in a multitude, and this 
multiplicity exhibits a sense of order that is reminiscent of the military: 
Angels constitute the army of God. This is not the military aspect that 
interests me here, although the idea of the ‘angel with the sword’ (not only 
the archangel Michael as the general of God36) consistently grounds and 
complements that of the messenger angel.37 Rather, what is more significant 
is the gradation of the intermediary world according to the proximity and 
distance to the senders or receivers of holy messages. Such a hierarchization 
of the world between God and humans was f irst described by Dionysius 
the Areopagite around 500 A.D. For Dionysius the hierarchy of angels is 
an answer to the unrepresentability of God. Dionysius proposes that a 
highly structured universe of intermediary beings stretches between the 
Seraphim, the symbols of light and f ire that stand next to God, and the 
guardian angels, which are close to humans. This can explain one thing: 
the talk of a ‘third’ that occupies the middle position between opposing 
forces is only a shorthand way of saying that an abundance of gradations 
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are operative between dichotomous extremes, which does not leave this 
in-between space empty, but rather marks it as a transitional space.
The notion that the in-between world of the angels makes an abundance 
of modularizations visible by virtue of what is distant from one another and 
yet nonetheless affects one another and is connected to one another leads 
to one last consideration: The angel as the embodiment of an ‘ontology of 
distance’.38
The ‘Ontology of Distance’ and the ‘Representation of 
Unrepresentability’: Interpretations of Angelology
How can distance be overcome and preserved at the same time? How 
can distance be transformed into proximity when it cannot provide the 
immediacy of contact or a bridge between distant points and it thus re-
mains ‘insurmountable’? This is the problem of monotheistic religions 
and angelology is an attempt to solve or at least offer some compensation 
for this problem. Andrei Pleşu and Massimo Cacciari have interpreted this 
problem in two different ways using an onto-epistemological approach and 
an aesthetic or image-theoretical approach.
Pleşu revised the problem: The point is not that people are unable to 
maintain a relationship across distances, but rather the contrary: The 
mostly familiar view of what lies in the distance, which is transcendent, 
utopian, absolute, and unavailable, directly obscures the view of what lies 
close by. It is not the distant, ‘it is the near that becomes inaccessible to us. 
Every celestial metaphysics has its morbid counterpart in the suppression 
of the feeling of closeness’.39 This ‘crisis of proximity’ – and this is Pleşu’s 
epistemological trick – thus depends on rigid dichotomies. However, if 
angels transform the ‘abyss between God and humans into an information 
space’40 and if the solution to the problem of distance consists precisely in 
f illing the hollow space, the emptiness of this abyss, with mediating f igures, 
then this generates a cognitive-epistemological resonance phenomenon: 
being-in-the-world must be understood not simply as a static dichotomy, but 
rather as modulations; people must overcome their ‘polarizing instinct’ and 
their ‘obsession with binary simplif ications’41 in the context of this image 
of a Jacob’s ladder that is made possible by the hierarchy of angels, which 
establishes gradations between things that are distant from one another. 
This constitutes the ‘technics of overcoming’ distance, which is crystallized 
out of angelology, because it takes the distance apart and ‘transforms it into 
a series of proximities’.42 This also implies an anthropological directive: 
humans should conceive of themselves not simply as dualistic but rather 
as a triadic composition of will, intellect, and emotion. This restores the 
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realm of the imaginary to the border between interior and exterior instead 
of reducing it to mind-body dualism.43
This space of imagined messengers is the space of visualized images, and 
it is at this point that Massimo Cacciari now comes into play.
Cacciari also understands his reflections on angels as a confrontation 
with the issue of an irreducible distance, but he nevertheless treats this 
– with reference to Walter Benjamin44 – as a ‘problem of representation’ 
and thus an aesthetic problem.45 If the graduating modularization of 
the in-between space is the one form that establishes the proximity of 
a distance, then forming an image of the distance brings about another 
modality. The inconceivability and unrepresentability of God f inds its 
paradoxical echo in the diverse images of angels, all of which are epiphanies 
of a withdrawn God who establishes contact without exposing or reveal-
ing himself.46 However, the angel thus becomes ‘the exact image of the 
problem of the image’,47 for an image is always different from and more 
than a symbol: Images also contain something magical in the form of a 
real effect of the depicted; they are at the same time both distinguishable 
and indistinguishable from that which they represent. They are the living 
presence of a distance, the projection of the absent in the present. For this 
reason, ‘every true image is never only a simple representation’; rather, it is 
one with its own state of being-distant – ‘it is one with absence’.48 Like Pleşu, 
Cacciari also addresses the imagination.49 By revealing this imaginative 
dimension the angel rescues perception from ‘merely being perception’ 
and it thus becomes apparent that every perceived object is always also 
a ‘fictum’.50
People therefore do not see angels, but rather they always only see images 
of angels. By referring to the question of how it is possible to represent that 
which cannot be seen, Sigrid Weigel emphasizes how paintings of angels 
embody ‘the moment of visualization’ and they thus serve as a ‘means for 
reflection on painting itself’.51
Cacciari and Pleşu also call attention to a further dimension of the iconic-
ity of angels, which is their mirror function.52 In the discourse about angels 
since time immemorial they have been characterized again and again as 
mirrors.53 ‘The world of angels – mundus imaginalis – resembles a mirror 
between the world of God and the world of humans, which reflects both 
worlds and unexpectedly brings them into contact.’54 Mirror images are 
precisely not subordinate to the regime of (arbitrary) semiotics; in other 
words, they are not symbols. Mirrors always reveal the ‘trace of a pres-
ence’ caused by synchronous action, but they are never the presence itself. 
Furthermore, mirror images are – in an optical sense – virtual images. They 
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move what is reflected to an illusory place. If an angel mirrors God in the 
world of humans, for example, then God appears in a place where he is not. 
The presence of a divine absence emerges in the image of the angel as the 
proximity of a distance.
The virtuality based on their mirror-like iconicity and the information-
technical virtualization anticipated by their relentless activity as mes-
sengers thus intersect in the f iguration of the angel.
What Does Transmission through Hybridization Mean? A Conclusion
Where are these reflections on the imaginary f igure of the angel leading if 
they are construed as a media theory avant la lettre? I want to emphasize 
f ive ideas:
(1) The problem of communication does not consist in overcoming 
distance, but rather in the otherness of the worlds between which 
a connection is to be established. Given the differences between al-
mighty God and mortal human beings, this connection is then (largely) 
unidirectional.
(2) The art and technique of this connection – and this is the central idea – 
lies in hybridity, or the notion that contact between the heterogeneous 
can be established when the ‘contact organ’ is composed of attributes of 
both of the worlds to be mediated. It is precisely the juxtaposition and 
simultaneity of these opposing characteristics that allows the angel to 
function as a mediator.
(3) Such hybridity can only be achieved through embodiment. While reflec-
tions on angels tend to emphasize their immateriality, they can only 
communicate with humans insofar as they themselves also have bodies. 
The transmission of God’s word is impossible without embodiment.
(4) The neutrality associated with messengers and their position in the mid-
dle and in between are always also vulnerable and subject to change. 
Lucifer, the messenger who develops a life of his own by denouncing his 
heteronomy and his intermediate position, is therefore only the reverse 
side of heavenly message transmission. The fallen angel is a structural 
element of the mediator’s position.
(5) Angels are more than ‘God’s cute telegraphs’: They bring the distance of 
the monotheistic God closer, they make his absence present and they 
make his invisibility visible. Angels do not simply reveal something 
imperceptible; rather, they reveal the imperceptibility of something 
that is nevertheless operative in the presence of his non-presence. 
Angels are therefore not only the messengers of God, but also traces 
of God.
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Viruses: Contagion through Transcription
An elementary process of transmission is painfully familiar: contagious 
diseases from the flu to AIDS are based on infection. ‘Infection’ (‘inficere’ 
is Latin for ‘contamination’) is part of the vocabulary of pathophysiology. 
Like few other medical terms, the ‘logic of infection’ is rooted deep in the 
everyday fears and hysterias of globalized societies.55 Moreover, infection 
has also been metaphorically adapted to explain cultural – for example, 
aesthetic – phenomena.56 It is obvious why the phenomenon of infection is 
particularly interesting here: it concerns a process of transmission through 
which the pathogenic agent f inds its way from one organism to another. 
Could the observation of infection provide insights into the ‘nature’ of 
transmission that would be signif icant for media theory? The following 
considerations are based on this assumption.
On the Classification of Infectious Transmission
Infection is ‘transmission through contact’ and thus a ‘physical model 
of influence’.57 An organism is contaminated and thus changed through 
contact. Microorganisms spread disease by inhabiting a body, reproduc-
ing themselves, and then migrating to other bodies. From the perspective 
of the infected bodies, the pathogenic agents come from outside. They 
bridge the distance between the ‘source of the infection’, from which they 
originate, and their future ‘host’, which then becomes another ‘source of 
the infection’. Contagious diseases require a physical exchange between 
the organisms as well as between the organism and the environment. 
They therefore represent a genuine physical process: there is no infection 
without material changes. Moreover, infection always involves a multitude 
of bodies: to observe one infected body separately is to interrupt a chain 
of events and abstractly single out one particular link in this chain. From 
the perspective of transmission, infectious transmissions do not actually 
have any beginning.
The medical ‘nature’ of contagious diseases has only recently been un-
derstood. An insight into the transmission character of infection has been 
hindered by the almost unbroken acceptance of humoral pathology from 
antiquity to the modern era: according to humoral pathology sicknesses 
appeared to be caused by an imbalance or unhealthy mixture of bodily 
f luids. Humoral pathology cannot explain how something from outside 
is transmitted into the body. It was not until the 1840s that the Göttingen 
anatomist Jakob Henle postulated the existence of a ‘contagium anima-
tum’ or pathogen that caused infectious diseases.58 In 1876 Robert Koch 
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succeeded in isolating, observing, and cultivating a bacillus that not only 
accompanied sickness, but was also its cause.59 The study of bacteriology 
was eventually founded, which paved the way for an understanding of 
infection as a contact and transmission event. An important milestone 
along the way was Louis Pasteur’s insight concerning immunization, which 
was achieved with great diff iculty: An organism is not immune, but rather 
it becomes immune by receiving and being exposed to the disease-causing 
pathogen in a weaker form. If a body is immunized by surviving an illness or 
receiving a vaccination, it no longer serves as part of the chain of infectious 
transmission. Nevertheless – and this shows just how much the theory of 
immunization is connected to the insight concerning the physical character 
of transmission – the difference between activated and inactivated vaccines 
is crucial: Vaccines with activated, living pathogens not only prevent an 
outbreak of the sickness, but also halt the spread of the infection; vaccines 
with inactivated pathogens, on the other hand, make it very easy for the 
relevant bacillus or virus to be passed on. In this case – using the terminol-
ogy of information transmission – a body is actually no longer a receiver, 
but rather an emissary of an infection.
Which insights about the ‘nature’ of transmission processes – understood 
in the literal sense – are revealed using the example of infection? Which 
kind of picture is obtained when ‘transmission’ is explicated using the 
model of infectious diseases?
(1) Embodiment: To start with, it is represented as a physiological event in 
which a natural substance and thus a material substrate is always transmit-
ted. Something must be transmitted, a bacterium, a virus, a parasite: in 
other words, a ‘somatic entity’. The infected body is not only the ‘receiver’, 
but also the ‘host’, and he has an elementary economic relationship to the 
pathogen implanted in him, as it reproduces ‘at his own expense’.
Nevertheless, I want to focus on the transmission event itself more than 
economics. The pathogen comes from outside and infiltrates into the inte-
rior: a kind of ‘invasion’ or hostile conquest takes place. Infections always get 
‘under the skin’. A dimension of violence is inherent to infectious transmis-
sion; this kind of transmission leaves victims in its wake. I will later return 
to this violent aspect of transmission. The relationship between exterior and 
interior applies to the macro and micro levels: At the macro level, it occurs 
between bodies; at the micro level, it occurs between pathogens and cells. 
Yet ‘from the outside inwards’ is always only a stage that follows immediately 
after ‘from the inside outwards’. The dual process of inclusion and exclusion 
constitutes the ‘chain reaction’ of infection. Every component of this chain 
is at the same time both a receiver and a sender of the pathogen.
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(2) Transmitting Medium: Transmission is impossible without a transmit-
ting medium. The function of the transmitter depends on the perspective 
from which the infectious event is observed: From the perspective of the 
pathogen, air, bodily fluids, skin, or simply food and water serve as means 
of transportation. For a parasite, entire organisms could also fulf il the 
function of a ‘transport host’. When the sickness is regarded as the thing 
to be transmitted rather than microorganisms, then a bacterium or a virus 
plays the role of the transmitter.
In any case, infections cover great distances. They are events that consume 
space, possibly through rampant epidemics. These means of transportation 
and transmitters of medical infection represent an elementary form of 
‘media’. It is nevertheless necessary to remain aware that the question of 
which transmitting medium is in force can only be answered in relation 
to the question of what is the object to be transmitted. What constitutes a 
medium in the course of infection is relative to and dependent on the position 
of the observer. It is nevertheless clear that an infectious transmission is 
impossible without a (transmitting) medium.
(3) Milieu: The invasion of the pathogen into the healthy organism is 
contingent on certain conditions. It is therefore necessary to put the inevi-
tability of infection in perspective: Infection is by no means a deterministic 
process. A body can be insusceptible to an infectious disease through its 
own natural defences or an acquired immunity. Both of these forms of 
resistance reveal important aspects of infectious transmission. The fact 
that physical resistance can hinder an infection shows that the presence 
of a pathogen and its transmitter is actually necessary but not suff icient 
for an infection. In order to be able to misuse an organism as a host, a 
pathogen always needs a milieu. This ‘milieu’ depends on whether the skin 
is unharmed, the acid protection layer is adequate, bacterial f lora is intact, 
the organism is sufficiently nourished and hygiene conditions are observed. 
In short: whether the milieu is favourable or unfavourable varies according 
to the pathogen, but infectious transmission always requires and depends 
on a milieu. The degree to which an organism is plagued by an infection is 
thus out of the question.
(4) Immunity: While the body’s natural defences call attention to the 
signif icance of the milieu, immunity points to some exceptional features 
of the relationship between the pathogen and the ‘host’. Immunization 
occurs precisely when the body experiences a sickness and develops the 
appropriate antibodies: In order to invade the host body, the pathogen must 
always occupy ‘foreign’ territory, which differs from itself. A divide between 
the ‘self ’ and the ‘foreign’,60 an asymmetry and heterogeneity, creates the 
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conditions under it is possible to speak about infectious transmission in the 
f irst place. The art of vaccination consists precisely in making the pathogen 
feel ‘at home’ in a body such that the generic divide between the infected 
and the non-infected organism collapses, it is no longer possible to distin-
guish between them pathogenically, and transmission is thus precluded. 
Is it trivial to state that there is no infection without a difference between 
a body with a pathogen and a body without a pathogen? In any case, this 
statement is obvious when one realizes that infectious transmission means 
not only that a pathogen is transmitted from A to B, but also that there 
must be a substantial difference between A and B, whose ‘pull’ f irst sets 
into motion the motor function of the infection process.
Viruses: Biological and Technical
The language of medical infection has been used to describe an astonishingly 
wide range and abundance of non-medical facts. Furthermore, the ubiquity of 
the vocabulary of infection outside of the medical and scientific disciplines is 
if nothing else thanks to the attention of that special form of infection associ-
ated with viruses. The concept of the ‘virus’ has been identified as a leading 
metaphor for contemporary culture,61 a ‘collective symbol’,62 and an exemplary 
stereotype that has the power to relate various specialist discourses, through 
which science differentiates and fragments itself, and to cement itself f irmly 
in everyday common knowledge. So what does ‘virus’ mean?
Viruses do not live; they do not subsist and grow. Viruses reproduce, but 
their reproduction is not automatic. Viruses are a complex of macromol-
ecules that consist of genetic material, DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) or RNA 
(ribonucleic acid), and protein molecules, which surround the virus gene. In 
order to reproduce they require suitable host cells.63 This peculiar method of 
reproduction, which does not have its own metabolism but rather exploits 
an existing mechanism of self-reproduction from a ‘host’ external to itself, 
is the basis of the virus principle. Without their host viruses are simply 
lifeless structures, like chemical compounds, but through their contact 
with cells or living entities ‘they are awakened’ and develop resourceful 
reproductive strategies.64
The form of reproduction specific to viruses requires a virus to infiltrate a 
system that has not yet been infected and use its reproduction mechanism, 
and thus its genetic structure, as a medium for its own reproduction; as a 
result, the newly formed viruses must then look for new hosts. Viruses are 
highly specialized parasites. By infiltrating a foreign cell, the biological virus 
uses the cell’s own processes of replication, transcription, and translation 
for the reproduction of its own genetic material. The genetic material of 
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the intermediate host of a virus is thus transliterated into the DNA/RNA 
of the virus, and different viruses employ different methods of ‘encoding’ 
their genes onto the genes of their host cells. The crucial insight here is that 
transmission through viruses can be understood as an act of a transcription.
This cellular activity reveals the substantial basis of the family re-
semblance between biological and technical viruses, as machines also 
‘infect’ one another. There are actually many similarities between the 
cellular mechanism of replication, which as ‘molecular machinery’ relies 
on reading, processing, and relaying information, and the mechanism of 
a self-reproducing machine or automaton, as modelled in the program of 
the Turing machine, which transcribes and reads. Indeed, there are so 
many similarities that there are currently attempts to construct ‘biological 
calculators’ that can be implemented in an organism and function like an 
immune system by identifying and exterminating diseased cells – a vision 
of a ‘vaccination’, therefore, that works with technical rather than biological 
pathogens.65
The concept of a ‘computer virus’ seems to stretch the medical terminol-
ogy to a metaphorical extreme, yet computer viruses and biological viruses 
have so much in common that it is possible to refer to two versions of a 
‘virus principle’,66 which suggests that this concept can be understood in 
an absolutely literal sense.
A computer virus is a part of a program that encodes itself in a ‘host 
program’ on another computer. When the user activates the infected pro-
gram, the virus can disrupt or even destroy digital ‘materials’, like data, 
hard drives, diskettes, and programs. In the process of inf iltrating the 
other computer, the virus also simultaneously replicates itself. The infected 
program thus becomes a medium through which the virus is able to copy 
itself onto more f iles and computers. Computer viruses that spread in an 
epidemic manner are known as macro viruses. They are relayed not through 
programs but rather through frequently exchanged documents, preferably 
as email attachments. Computer viruses can also be distinguished from 
‘computer worms’, which Florian Rötzer compares by analogy to viruses like 
bacteria.67 Computer worms are self-contained, self-reproducing programs 
that automatically spread through networks by detecting security flaws, 
using them to inf iltrate systems, and then, for example, multiplying the 
address f iles in an email program.
Computer virus problems increase in proportion to the amount of net-
working. Just as an infection between people requires their interaction, if 
not immediate contact, so too does an infection between machines require 
interaction. Machine interaction only refers to the exchange of data and 
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programs, but this is also true of biological infection when viewed on a 
cellular rather than a personal level, as a biological virus also transcribes the 
DNA of a cell and ‘exchanges’ information in the literal sense of the word.
Productive Dimensions of Parasitism
The previous description of infectious diseases emphasized that the in-
vasion of the pathogen represents a violent exertion of influence, which 
constitutes the basis of this form of transmission. However, there is more 
to parasites – in the broadest sense – than simply sickness and death for 
people or malfunction and destruction for machines. Without a doubt, 
parasites live off of others; they are freeloaders. Parasites are thus often 
seen as failures and vermin, but it is possible to reverse this emphasis.68 
Before the word ‘parasite’ experienced a shift in meaning and became 
synonymous with freeloader, the ancient word ‘parasitos’ referred etymo-
logically to the prestigious attendants invited by priests to holy banquets 
held in honour of the gods.69 The word ‘parasitos’ thus originally referred 
to a ritual functionary, but it already experienced a negative reinterpreta-
tion in ancient times and in the nineteenth century it was taken over – in 
the sense of an occupation – by the natural sciences.70 From a biological 
viewpoint, parasitism always establishes a (precarious) balance, as the 
parasite depletes the host’s energy while at the same time it is also interested 
in preserving the vital functions on which it lives. The host ensures the 
parasite’s survival. They both adapt in a kind of co-evolution. The parasitic 
lifestyle is one of the most successful in the animal world. Are there any 
systems at all without parasites? Nevertheless, asymmetrical symbiosis is 
simply a basic phenomenon in the development of the living. It gradually 
leads to the development of well-adapted species and the disappearance of 
poorly adapted species. In short: evolution would be unthinkable without 
parasites. The parasite ‘produces small oscillations of the system, small 
differences’.71
It was Michel Serres who drew the radical conclusion that the border 
between parasitic and non-parasitic life was fluid. For him, the parasitic 
relationship evolved into a community-endowing elementary form of inter-
subjectivity par excellence; the parasitic is interpreted as the ‘atomic form 
of our relations’.72 For him, the essence of parasitism is not the one-sided 
damage to the host, but ‘simply’ the disproportionate ratio of giving and tak-
ing. If ‘to parasite means to eat next to’,73 then the humour of this statement 
lies in the fact that people are always parasites as they are integrated in an 
irreversible chain of one-sided giving and taking. Due to the unidirectional-
ity of this chain it is not actually exchangeable, but it is balanced by the 
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multidirectional diversity in which people become either parasites or their 
hosts. For Serres, therefore, the ‘logic’ of the parasite constitutes the basis 
of all social relationships, and the essence of this ‘logic’ is non-reciprocity.
Something clearly emerges in the f igure of the parasite that is also 
signif icant for medical and technical infection. On the one hand, there 
is the one-sidedness of transmission, which requires the existence of a dif-
ference between two bodies, organisms, or programs; the direction of the 
transmission is thereby unambiguous and irreversible, and it thus proceeds 
asymmetrical and not reciprocally. On the other hand, it is signif icant that 
parasitic transmission involves not only a destructive but also a constructive 
potential that promotes cooperation and symbiosis.74
It is no accident that computer worms exploit security flaws in operat-
ing systems and thereby at the same time call attention to those f laws, 
which are all too easily overlooked in the course of an operating system’s 
practical use. Computer worms thus encourage the ‘healing’ – or should I 
say ‘immunization’ – of operating systems. In order to turn to a decidedly 
‘metaphorical’75 use of the vocabulary of infection, the interrelationship of 
infection and immunization now provides a key term – namely, the social 
contamination caused by violence between the groups of a ‘social body’.
The Epidemic of Violence and the Sacred Victim
Violence infects; violence violates. With its coerciveness and its potential for 
destruction, there is hardly any other behaviour that so strongly resembles a 
disease whose subversive power comes from the circulation of transmissions 
than violence, which obeys a logic of revenge. Infection produces sacrif ices. 
René Girard interprets the holy institution of the sacrif ice as a strategy of 
immunization directed against the epidemic spread of reciprocal acts of 
revenge in archaic societies, which do not (yet) have legal institutions.76 And 
in an ingenious essay Dirk Setton shows how, with the help of the terms of 
infection, Girard’s cultural anthropology of the sacrifice, which is motivated 
by religious theory, as well as Levinas’s philosophy of the incomprehensible 
singularity of the other, which is motivated by ethics, each reveal violence 
as the sublime common cause of problems that are then overcome in some 
way or other through religion and ethics: ‘The problem of infectious violence 
lies at the heart of religion and ethics.’77 In the following I will only take up 
Girard’s religious considerations, which primarily interpret the sacrif ice as 
an immunizing instance in situations of infectious violence.78
The holy sacrif ice is usually interpreted as an act of mediation between 
humans and god, and it thus becomes a social activity that is more or less 
inconsequential in the space of the imaginary. In contrast to this notion, 
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Girard wants to show that sacrif ice fulf ils real interpersonal functions. This 
f irst becomes evident when the sacrif ice is seen as a form of mediation not 
between humans and god but rather between the members and groups of 
social communities.
The starting point is the observation that in archaic societies violence and 
disease are both identif ied with the impure or the infected, so they are both 
to be approached with ritual efforts.79 Under archaic conditions, violence 
triggers a chain reaction of reciprocal acts of revenge. An act of violence 
against a member of a family or clan prompts a reciprocal act by this group 
against members of the other family or clan. Violence thus activates a ‘logic 
of infection’ and acquires a ‘viral power’80 within the social body, which 
can only be averted through strategies of immunization. The institution 
of law and the monopoly of violence associated with it can actually be 
interpreted as disrupting the continuous chain of reciprocal violence insofar 
as the judge’s verdict constitutes the last form of revenge, which cannot be 
transmitted any further. Girard’s premise is that societies without legal 
institutions attempt to stop the epidemic spread of violence through the 
rite of sacrif ice. From this perspective, law and holy sacrif ice prove to be 
equally pragmatic and functional.81
What is most interesting about Girard’s theory is not only the epidemic 
character of violence, the chain reaction of circulating violations in the 
social body of a society whose logic of infection weakens and undermines 
the community, or its resolution through the immunizing strategy of 
sacrif ice. It is even more signif icant that Girard explains the immunizing 
function of sacrif ice by describing it as the mediator of a transmission event. 
The potential for violence is transmitted to the sacrif ice – in an absolutely 
literal sense – and it can then be allayed and overcome in and through the 
sacrif ice. The special status of the sacrif iced thus becomes signif icant; like 
the neutrality of the messenger, it is caught between competing groups 
enmeshed in the reciprocal use of force. In a sense, the sacrif ice82 is ‘in-
nocent’ and indifferent; above all, however, it must be free of the reciprocal 
obligations and responsibilities of the members of a social body (i.e. the 
responsibility to exact revenge), and it is thus outside the social order. It 
is the scapegoat. Prisoners of war, slaves, foreigners, unmarried youth, but 
principally animals were thus especially predestined to assume the role of 
the cathartic sacrif ice.83
The sacrif iced becomes a ‘neutral’ medium, which absorbs and embodies 
the community’s potential for violence; the sacrif ice ‘is a substitute for all 
the members of the community, offered up by the members themselves’.84 
Communal killing or the collectivity of murder appeases and spares the 
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reciprocally injured and dead.85 From this perspective, the sacrif ice is no 
longer considered an exercise of violence against an individual, but rather 
as an act of violence against the scapegoat it constitutes at the same time 
a protective barrier against violence within the community. Girard thus 
interprets sacrif icing as a process of immunization.
In a virtual reversal of perspective, I will now turn to another f ield in 
which the vocabulary of infection can be applied: the aesthetic experience. 
The issue here is that the intellectual immunization inherent to theatre 
as a symbolic, representational institution is always also subverted by 
the theatrical performance, insofar as a kind of bodily infection emerges 
precisely in the here and now of the presentation.
Infection as a Form of Aesthetic Experience
With the concept of catharsis, a medical term was employed early on to 
attempt to describe and theoretically explain the effect of theatre on specta-
tors. ‘Catharsis’ means bodily purif ication for the purpose of healing. Erika 
Fischer-Lichte shows that it also makes perfect sense to use the concept of 
infection, which like catharsis refers to the transformation of a body (albeit 
in the opposite direction, from health to sickness), to express a modality of 
theatrical experience.86 Moreover, the ‘logic of infection’ of this theatrical 
experience is appropriate for expressing in a signif icant way the relation-
ship between artists and spectators as it pertains to the development of 
performance art since the 1960s. I will now illustrate the basic intention of 
Fischer-Lichte’s aestheticization of the concept of infection.
Infection occurs between bodies. It is therefore above all the dimension 
of corporeality in the experience of art, which is thematized in the idea 
of aesthetic infection: ‘The concept of infection conceives and describes 
aesthetic experience in the theater as a primarily somatic process.’87 The 
theatrical performance depends on the physical co-presence of actors 
and spectators in a shared space: the prerequisite for an infection is thus 
def initely fulf illed. However, unlike medical infection, which requires 
actual contact and the exchange of organismic material, theatrical infec-
tion only happens through the gaze of the spectator: ‘The infection takes 
place in the act of watching, it is the act of watching.’88 The spectator only 
changes through looking: a kind of ‘white magic’ takes place in his gaze, 
in contrast to the ‘black magic’ of the evil eye. The fact that the somatic 
character of infection takes on almost magical properties here illustrates 
how much the terminology of infection sees itself as a counter project 
to a hermeneutically-oriented understanding of visual perception. The 
spectator is not (any longer) considered to be a distanced or even indifferent 
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observer who reflects upon what he perceives. The somaticity of infection 
aims to subvert the reduction of watching to a mental process. Moreover, 
a pre-rational, pre-reflexive relationship between the actors and specta-
tors also unfolds. The spectator’s gaze is not directed towards the role and 
f igure of the actor, or his semiotic body, but rather it is directed towards his 
phenomenal body. The infection of the spectator consists in the fact that 
‘powers released in the body of the actor are perceived by the spectator’s 
gaze and are thereby able to influence and transform the spectator’s body’.89
Insofar as the concept of infection is based on the physiological effects 
on the spectator, it is no surprise that after this concept was codified in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the vocabulary of infection was then 
replaced by a notion of art reception with the proclamation of the autonomy 
of art in the nineteenth century, which was geared towards empathy and 
thus a spiritual-mental process.90 Infection took on the negative connota-
tions of ‘weakness’ and ‘contamination’, and it was not revisited again until 
the twentieth century when Antonin Artaud compared the theatre to the 
infectious effect of the plague, as it similarly provokes a crisis in the specta-
tor.91 For Artaud, the theatre can heal people in the Western world, who are 
ill with logocentrism and individualism, as it activates a ‘kind of counter 
infection’.92 The arts since the 1960s have absorbed the corporeality and 
materiality-oriented impulse of the historical avant-garde: action painting, 
body art, performance art, or scenic music not only bring the corporeality of 
the actors into play, but at the same time they also target the corporeality of 
the spectators themselves.93 When artists injure themselves during a perfor-
mance, when they overexert themselves to the point of physical exhaustion, 
when they display sick and frail bodies, when they make the intimacy of 
their nakedness public, these all lead to bodily reactions in the spectators 
themselves, to physiological, energetic, affective, and also motoric states. 
This physical involvement – among artists as well as spectators – reflects an 
understanding of aesthetic experience as a somatic process, which lends a 
new actuality to the concept of aesthetic infection: It thus seems ‘sensible and 
worthwhile to theorize the concept of infection, which until now has been 
applied metaphorically in the discourse of aesthetics, in the same way that 
the concept of catharsis has been theorized over the course of many centuries. 
For it appears in many respects to be the more important concept today.’94
Transcription and Mimesis
Take a step back from the panorama that has been presented thus far, 
which includes medical, technical, social, and aesthetic forms of infection. 
By discussing infection in terms of biological and technical viruses, it has 
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been revealed that ‘transcription’ is the central mechanism of transmission. 
The power of transcribing is precisely that it levels a systemic difference, 
the difference between self and other, which is the driving force that sets 
an infectious transmission in motion in the f irst place.
Could this equalization of difference through transcription also be 
reconstructed as a mimetic potential?
René Girard actually emphasized that the rite of sacrif ice turns everyone 
involved into ‘doubles’ whose attitudes converge as they are linked together 
and communitized through the shared guilt of collective sacrif icial mur-
der.95 The act of sacrif icing establishes a mimesis between the sacrif icers, 
and the sacrif ice thus becomes a mediator between them. For Girard, as 
Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf point out, ‘mimetic mediation’ is actu-
ally an anthropological fact and a ‘general principle of society’.96 Moreover, 
mimesis is an effective although historically transitory principle of art that 
nevertheless inevitably entails an anti-mimetic critique and must then 
give way to a semiotic paradigm (Girard explains this using the example 
of Romantic literature).
The relationship between mimesis and semiosis is connected to the 
concept of theatrical infection. From the semiotic perspective, the actor 
plays and represents a role while the spectator observes the stage event from 
a reflexive distance: This made the theatre into a paradigmatic model of the 
symbolic culture of representation, which seems precisely to overpower the 
mimetic as a mode of action and interaction. From the somatic perspective, 
however, the theatrical infection grips spectators in a way that is beyond 
distance, ref lection, and control, and it is always also interwoven with 
the idea that the actor is not only a symbolic body, but also a phenomenal 
body. Doesn’t this suggest that the vocabulary of infection undermines 
the logic of representation insofar as it features a mimetic dimension? 
Does mimesis thus constitute an anthropologically fundamental form of 
transmission, which is embedded much deeper in the representational 
processes of semiosis than is commonly acknowledged?
So What Does ‘Transmission through Infection’ Mean? A Conclusion
(1) Somaticity: One characteristic of transmission that occurs as infection 
is the explicit corporeality of this process. From a biological – as well as 
technical – perspective, this means that a pathogen is only transmissible 
through contact and that the infection then results in a transformation 
of the infected body. The use of the concept of infection in non-biological 
contexts is thus always also a counter-project to mentalistic, rationalistic, 
or ‘disembodied’ concepts of influence.
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(2) Heterogeneity: Transmission occurs between systems that vary enor-
mously, regardless of whether this is described as a difference between self 
and other, healthy and sick, host and parasite, actor and spectator, or rival 
clans/families. Strategies of immunization depend precisely on the possibil-
ity of levelling and erasing this heterogeneity in favour of homogeneity. If 
the divide created by a difference disappears, then there is also no infection 
(any longer).
(3) Non-Reciprocity and Unidirectionality: Although both sides must be 
in contact in order for transmission to occur, infectious transmission is not 
an interrelationship, but rather it is one-sided. Thus there is also an interval 
through which a body can f irst become the receiver and (then) the sender 
of a pathogen.
(4) Transcription: The primary device used in the particular kind of infec-
tion that occurs through viruses is transcription. It is the unique mechanism 
of transmission that makes viral activities so instructive. Although somatic-
ity constitutes the fundamental characteristic of disease transmission, the 
physiology of transmission through viruses is linked to information process-
ing, which is reflected in concepts like ‘transcription’, ‘coding’, ‘reading’, and 
‘translating’. At the same time transcribing is also related to mimesis. Does 
mimesis constitute the source of an interconnection between the symbolic 
and the phenomenal, the mind and the body? Does it constitute a strategy 
that equalizes the divergent without abandoning divergence?
(5) Violence: Violence is inherent to infectious transmission in many re-
spects: (a) pathogens are invasive. They have an elementary power with nearly 
compelling effects. This also means that something happens to the infected; 
he performs a passive role insofar as the event is largely beyond his control. 
This ‘compulsion’ is particularly significant when it is emphasized that the 
concept of ‘infection’ refers to a non-mental, non-reflexive process. (b) This 
violence is mirrored once again in the violence of the counter-measures used 
to resist them. Immunization thus represents the controlled implementation 
of a disease. Above all, however, the isolation and exclusion of quarantine is 
an element that is experienced as violence by the parties affected.
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Money: The Transmission of Property through Desubstantiation
There is hardly any transmission process as familiar as buying and sell-
ing. A business transaction in which goods are passed from one person to 
another is an activity that creates and confirms the overall picture of our 
social union like hardly any other aspect of our daily behaviour. These 
transactions are possible because of money.
For philosophy, money is an object that is all too profane and there-
fore – at least theoretically – mostly avoided. As much as philosophers 
are concerned with the communicative exchange of words and signs, 
they neglect to reflect on the exchange of goods and values. And yet there 
are surprising family resemblances between the circulation of signs and 
goods, as language and money, as well as intellect and economic rationality, 
def initely have something in common. Most recently, Hartmut Winkler’s 
study Diskursökonomie explored the structural similarities between the 
exchange of signs and goods, which thus introduced a new perspective for 
the theory of media as mediator of circulation.97 And Eske Bockelmann’s 
work Im Takt des Geldes examined the capacity for abstraction that exists in 
the equivalent relationship between, on the one hand, the value function of 
money, which is detached from its concrete content, and, on the other hand, 
the commodity form of goods, which possesses all concrete contents.98 In 
his groundbreaking study Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero, Brian 
Rotman has undertaken a comprehensive semiotic reconstruction of money 
by analyzing its function as meta-sign.99 Finally, Siegfried Blasche’s ‘Zur 
Philosophie des Geldes’ worked out the performativity of money as well 
as its performance conditions by analogy to the performativity of speech 
acts.100 However, I am less interested in the symbolic nature of money, and I 
will also focus only marginally on the performance of the social institution 
of the monetary system. I am more concerned with the question of whether 
the functional principle of money contains any insights that would be 
enlightening for media theory. But what does it mean to analyze money 
as a medium?
What Is Money?
What is the answer to this elementary question: What is money? One 
answer – which is nevertheless only provisional here – can be found in the 
monetary functions of money or the uses to which it is put. This reveals 
at least three dimensions: money is a means and mediator of economic 
exchange, it is an instrument of measurement, and lastly it is a store of value. 
Money transmits value, measures value, and stores value. Admittedly this 
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is an overly simplif ied hypothesis that must later be revised, but from the 
perspective of usage it is at least clear that the mediator function of money 
is indisputable. So what does it mean if the exchange of goods takes place 
through the medium of money?
People desire things that they lack but others possess. In societies based 
on the division of labour this applies to many things. There are three obvious 
ways of obtaining the desired object: it can be stolen, given as a gift, or 
purchased. Theft leaves behind a form of guilt, as does the one-sidedness of 
a gift.101 Paying the required price, however, absolves people of any further 
responsibility. Buying and selling always entail at the same time both giv-
ing and taking. Through the intervention of money, what is received is 
considered to be equivalent to what is given in exchange, and reciprocity 
is thus maintained.
The fact that people want what others have results in a conflict-laden 
asymmetry of interests, and the mediator function of money consists pre-
cisely in preventing this collision. The use of money enables people to induce 
others to do what they want in a way that – unlike the use of violence or 
love – saves time and energy102: ‘Money reduces transaction costs.’103 Money 
successfully mediates between those who are opposed by designating and 
assessing commonality in difference. Above all, it embodies and reif ies this 
commonality – the quantif iable value – thus making it manageable. Money 
is the standard that enables the similarity of the different, the homogeneity 
in the heterogeneous, to assume an objectifiable form. Money is, in the literal 
sense of the word, unifying, it synthesizes.104 I will now emphasize more 
clearly three facets of money-mediated exchange: (1) its sociality, (2) its ab-
stractness and indifference, and (3) its materiality and structural properties.
On the Sociality of Money
(1) Mediator between people, not things. The fact that we purchase goods 
with money or sell them for money fosters the impression that an exchange 
of things has taken place according to their inherent value. Contrary to the 
appearance of a transaction of things or services, however, money remains 
fundamentally a mediator between people. What money transmits is not 
simply a thing, but rather the ownership of a thing. Ownership is exclusive: 
if I legally own something, then others are excluded from this relationship. 
By enabling the transmission of property, money is a social medium. It 
mediates between people in that it enables the exchange of things in a way 
that is free of conflict.105
The national economist Hajo Riese goes further into the social inter-
pretation of the function of money. For Riese, money is based not on acts 
110 MediuM, Messenger, TransMission
of exchange, but rather on obligations: money is only a means of payment 
because it is ‘the ultimate medium of contractual fulf illment’.106 For Riese, 
the monetary system is not based on the exchange of goods, which is also 
possible in non-monetary forms, but rather credit,107 and thus the relation-
ship between creditors and debtors.108 The beginning of the monetary 
economy thus lies in an authorized institution of money creation. This 
institutional foundation of the monetary system contains two dimensions 
that help to illuminate its sociality: the religious origin of money and its 
performativity.
(2) The sacred origin of money. Ernst Curtius already clarified the religious 
character of Greek coins – the earliest form of minted money – in 1870, at a 
time when this was already assumed but not yet proven. Greek coin designs 
mostly featured gods, but this was not the profane result of the fact a deity 
constituted the city coat of arms and thus belonged on coins ‘by order of the 
state’. Rather, Greek temples were the oldest f inancial institutions and their 
priests were the first capitalists: the priests gave advances to congregations 
and private individuals, participated in profitable business enterprises, sup-
ported overseas settlements, and intervened monetarily in wars.109 Moreover, 
a number of cults were linked to practices whose own dynamics required 
the minting of money, such as temple prostitution and the ecclesiastical 
organization of contests, etc.110 Hellenic coins were thus originally used as 
temple money and it was not until later that they passed from the hands of 
the priesthood to those of the state.111
However, the connection between religion and money is also systemati-
cally instructive in other ways: The power of money to enable the peaceful 
transfer of goods from those who have them to others who do not derives 
from the sacrificial character of payment. The desired object is only acquired 
through a renunciation. Acquisitions mediated by money function as acts 
of self-denial. This is precisely the same functional logic that motivated the 
practice of holy sacrif ice. The connection between sacrif ice and money is 
actually quite prominent, and it is also established etymologically through 
such words as ‘pecunia’ (from the Latin ‘pecus’, which referred to ‘sacrif icial 
cattle’), ‘obolus’ (from the Greek ‘obolos’, which referred to ‘sacrif icial skew-
ers’), and ‘moneta’ (from Juno Moneta, the Roman goddess of fertility and 
coinage), or in the sacrif icial animal, which was the most common motif 
of early coins.112
In The Philosophy of Money, Georg Simmel identif ied sacrif ice as the 
basis of any exchange: ‘[T]he content of the sacrif ice or renunciation that is 
interposed between man and the object of his demand is, at the same time, 
the object of someone else’s demand. The one has to give up the possession 
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or enjoyment that the other wants in order to persuade the latter to give 
up what he owns and what the former wants.’113 The price of a commodity 
is therefore the price of the sacrif ice that is required for its acquisition. 
The fact that money mediates reciprocal exchanges opens up the meaning 
of sacrif ice, which in everyday language is considered to be a one-sided, 
asymmetrical act for which nothing is to be given in return.114 The idea that 
people must give something away in order to be able to take, that they can 
enjoy something when they are prepared to pay the price for it, illustrates 
how exchange differs from stealing or giving a gift. It also constitutes the 
money economy’s own rationality. Money weighs and specif ies the degree 
of sacrif ice necessary to acquire something; it makes giving and taking 
calculable and billable.
(3) The performativity of money. The origin of money in the temple and 
the priesthood already shows that money is an institutional fact; moreover, 
the reduction of money to the giving and taking of credit suggests that 
money is always associated with a ‘promise of value’ and thus also with 
‘trust’. In the words of Hartmut Winkler: money is an institution that is not 
based on reference, truth, or substance, but rather on performance.115 For 
Siegfried Blasche, the ‘crucial philosophical insight’ is that ‘money – like 
other institutions – is the result of speech acts’.116 And the performative 
nature117 of money means precisely that its validity has nothing to do with 
‘conditions of truth’, but rather it is based on trust and approval.118 There 
is only money insofar as something is accepted as money: Money exists 
because it is valid.119 Moreover, an object only becomes money when it is 
enthroned as money by a central institution.120 In modern societies, the 
central bank controls the creation of money and keeps money scarce. By 
virtue of this institutional authorization, the mediator function of money 
can then actually be based on the beliefs and expectations of those who 
use it rather than a reference to actual goods for which it can be exchanged.
I will now look more closely at this liberation of the value of money from 
its capacity to be a commodity or its ability to be exchanged for ‘valuable’ 
goods.
Generality, Indifference, Abstractness
If money makes giving and taking billable, if it represents the homogeneous 
in the heterogeneous, if it relates different things to one another and makes 
them equivalent, this is because there is a fundamental distance between 
money and the things whose circulation it mediates. Money becomes a 
medium for the exchange of goods insofar as it remains separate from other 
goods. This otherness of money is evidenced by the fact that people are able 
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to neither produce nor consume money: Self-produced money is not money, 
but rather counterfeit money; and if Uncle Scrooge’s consumption consists in 
the ‘enjoyment’ of the mountain of cash in his money bin (I will return to the 
issue of greed later), he has precisely alienated it from its mediating function. 
The economic encompasses production, consumption, and circulation: And 
money is a ‘material’ that genuinely belongs in the sphere of circulation (and 
distribution). When ‘natural’ commodities set the standard against which 
the value of the exchanged object was determined according to size, number, 
and weight – like barley, which was used in Mesopotamia around 2700 B.C., 
or more often metals like copper, tin, bronze, silver, or gold, which were 
remarkably useful for tools and jewellery – these were at best only early forms 
of money. In a conceptually narrow sense, coins furnished with images and 
numbers were the f irst examples of actual money because in these coins the 
complete metamorphosis of the use value of a thing into its exchange value 
acquired a concrete form. If the market economy’s penetration into a society 
tends to put a price on everything and thus subordinates everything to the 
regime of exchange value, does the ‘materiality’ of money represent a ‘pure’ 
and ideal form of value that objectif ies this transformation of use value?121
Money, as is well known, has passed through various stages of develop-
ment, from coins to paper currency and f inally to electronic money, which 
is only understood as sight deposits received and credited to accounts. And 
no less well-known is the tendency towards the successive separation of the 
real value and the face value of money: While material value and face value 
temporarily coincide in coins and while paper currency at least depends 
on the suggestion of f inancial coverage through gold reserves, the value of 
money actually consists in its legally determined institutionalization as a 
state-approved symbol of economic value.122
As a common equalizer, money functions as a ‘machine of decontextual-
ization’123 and a mechanism of dematerialization. Money establishes equiva-
lence not only in the sense of equality, but also in the sense of indifference.124 
Money does not reveal its history and it remains entirely available for future 
use. Money is free of indexical traces. Money is indifferent towards people 
and things and it can thus also be transmuted into everything purchasable. 
In the words of Goethe: ‘This metal can be transformed into anything.’ Money 
becomes the incarnation of a form of value that makes concrete qualities 
and substantial differences comparable by levelling qualitative differences. 
It is also possible to speak of a ‘self-neutralization’ of money, which is a key 
to understanding its medial character.125 Money must have differentiated 
itself as indifferent and without content as opposed to commodities, which 
are determined according to their content. Value and money are conceived 
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as ‘a pure unity that consists of itself and is determined by itself; it can refer 
to any conceivable contents while still remaining detached from them’.126 
The ‘quality’ of money consists only in its quantity.127 In money the abstract 
form of value not only prevails over the concrete natural form, but rather 
this abstraction also manifests itself: Something invisible is literally and 
materially objectif ied and becomes empirically real.128
However, as Bockelmann demonstrates, it was not until the sixteenth 
century (in central Europe), when market conditions took hold to such a 
degree that money actually became a universal and abstract unity, that 
nearly all goods were subjected to a standard measurement of value.129 As 
Richard Sylla points out, money f irst led to the rise of large national econo-
mies in Holland, England, the USA, and Japan in the form of a developed 
f inancial system and a functioning f inancial market.130
I previously asked how money was different from the rest of the world 
of goods, and I can now once again offer an answer: Concrete goods have 
a value that is inherently and indelibly connected to their materiality, but 
money represents this value in a way that is detached from any concrete 
materiality. Money embodies the disembodiment of value; it desubstantializes 
values. It is the objectif ication of an abstraction. Money is ‘the substance 
that embodies abstract economic value’.131
To posit different things as equivalent through exchange and to subsume 
the diversity of the objects exchanged into a unifying form is a practice that 
involves an intellectual if not theoretical performance of the f irst rank. The 
abstract and the general usually meet as a result of intellectual processes, 
but in money abstraction becomes an element of a practical performance. 
There is a striking family resemblance between the form of money and the 
form of thought, and it is therefore no surprise that some people assume 
there is a genuine connection between economics and intellect, between 
the abstraction of money and formalization. Nietzsche already considered 
this possibility: ‘Making prices, assessing values, thinking out equivalents, 
exchanging – all this preoccupied the primal thoughts of man to such an 
extent that in a certain sense it constituted thinking itself.’132 Alfred Sohn-
Rethel pursued the analogy of money and intellect to the greatest possible 
extent: For him, the transcendental subject, and thus the philosophy of a 
universally valid and necessary a priori, is historically based on the com-
modity form: ‘The abstractness of exchange is reflected in money and its rep-
resentation is separate from all other commodities.’133 Exchange, abstraction, 
and thought assist each other. It is no accident that the introduction of the 
coin form of money around 680 B.C. in ancient Greece was accompanied by 
the genesis of an abstract, logical form of thought.134 Sohn-Rethel interprets 
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this parallelism as a relationship of dependence: The abstraction of form is 
due not to thought, but rather to the social traff ic of the money economy.
Structural Properties
Money’s potential for desubstantiation is therefore due to the fact that it 
consists of an independent kind of substance that is unlike all other sub-
stances. At the same time, however, the development of the money economy 
is undoubtedly accompanied by a dematerialization and virtualization of 
money, whose ‘manageable substance’ is increasingly displaced by debited 
money. How can this tension between the ‘corporeality’ and ‘disembodi-
ment’ of money be understood more precisely? It is at least clear here that 
the identif ication of money and immateriality is not suff icient. Walter 
Seitter – like Sohn-Rethel before him – disagrees with the widespread 
notion of the immateriality of money: ‘Money is certainly not immaterial.’135 
But how is it possible to understand the ‘dematerialized materiality’ of 
money, which concretely embodies the disembodiment of value?
First, it must be taken into consideration that the physicality of coin 
and paper money ‘appears in the form of pieces’.136 As Seitter argues, these 
‘pieces’ can be understood as solid and stabile objects of a manageable size, 
which are suitable for forming units that can be dissected or combined.137 
Pieces are therefore manageable, which means that they also wear out. 
Coins become worn out, paper money becomes crumpled and ripped, yet 
the issuing institution always takes back ‘used’ money and exchanges it for 
‘high value’ money. This phenomenon shows that the notion of money as 
solid objects or pieces has its limitations.
Money is discrete and mobile, and it thus ideally fulfils Niklas Luhmann’s 
expectations of media as quantities of loosely connected units. However, 
money shares this discreteness not only with solid objects, but also with 
speech sounds, letters, and above all with numbers insofar as they also 
constitute countable quantities of units. The notion of money as pieces can 
thus be interpreted as a pioneering form of the digital. Bernhard Vief has 
theoretically explored the parallels between the discreteness of money and 
the digitality of the binary alphabet, which functions as ‘token money’ in 
the universe of signs.138
What is most significant here is that money is a ‘material’ that is designed 
to be countable. Pieces of money are distinct from other kinds of material 
in that they are not subject to physical changes over time, even when they 
are pulled from circulation.139
It is no accident that money is always furnished with writing and images 
and always symbolically marked with numerical values. This unmistakably 
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shows that the materiality of money does not reside in the material form 
of its physical givenness but rather in the performativity of its social value. 
Because the natural form of money wears itself out, the continuity of its 
value can only be guaranteed in practice through the f inancial institu-
tion’s promise to replace worn-out money for free. The fact that the use of 
money does not decrease its value is a property that distinguishes money 
from ‘ordinary’ things – even stamps – but links it to linguistic signs. The 
‘materiality of language’ also does not wear itself out. The reason for this is 
the (virtually) unlimited reproducibility of speech sounds. This is possible 
because it involves reproduction without an original. However, there is 
also a fundamental difference between money and language, which leads 
back to the exceptional nature of money: it is possible to produce linguistic 
utterances, but not money. As Walter Seitter says, money ‘always comes from 
an other, a distinguished Other’.140 Seitter also describes this extrinsic origin 
as the ‘heterogony and heteronomy’ of money.141 By virtue of this constitutive 
heteronomy money is scarce and everyone always has too little of it.
The dematerialization hypothesis falls short, therefore, not because 
the materiality of money consists in its physical materiality, but rather 
because it is based on the performative character of money. Money is a 
‘social material’ whose material substance complies with the conditions 
of its desubstantializing function.
Greed and Miserliness
My insistence on the indifferentiality and neutrality of money as a medium 
of circulation remains incomplete if it does not take into account that the 
logic of the money function always undermines this indifferentiality. Money 
can become an end in itself through greed, the goal of which is to increase 
money, and miserliness, the goal of which is to conserve money.142 In this 
polarization of ‘excess consumption’ and ‘obsessive denial’, money is in each 
case estranged from its role as mediator.143 Dieter Thomä characterized 
greed and miserliness as two modalities of avarice: maximized earnings, 
on the one hand, and minimized expenses, on the other hand.144 In excess 
consumption money is spent in order to be equally as quickly replenished, 
and it must then be spent again; money thus becomes the promise of ‘living 
it up’ with an unlimited amount of goods, for which more money is always 
needed. Conversely, the goal of miserliness is to accumulate money, and the 
phenomenal features of these hoards of money often provide a physical and 
archaic sense of satisfaction. Consider, for example, the comic character 
Uncle Scrooge, who embodies the most extreme denial of the circulation 
function of money. Uncle Scrooge bathes in money every morning, he swims 
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in the expanse of cash in his enormous money bin or burrows through it 
like a mole, yet despite this tremendous fortune he eats dry bread and 
drinks tap water. He keeps his ‘number one dime’ – the f irst coin he earned 
himself – until a glass cover. The abrogation of the mediator role of money 
is thus part of this very role, which is true of almost all media.
What Does ‘Transmission through Desubstantialization’ Mean? 
A Conclusion
(1) Money not only enables the exchange of goods, but rather it establishes 
rationalizable relations between people. Money peacefully equalizes situa-
tions of inequality (someone wants what someone else owns) by transmit-
ting property such that taking and giving can be calculated. People only 
receive something when they are prepared to give something in return. 
The social logic of money is rooted in this reciprocity. Human relations 
become billable.
(2) Money establishes a relationship of equivalence between two things 
that are distinct and unequal. Money is the medium that homogenizes 
the heterogeneous through desubstantialization. ‘Desubstantialization’ 
means that the substrate of money is a non-commodity, which is devoid 
of all content and emptied of all substance. Against the background of 
this indifference with regard to materiality and the qualitative, money 
represents quantitative relations: its quality consists in a quantifiability 
that is unaffected by content. In this capacity it is a medium that represents 
value and enables the social exchange of material.
(3) Money’s historical tendency towards dematerialization – from 
especially valuable precious metals to mere credit and electronic money 
– represents the material manifestation of what money ideally embodies: 
complete indifference towards matters of difference and the abstraction of 
all content. As with every medium, negations and reversals of the mediator 
role are part of this role itself: greed and miserliness constitute the poles 
of an approach that strips money of its medial character.
(4) Nevertheless, the desubstantialization, dematerialization, and 
virtualization of money should not be misunderstood as immateriality. 
Rather, the materiality of money can be conceived in a non-material way: it 
consists in its practical medial function. The main feature of this function 
is the performativity of money. Something is money because it is used as 
money. The value that money embodies is based not on its materiality or 
its reference to a process of material exchange, but rather on the authority 
of the f inancial institution that creates it; trust and trustworthiness thus 
lie at the heart of monetary transactions.
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Translation: Language Transmission as Complementation
Martin Heidegger explained the meaning of ‘translation’145 as a leap to 
another language that always remains foreign to the translator.146 In other 
words, translation is an event that is shaped by the distance between lan-
guages and the irrevocable foreignness of the text, which belongs to another 
language and another tradition. For Heidegger, therefore, translating is 
not appropriating a foreign work so that its information is transmitted 
into one’s own language. If this were the case then language would simply 
remain a vehicle that transports the meaning incorporated into texts using 
dictionaries as guides and tools. However, the translator does not bring 
information out of a foreign language into a familiar one, but rather he 
moves – with a leap that is also always precarious – from his own language 
to a new context that is foreign to him. By def ining translation as the act 
of crossing over, Heidegger makes it clear that translation should not be 
misunderstood as transmission.
No theory of translation that is to be taken seriously can ignore the fact 
that languages are fundamentally different and therefore there is always 
something foreign between them. This is symbolized in the myth of the 
tower of Babel. Quine and Derrida’s reflections on translation – despite 
the fact that they come off as quite different – can also be read as echoing 
Heidegger’s difference-oriented interpretation of translation. Quine’s idea 
of radical translation generalizes the ethnological situation of the f ield 
linguist who investigates a language on the basis of concrete situations 
and their immediate context, which are completely unfamiliar to him 
and whose meaning is therefore not based on practice through use, habit, 
and repetition.147 Derrida interprets the myth of Babel as a deconstructive 
act of God, who introduces rupture and difference between people and 
their languages while at the same time facilitating the genesis of sense and 
meaning by virtue of this differentiality.148
For Heidegger, Quine, and Derrida, therefore, the radical difference 
between languages is an unavoidable fact that sets the standard and the 
limit for every attempt at translation.
There is only one language thinker who acknowledges the existence 
of an irreducible linguistic difference ‘after Babel’ and also agrees with 
Heidegger’s disavowal of the instrumental concept of language reduced 
to the symbolic, but who nevertheless uses not division but rather kinship 
between languages – though not based on similarity – as the basis of his 
theory of translation. This thinker is Walter Benjamin, who actually inter-
prets translation as a kind of ‘transmission event’. According to Benjamin, 
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a virtually ‘true’ and ‘pure language’ looms in the vanishing point of real 
linguistic diversity, and this ‘pure language’ f inally emerges in the act of 
translation. This language does not actually exist for Benjamin, but rather 
it is only a quasi-‘messianic’ vanishing point that all translations point 
towards.
For Benjamin, translation is the ‘removal from one language into an-
other’.149 However, this does not mean that translation simply transmits 
sense and meaning from one language to another. As already mentioned, for 
Benjamin translation expresses the ‘essence’ and ‘nature’ of our linguistical-
ity; ‘to be a language’ is therefore ‘to be translatable’. This is the basis of the 
medial character of language, which is precisely why Benjamin’s concept of 
translation is signif icant here. For Benjamin, translatability and mediality 
are the two sides of our linguisticality, which – if this image were not so 
static and thus inappropriate – are related to each other like the front and 
back sides of a page.
For Heidegger, translation remains a leap because there is no medium 
that enables the transfer of one language to another. For Benjamin, how-
ever, translation is a constant transformation, and thus the transfer of one 
language to another occurs ‘through a continuum of transformations’.150
To reconstruct Benjamin’s theory of translation it is also necessary at the 
same time to reconstruct his understanding of linguistic mediality. Against 
this backdrop, Benjamin’s reflections on translation also provide an answer 
to the question of how the transmission function of media makes them 
productive. I will now illuminate the relationship between translatability 
and mediality in f ive steps.
Benjamin’s Affinity for the Reproductive
In familiar traditions of thought, language is considered productive pre-
cisely because and insofar as it is a medium, whether for the cognitive 
representation of facts or understanding between people. The idea that 
speech possesses a genuine creative power and that language is therefore a 
site of production, the original source of our cognitive and communicative 
creativity, is linked to the assumption that language can be used as an 
instrument of knowledge and communication.
In contrast, Benjamin displays – even in his early work – a persistent 
affinity for the reproductive dimension of language and thus for phenomena 
that are usually considered secondary and derivative, like ‘translation’, ‘cri-
tique’, or ‘mimesis’.151 By turning precisely to these linguistic practices, which 
are always associated with the repetition of and reference to something that 
has already been said, Benjamin attempts to sketch a prof ile of language 
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that subverts the instrumentality of language or the anthropogenic shaping 
of language as a medium of expression and communication. Translation 
shows that languages should not be conceived as a means of expression. 
If languages are not means, but rather media – as already mentioned, 
Benjamin’s concept of media is based on this opposition between ‘means’ 
and ‘medium’ – then this also implies that they are not media that refer 
to either objects or other subjects. This is precisely what is ordinarily as-
sumed: The referentiality of a language is based on its (cognitive) reference 
to the extra-linguistic world or its (pragmatic) reference to communication 
partners. For Benjamin, however, the constitutive relation of reference is from 
one language to another. Media are therefore languages insofar as they refer 
to other languages. The f irst decisive step towards understanding Benja-
min’s theory of translation is to conceive of the relationality of languages 
as interlinguistic. Language is only language insofar as it communicates 
with another language. For Benjamin, Wittgenstein’s ‘private language 
argument’ assumes the form of a ‘plurality of languages argument’: There 
can be no language that only exists for itself. Regardless of whether or not a 
language is actually empirically translated, its translatability is inscribed in 
every language, and this is precisely what makes it a language. Benjamin’s 
concentration on the sphere of linguistic reproduction is only logical: It is 
nowhere more apparent ‘what a language is’ than in its ability to refer to 
other languages.
It is important to note one additional fact concerning this interlinguistic 
referentiality; perhaps it appears trivial and will be easily overlooked: ‘To 
translate’ always means to translate languages and not texts. I will return 
to this later, but the next step involves dismissing yet another familiar 
attitude concerning the concept of ‘language’.
From the Metaphysics of Language to the Transcendental Character of 
Translation
In his 1916 essay on language Benjamin already goes far beyond a concept 
of language as a discursive utterance associated with voice or writing: ‘The 
existence of language […] is coextensive not only with all the areas of human 
mental expression in which language is always in one sense or another 
inherent, but with absolutely everything. There is no event or thing in either 
animate or inanimate nature that does not in some way partake of language, 
for it is in the nature of each one to communicate its mental contents.’152 At 
the same time, however, Benjamin also emphasizes that there are different 
languages, such as those of ‘technology’, ‘art’, ‘justice’, and ‘religion’.153 He is 
referring not to particular specialized terminologies here, but rather to the 
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way in which characteristic ‘mental beings’ are communicated for these 
domains. Something exists in the world that can communicate itself, but 
that participates in language in some form or another.
What can be achieved with such a metaphysical if not mystical absoluti-
zation of language? Benjamin’s theory of translation provides one answer. 
If the differences that are relevant for our world and its linguistic diversity 
‘are those of media that are distinguished as it were by their density – that 
is, gradually’154 – then translatability constitutes the universal register, in 
which all relationships and differences can be registered. To make language 
into the ‘material’ out of which the world is formed means that the order 
of the world is based on translatability and translation is an elementary 
expression of a relationship between the diverse. For Benjamin, the fact 
that all of the material dimensions of existence are projected as kinds of 
languages means that Plato’s fundamental distinction between an original 
and its ref lection, which implies that the imitated and reproduced are 
ontologically secondary and derivative, no longer applies.155 The interpreta-
tion of language and translatability as the basic constituents of the world 
guarantees that transfer, transmission, and translation will no longer be 
considered subordinate, but rather they will be conceived as the – funda-
mental – form of production. It actually all comes down to the concept of 
form. Benjamin emphasizes that ‘translation is a form’, which does not mean 
that a work is really translated, but rather that it ‘accepts and even calls for 
translation – in accordance with the meaning of this form’.156
Werner Hamacher’s insightful attempt to def ine translatability as the 
‘categorical imperative of language’, as a challenge that corresponds to 
Kant’s moral law, interprets translatability as a transcendental aspect of 
language.157 For Benjamin, translatability is actually a ‘law of language’, 
according to which every language transcends itself in its aspiration to be 
transferred into another language. In contrast to Kant’s a prioricity, how-
ever, the a priori of translatability in Benjamin’s work is to be understood 
as thoroughly historical. I will now attempt to explain that this means.
The Situation of the Translator: Exteriority
As already mentioned, Benjamin interprets the Fall of Man from a linguistic-
theological perspective as a break whose line of demarcation was marked by 
the fact that language was no longer exclusively employed as a medium, but 
rather – f irst and foremost – as an arbitrary means. God created by naming, 
and the ‘language of names’ was thus a ‘pure’ medium, but the Fall of Man 
resulted in the grammaticalization, semiotization, and instrumentaliza-
tion of language; from then on, language served as a pragmatic means 
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of denotation, identif ication, expression, and communication. Benjamin 
also describes this instrumental conception of language as the ‘bourgeois 
conception of language’.
A translator who understands his activity as an act of ‘mediation’, 
through which the assertions of a work are transposed into another 
language such that the meaning of the translation resembles that of the 
original, is neglecting his task: He is a bad translator.158 In contrast, the ‘true 
translator’ remains mindful of the ‘fall of language’: For him, translation 
is ‘a somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of 
languages. An instant and f inal rather than a temporary and provisional 
solution to this foreignness remains out of the reach of mankind.’159 At 
the same time, however, the translator attempts to reverse the historical 
tendency that culminates in the Babylonian confusion of languages and 
the bourgeois instrumentalization of language in the sense that ‘its goal 
is undeniably a f inal, conclusive, decisive stage of all linguist creation’.160 
On the one hand, the irrevocable foreignness between languages must be 
acknowledged; on the other hand, translation takes place in the vanishing 
point of a ‘paradisiacal’ stage of language. How can the ‘true translator’ do 
justice to both of these aspects? Benjamin’s answer is that he does not use 
language as a means, but rather he approaches it as a medium. This is the 
heart of Benjamin’s theory of translation, but what does it mean to approach 
language as a medium?
In the act of translation, the translator purges languages of their function 
as means and restores their immediacy, which was lost through the Fall 
of Man. This does not happen by transferring the information content 
intended by the author of a foreign-language text into the translator’s native 
language. When it is assumed that a language communicates something, 
then it is working indirectly rather than directly. Language is only immedi-
ate and direct when it communicates itself rather than something else. In 
order to enable this ‘self-communication’, the translator must be able to 
ignore precisely the intention of a text, its ‘meaning’ in the usual sense.
The translator does this by disregarding the relationship between content 
and form that is unique to the original text. While content and language 
actually form a ‘certain unity’ in the original text, like ‘a fruit and its skin, 
the language of the translation envelopes its content like a royal robe with 
ample folds’.161 Benjamin expresses this idea more drastically elsewhere: 
‘the reproduction of the sense ceases to be decisive’162; the translation must 
‘liberate the language imprisoned in a work’.163 With this disengagement 
from meaning and content, the translator radically sets himself apart from 
language and assumes a position outside of language. Benjamin compares 
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the poet and the translator and insists on a fundamental distinction between 
them: Unlike poetry, which is situated ‘in the center of the language forest’, 
translation does not enter this forest of language, but rather remains outside 
of it.164 By virtue of this exteriority – and here Benjamin uses a strange 
image – the translator ‘calls into it without entering, aiming at that single 
spot where the echo is able to give, in its own language, the reverberation of 
the work in the alien one’.165 This cryptic image is easier to understand when 
it is made clear that in his translation essay Benjamin also describes the echo 
and reverberation produced by the translator as ‘true’ and ‘pure language’.166
This ‘pure language’ is direct and thus functions as a medium; it is the 
language that was lost with the Fall of Man: ‘to regain pure language […] 
is the tremendous and only capacity of translation’.167 The point of this 
‘regaining’ is that something is restored that did not actually exist prior to the 
restoration. Benjamin’s linguistic-theological interpretation of the Genesis 
chapter, which identif ies ‘pure language’ with God’s creative language of 
names, implies that such language was never available to concrete histori-
cally situated people. This sheds a characteristically paradoxical light on 
the translator: The productivity of translation consists in revealing a ‘pure 
language’ that does not de facto exist. How does this work? At this point I 
will now turn to the technique of translation.
On the Technique of Translation: Literality
Because translation does not involve transmitting the meaning and content 
of the original, the translator focuses on the word rather than the sentence 
as a unit of meaning.168 Words – not utterances or messages – constitute 
the ‘primary element of translation’. This represents a preliminary step 
‘back’ to the immediacy of language that Benjamin associates with the non-
grammaticality of an (originally divine) ‘language of names’. At the same 
time, however, Benjamin also states that the words of different languages 
never coincide absolutely. At this point Benjamin introduces an important 
idea, which provides the key to his theory of translation. Benjamin distin-
guishes between ‘meaning’, which could also be called ‘word-meaning’, and 
‘connotations’. According to Benjamin, words like ‘Brot’ and ‘pain’ have the 
same meaning, but they each invoke entirely different connotations. These 
connotations are embedded in history, culture, and everyday practices in 
German- and French-speaking areas.
The translator thus focuses on connotations, which are incorporated 
into the original but always remains foreign in the translator’s native 
language. The translator is able to express this foreignness through the 
literalness of a word-for-word transmission: Literality thus becomes the 
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ideal method of translation. It is no accident that Benjamin refers here to 
Hölderlin’s translations of Sophocles, which for him represent ‘monstrous 
examples of such literalness’ because they embody the translator’s radical 
refusal to preserve the meaning of the original, which is precisely what 
the ‘unrestrained license of bad translators’ aspires to do. In Hölderlin’s 
translations of Sophocles, ‘meaning plunges from abyss to abyss’, which 
evokes the danger that the translator can be enclosed in silence. Hölder-
lin’s translations of Sophocles were his last work, but this danger of the 
radicalized literality of a translation can be entirely averted: Benjamin 
offers the example of the interlinear translation of Holy Scripture, which 
no longer attempts to mediate a meaning, but rather enables the appear-
ance of ‘true language’, which is direct and thus a medium, through its 
meaning-alienating literalness. A text proves to be translatable precisely in 
its literalness and without the mediation of meaning.169 This representation 
of ‘true, pure language’ is therefore what all translations amount to: By 
remaining faithful to the word, the translator loosens and suspends the 
original meaning of the message, and the translation now means something 
different than the original text: It thus reveals the true language, which 
was concealed in the original but is brought to light in the ‘transparent’170 
translation.
But again: How is it possible to understand this ‘true language’, which 
the translation reveals but nevertheless does not actually exist?
The Vanishing Point of Translation: The ‘True Language’ and the 
Complementarity of Languages
This ‘true language’ has nothing in common with a discursive sign system. 
It cannot be understood as a self-contained or demarcated object. It is 
something that only exists in the movement of translation.171 The ‘true 
language’ is the medium in which individual languages grow in that they 
are transplanted and ‘live on’ in the translation.172
A translation that focuses on words expresses the diversity of ‘connota-
tions’, which make languages incongruent with each other. By transferring 
one ‘connotation’ into another ‘connotation’, while still remaining mindful 
of their fundamental incongruence, the translator effectively complements 
or completes one language through another. The ‘connotations’ are then 
‘recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part 
of a vessel’.173
Translation is therefore not about replacement, which obeys the se-
miotic logic of aliquid stat pro aliquo and in which what resembles one 
another can take the place of one another; rather, it is about completion. This 
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complementarity is precisely what translation establishes and achieves. It is 
the fundamental relation between languages, which shows that languages 
are related to one another. A relationship – Benjamin emphasizes – does 
not presume any similarity: Languages and their ‘connotations’ are as dif-
ferent as puzzle pieces, which nevertheless f it together. The goal of the true 
translator is to trace these connotations ‘lovingly and in detail incorporate’ 
them.174 The fragment of a particular ‘connotation’ complements the frag-
ment of another ‘connotation’, which points to something ‘higher’ that is 
nevertheless only prospectively constituted by this reference. The pure 
language only exists in individual languages as trace and reference, as 
‘intensive – that is, anticipative, intimating – realization’.175
With this reference to something more complex than the individual 
languages themselves could possibly be, translation becomes ‘unsuited to 
its content, overpowering and alien. This disjunction prevents translation 
and at the same time makes it superf luous.’176 The translation does not 
transmit a meaning, but rather it irretrievably transplants the original in 
another place: This is also why a translation of a translation cannot restore 
the original text. This ‘relocation’ is also at the same time a defamiliarization 
of one’s own native language: Benjamin approvingly cites Rudolf Pannwitz, 
who complains that ‘our translations […] proceed from the wrong premise. 
They want to turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of turning 
German into Hindi, Greek, English.’177 Only when the translation reveals 
the foreignness and diversity between languages can these differences also 
be revealed as complementary and thus integratable. The ‘true language’ 
only becomes apparent to the translator by virtue of his position between 
the languages.
The task of the translator thus consists in transferring the original text 
into the translation in such a way that its brokenness becomes a trace of 
the absent ‘pure language’.
Translation as Complementarity: A Conclusion
So what does this complex theory of translation and its linguistic mysticism 
reveal about the signif icance of messenger, transmission, and medium?
(1) Unlike the poet, there is nothing demiurgical about the translator. He 
does not create original texts, but rather he represents the complementary 
relationship between languages. His sphere or métier is therefore not pro-
duction, but rather reproduction.
(2) The translator can represent the relations between languages insofar 
as he consistently occupies a position of exteriority. His standpoint with 
respect to language – also unlike the poet – is ‘external’. The translator 
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is not situated in language, but rather between languages. This makes the 
translator a kind of messenger f igure.
(3) From this external position the translator is able to loosen the rela-
tionship between content and form that is unique to the original text. By 
separating them from one another, the translator’s activity no longer needs 
to focus on the linguistic transformation of the meaning and information 
content of a text. The ‘joke’ of his position is therefore that his concern with 
language surpasses its function as communication. From this perspective it 
becomes apparent that language is not an instrument, but rather a medium. 
In its mediality language is always also a ‘language of names’, and literalness 
is therefore the ideal method of translation.
(4) The translator no longer focuses on the similarities or even equivalen-
cies between different languages, but rather on the differences in their 
‘connotations’, which constitutes the translation’s basic point of reference. 
The good translator does not correct or cover up these differences, but rather 
attempts to bring them out in the translation.
(5) The translator defamiliarizes the native language, but at the same 
time he can also show that the foreign language and the defamiliarized 
native language complement each other. Completion is thus a fundamental 
principle for translation. The translator becomes a mediator between lan-
guages, as he recognizes their diversity and brokenness but nevertheless 
integrates them by making them visible as fragments – like puzzle pieces 
– of ‘pure language’. By making the differences between languages transpar-
ent and nevertheless f itting them together, the translator reveals that all 
concrete languages jointly participate in a messianic-like ‘pure language’. 
This revelation can only occur through the process of translation.178
(6) Because these fragments of different languages complete each other, 
they point to a linguistic totality that does not actually exist but is poten-
tially visualized through translation. ‘Pure language’ has been gone and 
forgotten since the Fall of Man, but a good translation can be considered a 
trace of this ‘pure language’ insofar as it signals its absence and makes its 
potential givenness a measure of the work of translation itself. The trace of 
this ‘pure language’ is therefore not found in concrete languages, but rather 
in the activity between languages f irst produced by the good translator.
(7) The translatability of languages is intertwined with their mediality, as 
languages become media when they establish the milieu for an assemblage 
of the diverse.
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Psychoanalysis: Transmission through Affective Resonance179
‘The present is only intelligible in the light of the past.’ That is a truism, but 
within the framework of psychoanalysis the orientation of the present to-
wards the past takes on a surprising and also serious life of its own. It could 
be expressed as follows: The present can be scarred by something in the 
past that is forgotten or repressed. The practice of psychoanalysis focuses 
on people whose lives in this sense were not only formed but also deformed 
by their experiences – mostly in childhood. Psychoanalytic transference is 
the process of bringing these deformations to light so they can thus also be 
traced and ‘corrected’. A special relationship between the patient and the 
analyst emerges through transference, as the patient’s acquired affective 
patterns, which mostly remain unconscious, are projected onto the doctor 
such that the relationship to the doctor becomes a substitute for the patient’s 
primary, mostly early childhood object relations. The point here is that 
the psychoanalytic dialogue not only opens up the possibility of reviving 
and acting out frozen ‘inner’ patterns of experience by exteriorizing and 
transferring them onto the doctor, but rather it also contains the possibility 
of remembering the original context of these affective patterns; in this 
way, psychoanalysis is also able to relieve the patient of the burdensome 
implications of past experience.180 The repetition of past experience becomes 
an act in which the repeated is therefore recreated and reshaped. The goal 
of psychoanalysis is more than simply to ‘raise’ the unconscious to con-
sciousness through verbalization and memory: Its goal is to transform a 
cliché-ridden pattern of feeling, and transference is the process by which 
a mutation of the repeated takes place.181 The analyst is thus the mediator 
and medium of transference.
The Psychoanalyst: ‘Neutral Medium’ or Actor?
That is – in a few brief strokes – the basic idea of psychoanalytic transfer-
ence, which is incidentally also furnished with a particular ‘manner of 
speaking that is impregnated by the past and also mechanistic’, whose 
justif ication and relativization will be the aim of the following.
The psychoanalytic concept of transference is interesting because it 
promises to reveal new aspects of the phenomenon of medial mediation. 
Paradoxically, however, the notion that the analyst is a medium and a 
mediator in the transmission event is precisely repressed or represented as 
a problem to be overcome in psychoanalytic literature. There is an obvious 
turning point in the meta-psychological discourse of psychoanalysis, which 
emphasizes precisely the non-mechanical, intersubjective, interactive 
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character of the transmission event: Psychoanalytic transference can be-
come what Sigmund Freud intended it to be – not a disruption of analysis, 
but rather its most valuable tool – only when the idea of the therapist as 
a neutral, impersonal, affectless mediator is replaced by the idea of the 
analyst as a participating, interacting person, when the past experience of 
the patient encounters the here and now of an emotional, intersubjective 
relationship with the doctor, and when the analyst not only mirrors the 
projections of the patient but also encounters the patient as an incom-
mensurable Other and thus becomes a sounding board for the patient.
While this shift from a mechanically-oriented explanation of transfer-
ence to an intersubjective, social-constructivist approach is interpreted in 
the literature as surmounting the neutral mediator function of the analyst, I 
will show conversely that this ‘interactivity perspective’ provides a ground-
breaking answer to the question of how medial passivity can at the same 
time be conceived as a genuine form of activity. The doctor is a medium of 
transmission, but he alters the transmission event, which thus remains more 
than simply a repetition of the past. The goal of the following considerations 
is to work out this active potential as something that does not defeat or 
suspend but rather embodies the psychoanalyst’s position as mediator.
The Genesis of Psychoanalysis Out of the Spirit of Exorcism and 
Hypnosis
Psychoanalysis was not the f irst to discover that the relationship between 
someone who is spiritually or psychologically ill and his healer is a kind 
of transmission event. In the framework of the pathology of ‘possession’, 
which was practically ubiquitous in the nineteenth century, the exorcist 
would address the ‘evil spirit’ inhabiting the invalid not in his own but 
rather in the name of a higher being, which eventually resulted in the 
spirit’s expulsion.182 At the same time, however, the exorcist would also 
talk with the invalid himself, whom he encouraged and bolstered.183 This 
dual character of exorcizing communication, which addressed both the 
spirit that parasitically possessed the invalid as well as the real person of 
the invalid, is remarkable as these ‘two voices’ anticipate the dualism of 
psychoanalytic transference, which is related to both the ‘past unconscious’ 
(the ‘child within the adult’184) and the ‘present unconscious’ (‘the dominant 
conflict in the here-and-now’185) of the patient.
This brief reference to exorcism as an early form of ‘spiritual healing’ 
already outlines an interesting constellation: The medium – the exorcist 
who is commissioned by a higher being to relay communication with the in-
visible, disease-causing spirit – functions at the same time as a non-medium 
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insofar as he personally engages the patient in actual communication as 
an interacting partner. The healer stands apart from the patient in that he 
talks to spirits – both good and evil – but he also gets close to the patient in 
that he refers to him as a concrete person: ‘The structure of the exorcistic 
technique creates both closeness and distance between the therapist and 
the patient, which remains a function of every psychotherapeutic technique 
to this day.’186
The relationship between the hypnotizer and the hypnotized can also be 
considered a precursor to psychoanalytic treatment. For early mesmerists 
the hypnotic relationship was def ined by the concept of ‘rapport’, which 
Freud described as a ‘prototype of transference’. The ‘rapport’ established 
by the hypnotic relationship also incorporates elements of ‘réciprocité 
magnétique’.187 In this sense it was already clear early on that hypnotiz-
ability is dependent on a reciprocally affective relationship between the 
hypnotherapist and the hypnotized subject, a relationship that extends far 
beyond the scope of the mesmeric session.
Janet explored this ‘hypnotic’ relationship between therapist and patient 
in depth at the end of the nineteenth century.188 In the second phase of this 
therapy, the patient developed a ‘somnambulistic passion’ for his hypnotizer, 
which was a combination of love, jealousy, fear, and respect.189 This love 
could be erotic, childish, or motherly, but it hardly had any effect on the 
hypnotherapist. The principle of transference and countertransference 
therefore already informed the analysis of the hypnotic relationship and, 
for Janet at least, it was also reflected in the therapeutic technique.
After the turn of the century, however, this understanding of affective 
reciprocity as the condition of possibility for the hypnotic treatment of 
diseases was replaced by a non-reciprocal concept of hypnosis, in which 
the hypnotherapist once again assumed the position of a neutral mediator 
and hypnosis became f irst and foremost the one-sided performance of the 
hypnotized.190
In his analysis of Anna O., a patient suffering from hysteria, Sigmund 
Freud’s colleague Dr. Joseph Breuer experienced the impossibility of 
actually maintaining such a neutral position: In the course of analysis 
Anna O. fell in love with Breuer and openly revealed her sexual desire for 
the analyst, whereupon Breuer abruptly ‘took f light’. He terminated the 
analysis, stopped treating her, and refused to treat any other hysterical 
patients. In the commenting literature this reaction was assessed in such 
a way that Breuer could not even admit to himself how much he in turn 
also desired his patient. He could only give an indirect signal of his own 
libidinal confusion: The following day he took his wife to Venice for a second 
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honeymoon!191 Sigmund Freud was an observer and witness of Breuer’s 
analysis of Anna O. Is it an accident that Freud’s f irst thoughts concerning 
the psychological transference from patient to doctor and the irrefutable 
phenomenon of countertransference from doctor to patient occurred at the 
same time as Breuer’s reactions to Anna O.? In any case, Peters concludes 
that ‘the history of psychoanalysis thus begins clearly with an uncontrolled 
transference-countertransference relationship’.192
Before turning to Freud’s views on transference, it is necessary to try 
once again to attempt to understand more precisely the ‘initial spark’ that 
motivated Breuer’s elaboration of Freud’s psychoanalytic technique.
Breuer’s work as a neurologist was part of the tradition of hypnotic sug-
gestion, which offered an alternative to electrotherapy and was remarkably 
successful in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Breuer observed 
that Anna O. could escape her psychological state of confusion as soon as 
she was able to verbalize her psychological conditions. Breuer subsequently 
asked his patient, under hypnosis, to describe what moved her internally. As 
soon as Anna O. was able to remember the offending and hurtful feelings 
and experiences that had previously been repressed, which resulted in her 
hysterical ‘symptoms’, she was then able to release these repressed feelings 
and her neurotic symptoms disappeared: The ‘cathartic method’ of the 
abreaction of the repressed was thus born.
Freud adopted this cathartic method from Breuer, although he found an 
alternative to hypnosis in the psychoanalytic technique of free association, 
whereby patients are induced to speak and the analyst then deciphers 
and interprets their verbal communication as an expression of repressed 
impulses, ideas, and feelings.
This search for a suggestive technique that employed speech rather 
than hypnosis represented the birth of the ‘psychoanalytic cure’, and it 
was also the context in which Freud f irst came across the phenomenon of 
transference.
But once again: What was the ‘initial spark’ of Breuer’s psychoanalytic 
method? The simplest answer is the following: He discovered that through 
the verbalization of painful feelings in the past these feelings can once 
again be experienced, acted out, and thus also consciously remembered, 
which results in a release from the unconscious symptoms of repressed 
suffering. Yet there is also a more subtle answer, which is related to Freud’s 
experience of the relationship between Breuer and Anna O. Freud is an 
uninvolved observer of this event, which he undoubtedly knew to interpret 
as a transmission event – and actually on both sides. The word ‘transference’ 
f irst appears in the theoretical section he wrote for Studies on Hysteria, 
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which he published together with Breuer.193 However, at the same time 
Freud observed that Breuer, who was entangled in a thoroughly two-sided 
‘emotional rapport’ with his patient, was not able to recognize or control-
lably avoid this situation.194 As a result, this relationship reflected the same 
duplicity of distance and engagement that already informed the exorcistic 
and hypnotic precursors of psychoanalysis. Freud then developed a concept 
of psychoanalysis in which, on the one hand, the doctor assumed a strict, 
ascetic, and so to speak ‘uninvolved’ observer position, but which, on the 
other hand, also acknowledged that the patient-doctor relationship was 
reciprocal and inevitably libidinal. The idea of psychic transference, which 
Freud develops into a fundamental theorem of his metapsychology and as 
the core process of the psychoanalytic technique, constitutes – and this 
is my primary hypothesis – the theoretical and technical foundation for 
the double role that is attributed to and demanded from the analyst in 
psychoanalysis: to be able to be both a neutral medium and an affective 
sounding board at the same time. But how can the concept of transference 
fulf il this function?
On Transference as Theory and Technique: A Hypothesis
From an objective perspective, psychoanalytic therapy involves a person 
who seeks help from an analyst to cope with problems that limit and cloud 
his life and experience. Not only does a ‘working bond’ develop between then, 
but this bond also arises in an extremely intimate situation: They regularly 
meet each other entirely alone and – usually – over a long period of time. The 
patient begins to reveal his innermost and hardly acknowledged emotions 
to the analyst. The physician listens and also appears to belong entirely to 
the patient: His attention to the patient is undivided. The analyst makes 
every effort to establish a trusting relationship, which allows for the most 
embarrassing feelings and most intimate confessions to be put into words 
without shame. The physician understands his patient – probably more than 
anyone else. Do we ever experience conversations in our everyday lives that 
are so intimate, impulsive, and intense, particularly for neurotic patients?
The physician becomes a libidinal object for the patient, mostly desired, 
sometimes also feared and repelled – but always with a certain inescap-
ability, not to mention inevitability. But what is it like from the reverse 
perspective? What does the patient represent for the analyst? Is he not a 
libidinal object?195
In his commentary on Breuer’s abrupt escape from Anna O’s desire, 
Freud notes that Breuer did not understand the ‘impersonal nature’ of 
‘his patient’s transference on to her physician’, which was ‘never absent’196; 
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furthermore, Breuer could not admit to himself that he was also preoccupied 
with his relationship to his patient. Freud’s concept of transference thus 
lays the groundwork for this necessary depersonalization of the emotional 
relationship between physician and patient.197 The idea of transference 
makes the physician aware of the emotions that the patient shares with 
him, but at the same time it also reveals that these emotions are not to be 
taken personally, as they are not directed at the analyst as a concrete, real 
individual, but rather only as a symbol of previous attachment figures. Freud 
described transference as follows: ‘This new fact, which we thus recognize 
so unwillingly, is known by us as transference. We mean a transference 
of feelings on to the person of the doctor, since we do not believe that the 
situation in the treatment could justify the development of such feelings. 
We suspect, on the contrary, that the whole readiness for these feelings 
is derived from elsewhere […] and, upon the opportunity offered by the 
analytic treatment, are transferred on to the person of the doctor.’198 ‘What 
are transferences? They are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and 
phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress 
of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for 
their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the 
physician. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological experiences 
are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of 
the physician at the present moment.’199 While the transference ‘seemed in 
every case to constitute the greatest threat to the treatment’, it also ‘becomes 
its best tool, by whose help the most secret compartments of mental life 
can be opened’.200 By virtue of transference, rigidif ied emotional conflicts 
from the past are actualized as symptoms and in their libidinal orientation 
towards the physician they take on a new meaning.201 If the physician does 
not succeed in deciphering this meaning, tracing the patient’s positive and 
negative feelings of love, hate, anger, and fear back to their infantile origins, 
and thus ‘pointing out to the patient that his feelings […] are repeating 
something that happened to him earlier’,202 then this repetitive acting out 
can be transformed into conscious memory so that the neurotic symptoms 
are reduced.203
Nevertheless, this is not the whole ‘story’ concerning Freud’s observations 
of Breuer, for where there is transference from patient to physician there 
are also emotions that flow in the opposite direction.204 ‘Other innovations 
in technique relate to the physician himself. We have become aware of the 
“counter-transference”, which arises in him as a result of the patient’s influ-
ence on his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that 
he shall recognize this counter-transference in himself and overcome it.’205
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I will now attempt to sort through the aspects that are essential for 
understanding ‘transference’:
(1) Affection: Transference involves the transmission of feelings and 
therefore mental conditions or attitudes.
(2) Orientation towards the past: These feelings are not new, but rather 
they originate from the patient’s past.206 They are acquired emotional pat-
terns – Freud also refers to them as ‘stereotype plates’.207
(3) Unconsciousness: These past feelings are not simply remembered, 
but rather they are revived and re-experienced through the patient’s 
relationship to the physician.208 They are affective schemata rooted in the 
‘unconscious’, which are then acted out.
(4) Symbolism/Irreality: The transferential nature of these emotional 
clichés implies that they are directed towards the analyst as a ‘substitute’ 
for past object relations; the analyst becomes a symbol and a representative 
of primary attachment f igures from the past, with whom the patient was 
involved in conflict-laden emotional relationships. These feelings, which 
are now projected onto the physician, are – for Freud at least – ‘not founded 
on a real relationship’.209
(5) Interpretation instead of experience: While the patient experiences 
these feelings, it is the analyst’s task not to respond to them emotionally 
but rather to interpret them. In order to interpret them effectively, the 
physician must be consciously aware of the illusory character and thus 
the inappropriateness of the ‘transference feelings’ directed towards him.
(6) Countertransference: Although his role is that of an interpreter, the 
analyst not only interprets but rather also experiences: He also always 
responds to the patient emotionally and unconsciously. He is not only an 
observer and an instrument of transference, but rather he himself enters 
into a transference relationship with the patient.
By viewing the intimacy of the psychoanalytic dialogue from an ‘objec-
tive perspective’ and then comparing these observations to Freud’s explana-
tions of the concept of transference, it is revealed that the psychoanalytic 
constellation has two meanings: (i) The patient should be able to act out 
long-forgotten and above all repressed emotions in the here and now of the 
analytic dialogue. Yet at the same time it is clear that this does not simply 
involve repetition, but rather repetition under altered conditions, which 
(should) open up the possibility that the reproduced emotions are at the 
same time altered through their repetition in that they are articulated, 
remembered, and thus made conscious. Transference is a process not only 
of regression, but also of progression. (ii) The psychoanalytic dialogue is 
emotionally intimate and intense (for both the patient and the physician, 
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as the concept of ‘countertransference’ implies), yet it takes place within 
a particular context where things are only spoken but never acted upon. 
Thomas Szasz thus characterized the analytic situation as a paradox: ‘It 
stimulates, and at the same time frustrates, the development of an intense 
human relationship […] The analytic situation requires that each participant 
have strong experiences, and yet not act on them.’210 I am proposing that 
transference (in conjunction with countertransference) can be interpreted 
as a process that enables this ambivalence.211
The above-mentioned considerations can be consolidated into a hypoth-
esis that contains two parts: (1) As a theory, the concept of transference/
countertransference explains and justif ies the double role of the physician: 
namely, his function within the psychoanalytic constellation as both a neu-
tral medium and an engaged participant. (2) As a technique and a process, 
transference introduces the possibility of circumventing the paradoxical 
tension between neutrality and intimacy or between impersonal abstinence 
and personal engagement.
Transference as a Two-Way Process
First, I want to clarify what it means to describe the physician as a neutral 
medium within the context of the concept of transference. Transference 
actually constitutes a ‘liminal realm’; it is a bridge and a mediator between 
the patient’s past and the present. It generates a separate world between 
mental illness and mental health, between the ‘real’ and the merely ‘sym-
bolic’ relationship of the patient to the physician. Freud himself used the 
expression ‘liminal realm’ to describe transference, and he emphasized 
that it is this feature that enables the ‘transition’ from illness to life.212 This 
localization of transference in an in-between space also enables the physi-
cian to occupy a double role:
(1) On the one hand, he is a projection surface for the patient’s repressed 
conflicts, and the more he is able to bring out these infantile conflicts 
and focus them on himself like a concave mirror, the more he succeeds 
in withdrawing as an individual, real, present person – in becoming a 
blank space, if you will, which can then be ‘f illed’ by the patient. From 
the patient’s perspective, the analyst actually takes the place of infantile 
object relations and becomes a supplement to the patient’s past attachment 
f igures. The analyst is thus an ‘embodied carrier’ or ‘material signif ier’ with 
a merely symbolic and impersonal meaning. He becomes a stage on which 
the dramas experienced by the patient can be re-enacted. In order to focus 
the wishes and conflicts of the neurotic patient onto himself, the physician 
must act as a neutral medium.
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(2) However, at the same time Freud also conceded the phenomenon of 
countertransference: Remaining within the same language game – namely 
that of transferability – he recognized with the concept of countertransfer-
ence that the physician is not only a passive projection surface for the 
patient’s ‘inner child’, but rather the physician in turn also externalizes and 
to a certain extent acts out his own unconscious emotions. The physician 
thus suspends his neutral status: He is no longer a non-responsive medium, 
but rather he becomes a reacting and interacting sounding board.
Freud thus conceived of transference as a two-sided process, as the rudi-
mentary form of an interactive event. From the physician’s neutral (media) 
perspective it appears that illusory, distorted, and inappropriate feelings are 
constantly being directed at the ‘wrong person’ in the form of the physician, 
but from the patient’s perspective they can be real, ‘true’ feelings, which 
are directed towards the physician as an individual person and not only 
as a substitute for infantile attachment f igures.213 Freud wondered whether 
the infatuations that manifest during analysis should be considered real, 
as he explained: ‘We have no right to dispute that the state of being in love 
which makes its appearance in the course of analytic treatment has the 
character of a “genuine” love.’214 Concerning the relationship of the analyst 
to the patient, on the other hand, Freud wrote in a letter to Oskar Pf ister on 
June 5, 1910: ‘In general I agree with Stekel that the patient should be kept 
in a state of abstinence or unhappy love, which is naturally not entirely 
possible. The more the physician allows the patient to f ind love, the more 
he develops the patient’s complexes.’215
Although Freud originally recognized it ‘only’ in terms of countertrans-
ference, he claimed that insight is available or at least prepared in the real 
and not only the symbolic, in the interactive and not only the reflecting-
receiving relationship between physician and patient.
You will recall that with Breuer Freud witnessed how the emotional 
involvement of the analyst can undermine and threaten analysis if these 
emotions are not consciously processed and controlled. When it ‘goes off 
the tracks’, countertransference can be disastrous for therapy. Because he 
recognized the double role of the physician as medium and actor, as an 
intellectual organ of perception and an affective sounding board, it seems 
only logical that Freud’s concept of transference was designed to ensure 
theoretically as well as practically that the physician’s function as a medium 
during analysis remains the organizing centre of the psychoanalytic process.
This was ensured theoretically in that according to the Freudian ap-
proach all transference feelings, whether originating from the patient 
or the physician, are in a sense misguided and therefore ‘inappropriate’, 
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‘illusory’, and ‘distorted’ insofar as they remain quasi-mechanical repetition 
procedures and constraining structures. Freud thus describes transference 
as both a ‘false connection’216 and a ‘new edition’.217 From a pragmatic point 
of view, this emphasis on the reality distorting, repetitive, and regressive 
character of transference – which has incidentally been discredited by many 
psychoanalytic authors as an egological, solipsistic, and psychic-technical 
dimension in Freud’s approach – proves to be a tool or ‘safeguard’ that 
serves to prevent the internal dynamics of the paradoxical tension between 
intimacy and technicity, affectivity and recognition from threatening the 
implementation of psychoanalysis. To know that he is not the receiver, but 
rather the mediator of the intensive feelings directed towards him helps 
the physician to maintain a sense of distance with regard to the seductive 
involvements or repulsive entanglements involved in these emotions.
This was ensured practically in that the spatial constellation of the 
psychoanalytic dialogue as shaped by Freud provided for the staging of 
a depersonalization if not ‘anonymization’ of the analyst: The analyst sits 
behind the patient and thus remains beyond his f ield of vision, while the 
patient in turn lies on the couch.218 ‘Like an infant, the patient cannot be 
active’ and is ‘restricted to his couch/crib’.219 These rules of the analytic 
dialogue situation evoke associations with early childhood relationships. 
Precisely because Freud presumes that the transference of infantile at-
tachment f igures onto the analyst serves as a positive, indispensable aid, 
he requires and establishes a set-up for the dialogue situation, in which the 
physician positions himself as mediator and ambassador of the patient’s 
past. This can already be seen in his seating arrangement, as the analyst 
literally ‘withdraws’ and the patient speaks into the blank space of his 
projections.
The concept of transference thus does not simply discredit the interactive 
productivity and mutual affectivity of the psychoanalytic dialogue, but 
rather it guarantees that the emotional contact of the physician does not 
undermine his role as the analyst. This shows that the ‘mechanics’ of the 
transference process, which are notoriously rooted in the past of the patient, 
at least implicitly point to the reciprocally binding forces and emotions that 
come into effect in the presence of the therapeutic situation. The precepts of 
transference ensure that the physician, insofar as he reacts emotionally to 
the patient, at the same time knows that his patient in turn assumes the role 
of a medium and becomes a projection surface, on which the unconscious 
emotions of the analyst are ‘registered’. In countertransference the physician 
subverts his own neutral position as mediator only in order to reconstitute 
it in the patient; he mutates from mediator to agent in order at the same 
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time to turn the acting (out) patient into the ‘ambassador’ and ‘mirror’ of 
the physicians’ emotions. If the analyst is both a de-individualized mediator 
and an affected individual he can ‘play’ his role as an individual person 
precisely because he transfers his depersonalized mediator function to the 
patient. This contradicts the unidirectionality and asymmetry underlying 
the notion that the patient ‘sends’ neurotic signals, which the analyst then 
‘receives’ and interprets, insofar as these positions prove to be interchange-
able in the here and now of psychoanalysis. However, in the psychoanalytic 
constellation there is always a divide between the position of a non-acting, 
neutral medium and the position of an engaged, acting non-medium.
A Conjecture: Is the Psychoanalytic Dialogue Beyond Dialogue?
The foregoing discussion prompts the following conjecture: Freud describes 
transference as the core event of the psychoanalytic dialogue, and ac-
cording to Freud this transference constitutes an irresolvable asymmetry 
between the speaker who acts (out) and the speaker who is ‘only’ a medium; 
furthermore, Freud concedes that these roles are indeed interchangeable, 
but they are not abolishable: Doesn’t this suggest that the psychoanalytic 
dialogue – if Freud is actually taken seriously – cannot be understood ac-
cording to the model of a dialogue? I am using the word ‘dialogue’ here in 
the elementary sense of a symmetrical two-way conversation, in which the 
participants are on equal terms. I thus propose the following conjecture: 
Wherever transference takes place, there is also no dialogue (in the ‘strict’ 
sense of the word).
When interpreted in a literal sense, this statement may seem trivial. 
Based on the fact that it concerns psychoanalytic dialogue, however, the 
conjecture of a non-dialogism is quite remarkable. You will recall that 
Freud’s ‘discovery’ of psychoanalysis was the result of his efforts to replace 
suggestion, for example, through hypnosis, with talk and nothing but talk. 
Yet now it has been established that by making transference the core event 
in the psychoanalytic dialogue Freud precisely revoked the psychoanalytic 
dialogue’s status as ‘a dialogue’. Nothing illustrates this denial more clearly 
than the rules governing the seating arrangements during psychoanalytic 
sessions, which impose conditions on speech that are constitutively unequal.
At this point it is useful to cast a side glance at Jacques Lacan, who as-
sumes a fundamental bipolarity in speech: Depending on whether the 
speaker employs the ‘moi’ of an egological self-relation or the ‘Je’ of a desire 
oriented towards the other, speech is either a declaration or a remark, it is 
either a representation or an evocation, it either refers to something that 
is objectively accurate or to an existential truth. Indeed, we always speak 
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with these two voices – not only in psychoanalytic dialogue – and for Lacan 
it is the task of the analyst to make the mostly submerged or repressed 
voice of the ‘Je’ talk.220 To return to Freud’s idea of transference, the more 
the analyst becomes the medium of transference for the patient, the more 
he succeeds in making this repressed voice talk, because in this way the 
desire of the patient towards the other can focus on the analyst without any 
inhibitions or distractions. From Lacan’s perspective, the ‘dialogism’ that 
Freud withheld from the psychoanalytic ‘talking cure’ precisely opens up 
the way for a form of speech oriented towards desire. I will now turn to this 
dialogism; and for this purpose it will help to look at newer developments 
in transference theory, which must nevertheless be read ‘against the grain’.
A Dialogical Revision of Freudian Transference Theory?
In the metatheory of psychoanalysis there has been a change regarding the 
theorization of the concept of transference. In conscious opposition to the 
theory that was just developed, this change involves the designation and 
reconstruction of ‘transference’ as precisely a dialogical process. Transfer-
ence is no longer conceived as more than (1) a monolinear, one-sided process 
that (2) revives past emotional clichés in an almost mechanical way, which 
(3) distorts the present by referring to the ‘wrong’ objects at the ‘wrong’ 
time and which (4) receives no response from the analyst but is simply 
observed, interpreted, and recognized by the analyst from his position as a 
neutral medium, such that (5) with analyst’s help the patient’s unconscious, 
repressed past is translated into conscious memory and the patient is thus 
able to free himself from the neurotic symptoms of confrontational experi-
ences from childhood.
I will now recap how the quasi-mechanical concept of transference, 
allegedly laid out by Freud, has been corrected.
(1) Reciprocity instead of one-sidedness: The heart of the dialogical revision 
is the recognition of the reciprocity of transference. Balint observed already 
in 1949 that Freud had created a one-body-psychology, a quasi-physics of the 
psychic apparatus, such that his metapsychology precisely neglected the 
intersubjective character of the psychoanalytic situation.221 Transference 
is now considered the form of a relationship between people that is based 
on two-sidedness and reciprocity.222
(2) Intersubjectivity: What is always brought to light as ‘important’ in the 
psychoanalytic dialogue is not simply the repetition of a meaning that was 
buried in the subconscious in the past. Nor is it an action that arises from 
the quasi-solipsistic isolation of the patient. Rather, it is an activity that is 
due to the reciprocal interactivity of the analytic dialogue: The meaning 
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of transference is therefore always an intersubjective phenomenon. It is 
not the past of the patient that is to be interpreted in light of transference; 
rather, it is the existing relationship between the physician and the patient 
in the present. The unconscious of the patient thus does not itself exist as 
an absolute fact – according to Paul Ricoeur at least – but rather it only 
exists relative to the ‘dialogical’ process of therapy: It is the analyst’s act of 
witnessing that constitutes the patient’s subconscious in the f irst place.223
(3) Relation to reality: Instead of the inappropriate, illusory, and distorted 
character of transference feelings it is emphasized instead that what occurs 
during the process of transference represents to a certain extent a thor-
oughly realistic and appropriate reaction of the patient to the here and now 
of the therapeutic situation. This effectively eliminates the demarcation line 
separating the patient’s ‘deceptive’ form of transference and the physician’s 
‘realistic’ insights into the ‘true nature’ of this transference.
(4) Beyond the analyst as medium of perception: Contrary to an intel-
lectually constraining view of the analyst who remains in the position of 
the observer and performs the functions of recognition and interpretation, 
it is emphasized instead that the physician is emotionally involved in the 
transference event and must be in order to be able to establish a connection 
between the unconscious of the patient and his own unconscious. Wyss 
thus observes that the therapist’s sphere of experience is constitutive for 
mutual understanding.224 Racker emphasizes the fundamentally libidinal 
character of transference: For him, love becomes the very condition of 
possibility for a successful psychoanalysis.225 Weiß also agrees with this 
concept, as he sees transference ‘above all as a manifestation of love’.226 
What is required is not recognition and hermeneutics, but rather a ‘scenic 
understanding’ that – as Lorenzer emphasizes – is only possible insofar 
as the analyst actively participates in what the patient performs in his 
language game.227 The physician is therefore precisely not a medium; he 
does not function as a reflecting mirror or as an empty screen for neurotic 
projections.228 His self-withdrawing anonymization and depersonalization 
also remains an illusion.
(5) The healing effect of psychoanalysis does not simply consist in cloth-
ing a forgotten past in words and thus being able to bring back memories. 
Rather, if the analyst recognizes and accepts the patient’s feelings without 
fulf illing their imaginary claim, then the patient is confronted with his own 
desire in a new way: The ‘object’ of his desire no longer remains a plaything 
of his own projections. Rather, through the reciprocal action of acceptance 
and accommodation in the analyst’s real relationship to the patient, on 
the one hand, and the analyst’s otherness and hiddenness with regard to 
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the patient’s imaginary claims, on the other hand, the analyst becomes a 
focal point for a new kind of ‘relationship experience’ for the patient. The 
solidif ied clichés of traumatic experiences can thus liquefy and f inally also 
disappear. The experience of a new kind of relationship, not merely recognition 
or memory, heals the patient.
Allow me to try once again to explain in a different way the logic of the 
revision of the classical concept of transference that was just sketched out: 
The classical concept of transference assumes that an inappropriate, conflict-
laden, and deformed emotional pattern acquired in the past is transferred to 
the present, where it can then be deciphered and treated. An interactive and 
post-classical concept of transference, on the other hand, assumes that an 
emotional constellation acquired in the past is transformed over the course 
of transference, insofar as the patient can have a self-altering relationship to 
the physician: The patient’s emotional clichés are thus subject to a mutation 
and transmutation. According to the classical perspective, therefore, the 
physician serves as a recording medium and an observing perceptual organ 
that helps the patient to ‘translate’ an unconscious potential for conflict 
into verbalizing memory; the physician thus mediates between the patient’s 
past and present. According to the post-classical perspective the physician 
is an interactive partner who always also has an emotional and not only 
interpretive relationship to the patient; together they are able to establish a 
new kind of relationship, which is real rather than illusory, and through this 
relationship the patient is able to free himself from his neurotic symptoms. 
This reconstruction of an ‘interactive turning point’ in the theory of transfer-
ence emphasizes the differences between these approaches, and it presents 
a paradoxical situation for this media-theoretical project: Freud’s concept of 
transference is groundbreaking insofar as the analyst represents a mediating 
f igure that is able to cast a new perspective on media in relation to trans-
mission. However, the interactive concept of transference fundamentally 
challenges precisely the medial status of the analyst. The reason for this is 
the supposition that the relationship between the patient and the physician 
represents an entirely interactive and communicative relationship, which 
thus gives rise to a collectively ‘shared’ reality in the here and now of the 
analytic situation. For Freud the physician plays a double role: he is a more 
or less neutral medium in transference and at the same time an emotion-
ally involved person in countertransference. In the post-Freudian theory 
of transference, however, this difference disappears and the boundaries 
between transference and countertransference are blurred.
My method now consists in drawing together aspects of the classical and 
the post-classical theories, as the question arises: Would it not be possible to 
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combine what Freud constructed as a kind of exclusive relationship between 
the analyst as, on the one hand, an observing, reflecting, and interpreting 
medium and, on the other hand, an emotional person acting out his own 
subconscious feelings? Doesn’t this difference help to explain the productiv-
ity of transference, which includes the mutation and metamorphosis of what 
is transferred and thus reflects one of the central concerns of post-classical 
theory?
In order to connect both elements it is necessary to ‘de-discursify’ the 
communicative interaction between the patient and the analyst. The 
reciprocity, two-sidedness, interactivity, and intersubjectivity that post-
classical theory rightfully emphasizes actually exists, but they precisely 
do not correspond to the universally pragmatic model of communication 
taken from speech act theory, which is based on the assumption of the 
formal-rational equality of conversation partners. In order to give an idea 
of this ‘de-discursif ied interaction’ I will now go back to the considerations 
of René Spitz, who examined pre-linguistic ‘dialogue’ in the interactions 
between mothers and children.
‘Dialogue’ as Circular Affective Resonance
René Spitz researched the early forms of dialogue that occur in childhood 
interactions before the child is capable of speech. For Spitz, a depth psy-
chologist, this orientation towards early childhood interaction was not an 
end in itself; rather, he assumed that there were analogies between the 
analytic situation and early childhood relationships to primary caregiv-
ers.229 This notion implies that the structures of extra-linguistic interaction 
and their ‘criteria for success’ also reveal the structures of psychoanalytic 
dialogue and their ‘options for success’. Furthermore, it reflects the insight 
that although psychoanalysis understands itself as a pure ‘talking cure’ 
its ‘asymmetrical nature’ fundamentally distinguishes it from the model 
of communication taken from speech act theory and it is therefore more 
than just ‘talk’.
Spitz introduces the concept of ‘dialogue’ to describe early pre-verbal 
action sequences, and by replacing the usual psychoanalytic concept of 
the ‘object relation’ of the patient to the analyst with the term ‘dialogue’ 
he also becomes a proponent of the tendency towards the ‘dialogization’ of 
psychoanalysis. At the same time, however, there are also indications that 
this kind of dialogue is involved in psycho-sexual development and it is thus 
instrumentalized through the manner in which the child’s wishes relate to 
the animate and inanimate object world. The dialogical character of the 
interaction between mother and child is not conceptualized according to 
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the model of linguistic understanding; rather, it constitutes a matrix for all 
human communication phenomena and identity processes and thus also 
for psychoanalytic dialogue.
Here is what this ‘dialogic interaction, which precedes language’, looks 
like: Spitz identif ies three stages that occur within the f irst 18 months, up to 
the point when the child acquires his mother tongue: (i) An ‘objectless stage’ 
during which the I and the not-I remain inseparable, although at the end of 
the second month human beings occupy a position above all other things, 
as they are consistently smiled at.230 (ii) A stage when others are perceived 
as distinct from the self and the child – obviously experiencing the ‘fear of 
separation’ at eight months, which constitutes a counterpart to the ‘smiling 
response’ of the earlier stage – is able to distinguish between strangers 
and people who are familiar.231 (iii) And f inally the training of the f irst 
‘semantic gestures’ – especially head shaking to indicate ‘no’ – which the 
child experiences and adopts through his interaction with and emulation 
of others, such that his self is constituted by the behaviour of others, the 
non-self: ‘The “no” thus becomes the identifying stamp of social relations 
on a human level.’232
I cannot pursue the details of this fascinating reconstruction of the evolu-
tion of communication in the preliminary stages of linguisticality. What 
matters here is that the development of these early forms of dialogicity is 
tied to the active interplay between mother and child, and it is crucially 
shaped by the facilitation or inhibition of this interaction. According to 
Spitz, what emerges in the relationship between mother and child in the 
first months is a ‘circular resonance process’ that engenders a ‘quasi-magical 
sensibility’.233 It is a process that is not organized through the medium of 
signs, but rather it constitutes the very origin of this sign function. And 
yet it does involve a medium, which is the person who interacts with the 
child. One could also say that the child needs and uses the mother as a 
medium for the training of his I in relation to others. But the mother can 
only be such a medium insofar as she constitutes an emotional sounding 
board for her child. This early childhood interaction must therefore be 
understood as a series of reciprocal actions, as an exchange of looks that 
can pose questions and answers, as physical proximity and contact, as 
sounds resembling ‘twitters of delight’ that are exchanged as reciprocal 
signals of acceptance and resistance.234 For Spitz the ‘essence’ of this dia-
logue lies in the ‘expectation that something will happen’.235 For him, this 
reciprocity fundamentally distinguishes the living from the dead.236 But it 
is a reciprocity that, like the mother-child structure, not only involves but 
virtually presupposes an asymmetry between the interacting partners. It 
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is the productive resonance of the emotional sphere that makes an unequal 
relationship with one another possible. What Spitz means by ‘dialogue’, 
therefore, is the formation of an emotional echo of the I in the not-I. In this 
sense, for Spitz and also for Weiß psychoanalytic transference is based on 
‘dialogic resonance phenomena’.237
At this point it makes sense to visualize the actual meaning of ‘resonance’ 
(Latin ‘resonare’: resound). In a physical sense, it refers to the resonating 
of a system whose movement is induced by another system. The reacting 
system thus has a resonant frequency, which is nevertheless ‘amplif ied’ by 
external stimulation. Niklas Luhmann employs ‘resonance’ as a term for 
social transmission, thereby emphasizing that a system can only resonate 
insofar as it already has its own vibrations; at the same time he also stresses 
that transmission through resonance is only possible between similar 
kinds of system zones, when there is therefore a similarity between both 
systems.238 Resonance thus requires that there is a fundamental difference 
as well as a similarity between two systems. It causes the movement of 
one system to be transmitted to another system, but at the same time the 
resonant frequency of the affected system is changed and converted by 
this transmission.
So how might it be possible to connect the notion of the analyst as a 
medium and the notion of the analyst as an actor, which Freud conceived 
as separate functions? The ‘dialogization’ that the post-classical theory of 
transference has in mind – at the expense of the analyst’s medial func-
tion – manifests itself as something that is embedded in the way the analyst 
becomes a medium. The transference of past experiences onto the analyst 
occurs in such a way that the patient’s ‘reoccurring’ trauma is ‘processed’ in-
sofar as the analyst becomes a sounding board for the emotions experienced 
by the patient. The vibrations emanating from the patient are thus not only 
recorded but also transformed through the analyst’s own vibrations. This 
‘self-oscillation’ consists in not only the physician’s own emotions, but also 
the fact that he is removed and is thus capable of observing and interpreting. 
The double role of being at the same time both an observer and an actor is 
inscribed in the actions of the analyst. This is the joke of psychoanalytic 
resonance. The ‘echo of the I in the not-I’ is precisely for this reason not 
only an echo, but also a transformation, because the analyst embodies the 
difference between participating and not participating. The analyst both 
empathizes and observes; he is both similar to and at the same time differ-
ent from the patient. The analyst can become a (non-participating) medium 
of psychic transference precisely because he enters into a (participating) 
emotional relationship with the patient.
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Transference through ‘Affective Resonance’: A Conclusion
(1) ‘Transference’ is a psychoanalytic term that describes the kind of connec-
tion that emerges in the psychoanalytic situation. With this concept Freud 
points to the unconscious repetition of earlier experiences in the current 
relationship of the patient to the analyst. He concedes that transference is 
usually accompanied by countertransference on the part of the physician 
towards the patient, yet it remains important for him that transference func-
tions as a therapeutic ‘tool’, as the analyst withdraws as a person in order 
to act as a medium that can become a ‘projection surface’ for the patient’s 
unconscious. Nevertheless, it is also an undeniable fact for Freud that the 
analyst is always also emotionally involved with the patient. The activity 
of the analyst thus embodies two aspects: He is an observer, interpreter, 
and analyzer and at the same time a participant and an actor. Post-classical 
theories emphasize that transference not only represents a repetition of 
the past, but rather it is also shaped by the present of the psychoanalytic 
situation, and it can therefore be understood as a completely interactive 
event that occurs between the physician and the patient. However, the 
insight into the role of the analyst as a medium for transference is largely 
missing in these theories.
(2) The fundamental question is how the passivity and the activity of the 
analyst, his function as a medium and his role as an actor, can in each case 
be understood as two dimensions of the transference event. This implicitly 
explains how ‘repetition’ can always also be conceived as an act of ‘reshap-
ing’. Nevertheless, questioning this duplicity of transferring and creating is 
only meaningful so long as one holds onto the Freudian insight that being an 
analyst also means offering oneself as a medium for the repressed feelings 
of the patient precisely by remaining ‘neutral’ and withdrawn.
(3) The key to understanding the creative dimension of the transference 
event is the phenomenon of affective resonance. Being a sounding board 
means reacting to a vibration. It is important that this ‘physics of vibration’ 
is here only a metaphorical expression for the reciprocity of emotions, 
or affects, which enable a reciprocity between the unequal. René Spitz 
explained the resonating ability of the dialogic using the example of pre-
verbal mother-child interaction, and he thus at the same time attributed 
a meaning to the function of language in psychoanalytic dialogue that 
precisely cannot be compared to a dialogical speech act.
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Witnessing: On the Transmission of Perception and Knowledge 
through Credibility
Is Something ‘Known through the Words of Another’ a Form of 
Knowledge?
Whenever we learn a language, whenever we learn when we were born 
and the identity of our birth mother, whenever we acquire knowledge 
from earlier times and distant lands, whenever} we are informed of the 
day’s events through news reports, whenever we look for a street or a train 
station on a city map, whenever we consult a lexicon in order to learn what 
terms such as ‘clay loam soil’ mean, whenever we learn anything through 
spoken or written instructions, then we are acquiring knowledge through 
the words of others. Is it possible to imagine acquiring any knowledge at 
all without communicating with others? How much of what we regard 
as experiential facts are actually experienced rather than ‘only’ heard or 
spoken?
To depend on information that is not ascertained by us but rather 
transmitted to us constitutes the basis of our practical and theoretical 
orientation towards the world, and this applies to science as well as everyday 
life. Knowledge acquired through the witnessing of others is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon.
What is even stranger is that this knowledge is not considered to be 
knowledge, according to the epistemological standards of philosophy, 
because knowing something means ‘knowing why’. According to the 
traditional epistemological perspective there are only two possible ways 
of explaining this ‘why’: either through direct perception or deductive 
reasoning (or the memory of direct perception or deductive reasoning in 
the past). No other sources of knowledge are taken into account except 
perception and deduction. Western philosophy thus deploys a concept of 
knowledge that denies the most widespread way of acquiring knowledge 
the status of ‘being knowledge’.239
Of course the history of philosophy is more complex than this briefly 
sketched outline: Since the modern era several philosophers, including 
Leibniz,240 Hume,241 Kant,242 and above all Thomas Reid,243 have referred to 
the meaning and epistemological nature of ‘the testimonials of others’. In 
the last few decades in particular philosophers have revaluated witnessed 
knowledge, which is seen as legitimate precisely because it cannot be 
reduced to already recognized forms of knowledge, like perception and 
deduction. The act of witnessing has also developed into a genuine, irreduc-
ible source of knowledge ‘that neither requires nor is capable of feeding back 
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into allegedly more foundational sources’.244 And this means: ‘Testimony is 
a means of the creation of knowledge.’245
Within the framework of the debate concerning ‘testimony’ among pri-
marily Anglo-Saxon philosophers, therefore, knowing through witnessing 
has been rehabilitated and its status is now seen as equal to tradition-
ally approved forms of knowledge.246 This perspective was the result of a 
methodological break with the theory of epistemological individualism in 
favour of a social epistemology, which acknowledges that our knowledge is 
inescapably dependent on others.247 I will return to this later.
What is most interesting about this epistemological rehabilitation of 
knowledge through the words of others is the argument with which it 
was achieved. In the debate concerning ‘testimony’ at least, the status of 
witnessed knowledge was elevated due to the fact that it is actually a form 
of knowledge that originates in and through the act of testifying. Witnessing 
is thus shown to be the genuine creation of knowledge. Conversely, this also 
implies that most philosophers reject the status of witnessing as knowledge 
because they interpret the act of testifying as a form of knowledge that can 
only be transmitted and not created.248
This is the central issue: Reflecting on the nature of witnessing means 
confronting the problem of transmitting knowledge. And it can already be 
established in advance that the philosophical rehabilitation of witnessing 
– which is both useful as well as necessary – draws on the latent or also 
manifest devaluation of what is merely due to ‘transmission’. Witnessing 
is of epistemological interest when and only when it proves to be the new 
creation of knowledge. In order to be philosophically acceptable, witnessing 
must be a form of production.249
This media-theoretical perspective presents the following question: 
Assuming that a witness ‘only’ functions as a medium for transmitting 
perception and knowledge, is it possible to specify the ‘creativity’ of 
witnessing in a way that does not negate but rather reconstitutes the 
transmission character of the event? My assumption (of course) is that this 
is possible, and it is for this reason alone that I am turning to the f igure of 
the witness. The ‘creativity of transmission’ can be traced by examining 
the relationship between the witness and the audience for whom the 
testimony is given, and this social relationship is obviously rooted in 
‘credibility’ and ‘trust’. The testimony of a witness can be considered a 
true statement that ‘gives’ listeners a knowledge that they previously did 
not possess only because and insofar as the listeners trust and believe 
the witness. The witness can function as a medium for transmitting 
knowledge, which at the same time produces new knowledge (on the 
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part of the listener), when and only when the listeners consider him 
to be credible. Trust and credibility thus constitute the ‘mechanism’ of 
knowledge founded on testimonials. This ‘mechanism’ is a thoroughly 
social process, which Thomas Reid saw before anyone else: Reid refers 
to a ‘social operation of mind’ related to witnessing, which he associates 
with the principles of ‘credulity’ and ‘veracity’.250
What does ‘trust’ mean? To trust the other is to be convinced that what 
the other does is right. To regard the other as credible and truthful is to 
assume that what he says is true. Trust, credibility, and truthfulness are 
only important in situations of insecurity and uncertainty. When some-
thing is certain, trust is not necessary. ‘Witnessing’ is only important when 
something is not known. It is therefore no surprise that ‘being a witness’ is 
a term taken from legal proceedings, especially criminal proceedings. Its 
etymological origins lie in the legal sphere, and it is there that its def ining 
conceptual contours can also be established.251
On the ‘Grammar of Witnessing’: Reflections on Legal Witnessing
The paradigmatic situation of legal witnessing provides an ideal starting 
point for understanding what a witness is. Five aspects of legal witnessing 
are particularly relevant: (i) the creation of evidence, (ii) perception, (iii) 
speech acts, (iv) the audience, and (v) credibility. These aspects constitute 
what I am calling the ‘grammar of witnessing’.
(i) The witness creates evidence: Whenever a legal dispute is to be decided 
there are contradictory ways of judging an event. The task of the court is to 
ascertain the facts and render a verdict. Witnesses are people who are de-
ployed in this process as a means of providing evidence (this ‘objective’ form 
of expression is important); they ‘serve’ as ‘objects’ and ‘instruments’ for the 
acquisition of factual knowledge, which underlies the court’s ability to reach 
a verdict. Witnessing thus produces evidence.252 The witness only appears 
in situations where something is not known: ‘One becomes a witness only 
when one can no longer rely on knowledge and when testimony […] must 
nevertheless relate to a series of occurrences that is in itself not-one’ in the 
conflict between competing accounts of an event.253 The investigation of 
the ‘truth’ is neither an end in itself nor an evaluation of the ‘right’ version 
of a story; rather, it is supposed to enable the court to reach a fair verdict. 
It is not supposed to ascertain simply truth or falsity, but rather guilt or 
innocence. The evidence that the witness creates can also have serious 
consequences: it changes people’s lives – and sometimes also leads to death. 
In ancient Jewish legal proceedings the witnesses were required to throw 
the f irst stone of execution.254
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What matters here is that the epistemological uncertainty that is typical 
of witnessing is associated with legislation.255 Witnessing thus culminates 
in an act of ‘restoration’ in the broadest possible sense as the eradication of 
an imbalance that includes the socialization of private knowledge as well 
as justice for the victim and atonement for the perpetrator. If the witness 
creates evidence and his function is embedded in the ‘restoration of a social 
equilibrium’, then his truth claims always have a practical, ‘humanizing’ 
dimension.
(ii) The witness is able to testify by virtue of his perception. The witness was 
physically present at an event that occurred in the past; he saw something 
‘with his own eyes’ and thus bears witness to a direct perception, something 
he experienced himself. This ‘principle of immediacy’ is highly valued in 
court proceedings.256 Reports from others also count as something perceived 
through witnessing, and hearsay testimony is today257 – in Germany at 
least258 – a legally admissible form of evidence.259 With hearsay it is not 
an event that is witnessed but rather the report of an event: it is therefore 
an inferior means of evidence. This was already true for Plato260 as well 
as Plautus, who believed that one eyewitness was worth more than ten 
hearsay witnesses.261
By any account, therefore, the perceptual foundation of giving testimony 
is this: To have had a perception constitutes the conditio sine qua non of 
witnessing. Only the ‘perceptions of a witness’ can be an ‘appropriate 
object of testimonial evidence’.262 This distinguishes the witness from the 
expert, who does not report his perceptions but rather makes his expert 
knowledge available to the court. The witness is sought because he was 
an observer. He only counts as the recipient of an event. His cognitive and 
evaluative activities, such as his opinions, valuations, or conclusions, are 
not relevant; they disrupt and cloud the process of testifying and thus they 
remain definitively excluded from legal proceedings.263 Anyone capable of 
perception can be a witness.264
The dilemma of witnesses who are at the same time victims is grounded 
in this recipient and observer status. The ideal witness – in the legal sphere 
at least – is not involved in the event being witnessed.
(iii) The witness discursifies what he perceived: The witness must not 
only have perceived something, but also reported it. Witnessing is thus 
based on the transformation of a perception into linguistic testimony.265 
Something seen is transformed into something spoken, and the sensually 
received is transformed into linguistic sense. The witness must perform a 
kind of translation or transcription of his private experience into a public 
statement. This is an extremely fragile process. In order for the witness’s 
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statement to be considered a truth claim, which can then be utilized by the 
court, it is heavily ritualized and institutionalized – and not only when it 
takes place under oath. The witness does not simply talk and report, but 
rather he performs a speech act in an institutional-theoretical sense. In the 
f irst place, only those who are called to the witness stand are authorized 
to bear witness. In other words, the witness’s statement is only considered 
true because it is spoken in the witness stand.266 There are therefore harsh 
punishments for perjury and false testimony.
(iv) The activity of the listeners: The witness must have not only perceived 
something and spoken about it, but also spoken to someone. It is impossible 
to bear witness without listeners or an audience. The listeners are unaware 
of the event about which the witness is testifying; otherwise, they would 
not need the witness. There is therefore a fundamental asymmetry between 
witness and listener. The event to be cleared up is irrevocably past; no words 
are capable of repeating it. It is impossible to assess the truth content of the 
witness’s statement by direct ‘reality testing’.
Testimony is therefore not a monologue, but rather an interaction be-
tween the witness and the listener(s) that consists of questions and answers. 
In a trial there is a distinction between the ‘statement’ and the ‘questioning’ 
of the witness.267 The witness’s statement evolves as part of a dialogue, 
as the listeners’ questions always also determine, direct, and shape what 
the witness presents with his words and how he does this. The witness’s 
statement is not only a speech act, but also at the same time an act of listening.
(v) Credibility: Mental conditions like perceptions and experiences are 
not transmissible. As John Durham Peters laconically remarks: ‘No transfu-
sion of consciousness is possible. Words can be exchanged, experiences 
cannot.’268 The possibility of lies is thus inherent in every testimony. No 
matter what the witness says, it can – in principle – be false testimony. 
This distinguishes witness statements from ‘ordinary traces’ or indexical 
signs, which can be misread and misinterpreted but cannot ‘lie’.269 Given the 
empirical unverif iability of the truth of witness testimony, the illocutionary 
force that enables the words spoken by the witness on the witness stand to 
be considered true is also stretched to its limits. The credibility, truthful-
ness, and trustworthiness of witnesses thus become more essential. The 
witness vouches for his words with his character: The truth of his sentences 
is based on the truthfulness of his character. Only a trustworthy witness is 
convincing. But trust can always be betrayed – otherwise it would not be 
trust.
This shows that the concept of witnessing has an ethical dimension.270 
And it is no surprise that the verif ication of the credibility of witnesses 
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constitutes an important element of the work of the court.271 Is the concept 
of oral testimony272 rooted in this sense of personal responsibility, which 
privileges the voice as a (more or less authentic) trace of the person and 
at the same time ensures that the participants are able to look each other 
in the eyes?273 As Niklas Luhmann points out, talking in the presence of 
others helps to prevent a breach of trust.274 The listeners’ lack of knowledge 
thus corresponds to the trust they place in the witness, which attributes 
credibility to him: the transmission of knowledge is only possible with the 
help of the social bond of trust.
There are f ive conditions that constitute the ‘syntax of witnessing’: (1) In 
a situation of uncertainty, where knowledge is lacking, the witness creates 
evidence in the sense of fact-f inding; this, in turn, becomes the basis of the 
verdict. (2) The witness was ideally a disinterested observer of an event that 
took place in the past, and the basis of the witness’s testimony is his percep-
tion of this event. (3) The witness must transform his sensory experience 
into a verbal statement, and this speech act is considered true precisely 
because the witness is institutionally authorized. (4) Witnessing is an in-
teraction between the witness and the listeners, as the expectations and 
questions of the listeners always also influence the content of the testimony. 
The listeners thus represent a constitutive element of witnessing. (5) The 
witness’s statement is recognized to be true not only because of the witness’s 
institutional authorization, but also because of his trustworthiness.
I call these f ive structural elements the ‘grammar of witnessing’. It does 
not require tremendous powers of imagination to realize that this ‘syntax 
of witnessing’ is related to the concrete practice of witnessing like school 
grammar is related to everyday speech: We are able to communicate with 
each other in everyday life without speaking in grammatically correct 
sentences. It can therefore be assumed that real witnessing (and its dilem-
mas) differs from the standards of ideal witnessing. I will now look at what 
causes this deviation.
On the Pragmatism of Witnessing: The Ambivalence of Witnessing
It is easy to identify and label the cause of this deviation: It is the fallibility 
of witnessing as an instrument for producing evidence.275 The witness is a 
means of evidence, yet the act of bearing witness is a process that remains 
extremely prone to error and subject to failure. To express this idea in the 
style of Giorgio Agamben: The potential of witnessing also contains the 
failure and impotence of witnessing.276
This also applies to the thoroughly institutionalized and socially con-
trolled sphere of the law. The appearance of witnesses in criminal trials 
150 MediuM, Messenger, TransMission
seems so natural that it is hardly ever reflected upon or problematized. 
However, in his essay ‘Witness Evidence on Thin Ice’ jurist Bernd Schüne-
mann calls attention to the fallibility of witness testimony in a way that is 
unusually critical for a work of legal scholarship: ‘Disinterested witnesses 
suffer from poor observation, poor information processing, poor informa-
tion storage, and poor information reproduction, while interested witnesses 
often tend to manipulate information reproduction. In the postmodern age, 
therefore, witness testimony must qualify as the most problematic means of 
evidence.’277 Schünemann explains why criminal trials nevertheless do not 
fall apart due to the fallibility of witnesses by mentioning another fact that 
further problematizes the demonstrative strength of witness statements: 
According to Schünemann, these statements are so indeterminate that they 
can be extensively formed over the course of legal proceedings: Witness 
statements are already decisively directed and shaped by the hypotheses of 
the police off icers who conduct interrogations.278 These are also the same 
officers who – without exception – prepare records of interrogations in writ-
ing, and this privileging of writing as opposed to other means of recording 
further shapes witness statements by reflecting the interrogators’ priorities 
and assumptions concerning the event. During the main trials, on the other 
hand, judges nevertheless tend to overestimate incriminating witnesses and 
underestimate exonerating witnesses: a ‘solidarity effect’ between lawyers 
and judges is thus a regular and empirically verif iable reality.279
It is not necessary here to discuss legal assessments. These few refer-
ences are already suff icient to show that there is something fundamentally 
problematic about the witness function.280
Social-psychological studies also clearly illustrate the relativization of 
the evidentiary strength of witnessing.281 Different people present at the 
same event will provide different accounts of the event. Identification errors 
involving people and faces are also the order of the day: From the perspec-
tive of the perceivers hair colour, clothing, facial features, body sizes and 
much more are constantly changing like a chameleon. Although memory is 
weak, a willingness to eliminate dissonance and incongruity deludes people 
into making blurry perceptions into detailed statements or transforming 
the factually indistinct into the f ictionally sharp. People would rather obey 
the logic of a narrative structure than admit the lacunarity and uncertainty 
of their own experience.
It is hard to deny that the practice of witnessing deviates from the ideal 
of witnessing.
If the deformation of a form in the act of its implementation, its deviations 
from a set pattern in the course of its realization, and the failure of a complex 
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praxis in contrast to its simple program were remarkable for nothing else 
they could at least call attention to the trivial fact that the concept and the 
reality are – as always – different. However, if a performative approach is 
employed then the otherness of praxis with respect to its normative and 
theoretical standards does not appear simply as a lapse or a deformation, but 
rather as an expression of ambivalence and aporia, which are immanent in the 
thing itself. In this sense the practice of witnessing, which is shaped by its 
fallibility, alludes to an aporetic structure that is inherent to the ‘grammar 
of witnessing’. And an explanation of precisely this aporetic structure leads 
to the core of what it means to say that the witness is a medium – or at least 
this is my hypothesis.
The idea of regarding witnesses as media can be traced back to John 
Durham Peters. He characterizes witnesses as ‘the paradigm case of a 
medium: the means by which experience is supplied to others who lack 
the original’.282 And for Peters the undeniable ‘unreality of witnesses’ is 
rooted in the transmission character of witnessing, as the witness must 
turn a subjective experience into an objective discursive form. The private 
inner world of experience is thus transformed into a public statement, and 
something mental is transformed into something that is socially accessible: 
The discursif iability of experience thus enables the generation of evidence 
through testimony.
I would like to pursue this observation a little further. It is perhaps obvi-
ous, but it is still worth mentioning: People function as witnesses, witnesses 
are people. There is therefore a tension between the depersonalization of 
the witness, which is reflected in the notion of the witness as a medium, 
and the credibility and trustworthiness of the witness, which is exclusively 
embodied in the person of the witness himself. The witness is at the same 
time both a ‘thing’ and a ‘person’; he functions as a ‘means to an end’, yet he 
is also an ‘end in itself’. When regarded existentially, the witness is a person; 
when regarded functionally, the witness is an object and an instrument. This 
constitutes the ambivalence of witnessing – from a media-theoretical 
perspective.
One juridical fact is particularly revealing concerning the status of the 
witness as thing and object. The ‘object quality’283 of the witness is actually 
foregrounded in the code of criminal procedure. Due to the importance of 
ascertaining the truth when there is a breach of the law, the notion of the wit-
ness as a subject with his own demands and needs for protection recedes into 
the background.284 It is thus remarkable that modern court proceedings tend 
to increasingly promote and strengthen the subject position of the witness; 
this development began with the successive expansion of the right to silence 
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(such as in the case of questions that concern the past life or intimate life 
of the witness) and it culminated in the institution of the ‘witness advisor’, 
which was f irst introduced in 1974.285 According to Bernd Schünemann, the 
expansion of the legal status of the witness advisor involves the danger that 
the witness will no longer occupy a position between the disputing subjects, 
but rather the witness himself will be treated ‘like a party’ in the case; in 
other words, the witness will be treated like a subject in the lawsuit.286
This tension between neutrality and involvement becomes more openly 
visible in criminal proceedings where the victim is at the same time also 
the (sole) witness. Yet what culminates and manifests in the situation of the 
victim-witness is a latent dilemma that is inherent in every act of bearing 
witness. I will return to the issue of survivor testimony later, but for now 
let me attempt to characterize this dilemma once again:
(i) Witnesses are always people who have perceived something and thus 
had an experience that is not accessible to those before whom they bear 
testimony. Because perception and experience are mental acts, the ‘craft’ 
of witnessing does not consist solely in transmitting these private experi-
ences through public, openly accessible speech. Rather, the Archimedian 
point is that the witness presents a narrative of his experiences as if they 
had been passively recorded rather than (actively) lived. The witness must 
behave as if he is a ‘blank slate’, a disinterested seismograph, a meticulous 
recording instrument that registers an event in an entirely literal sense. 
Strictly speaking, it is neither experience nor knowledge that the witness 
relays, but rather something much simpler: Data and information that 
is still on the verge of being ‘processed’ and ‘integrated’ into something 
like experience or knowledge. It then becomes the task of the listeners to 
synthesize the witness’s ‘simple’ information about an event and give it the 
coherence of knowledge. It is precisely by acting as a recording device that 
the witness is able to convey something out of which new knowledge can 
actually emerge for the listeners. However, this presumes that the witness 
is able to separate the instance of perception from the processing of percep-
tions, which transforms them into an experience or a form of knowledge. 
If the witness talks about his experience, he disrupts and undermines his 
function as a messenger who relays ‘acquired data’. To say that the witness 
is a medium basically means that his personal experiences and synthesized 
knowledge are not relevant; rather, he is nothing more than an instrument 
for recording data.
(ii) There is an unbridgeable asymmetry between the ‘knowing’ witness 
and the ‘unknowing’ listeners. The performative strength of the witness’s 
statement, whose truth is supposed to be guaranteed by the fact that this 
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statement is spoken under certain institutionalized conditions, is thus at 
the same time bound to the personal credibility and trustworthiness of 
the witness. The witness must prove to be an objective seismograph while 
at the same time as a person embodying an integrity that consists in the 
correspondence between his mental state and his statements, between his 
private inner world and his publicly accessible external world. Consider-
ing the complexity of our psycho-physical existence, this integrity is – if 
anything – an ideal that is virtually unachievable. More importantly, this 
trustworthiness is not explicable in words: Saying ‘I am trustworthy’ does 
not make someone trustworthy.
The fundamental dilemma of witnessing thus consists in the Janus-faced 
character of the witness role, which involves and requires being both a 
medium and a person. Personality and depersonalization are both necessary 
to make the mediality of the witness possible. To say this in the terms of 
antiquity: One only functions as an end for others by at the same time 
appearing as an end in oneself.
In order to examine this aporetic structure in greater detail, I will now 
trace two distinct types of witnessing: the sacred witnessing of martyrs 
and the profane witnessing of survivors.
Martyrs
In the christological perspective, the concepts μάρτυς (‘martys’–witness), 
μαρτυρείν (‘martyrein’–witnessing, being a witness), and μαρτύριον (‘mar-
tyrion’–testimony) successively adopted the meaning of ‘martyr’ as someone 
who vouches for the truth of his testimony with his life. Insightful references 
to the dilemma of witnessing can be found in this metamorphosis from the 
concept of the witness, who testif ies through what he says, to the concept 
of the martyr, who testif ies through the suffering of his body.
Let us begin with an observation in Søren Kierkegaard’s Practice in 
Christianity. Kierkegaard distinguishes between two kinds of truth: On 
the one hand, there are truths that are transmittable, and thus teachable 
and learnable, and the aim of these truths is to produce a form of knowledge 
that can be verbalized and communicated within a community – in a 
way, they are therefore a ‘public good’.287 On the other hand, there are non-
transmittable truths, which can be neither stated nor taught but rather 
only shown; these truths are not given as a ‘result’ but rather only as a ‘path’ 
that cannot be acquired through others but rather only experienced by 
the individual. This truth is no longer a quality of statements formulated 
in a commonly shared language; rather, it is an attribute of the life of the 
individual: ‘And hence, Christianly understood, the truth consists not in 
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knowing the truth but in being the truth. In spite of the newest philosophy, 
there is an inf inite difference between these two.’288
Kierkegaard’s distinction between ‘knowing a truth’ and ‘being a truth’ 
can be described as a distinction between a discursifiable and an existential 
truth. In religious terms, Christian truth can be understood as an existential 
truth. This involves two implications:
(i) Christ himself is considered to be a f igure that attests to an existential 
truth, which nevertheless remains inaccessible to humans: Christ is pre-
cisely the truth that he testif ies. It is fundamentally impossible for him to 
answer Pontius Pilate’s question ‘What is truth?’ because a question-answer 
structure lacks what might be called today the performative character of 
the ‘truth of Christ’: An answer to Pilate’s question would amount to a 
performative self-contradiction.289
(ii) The concept of testifying to the truth of Christianity by ‘being a 
martyr’ is thus based on the impossibility of bearing witness to a truth 
and thus only being able to show it through bodily suffering and one’s own 
death. Indeed, Kierkegaard also concludes that martyrdom, suffering for 
the sake of one’s faith, applies in a sense to all Christians.290
Kierkegaard’s considerations provide a suitable entryway into the Chris-
tian reinterpretation of witnessing insofar as he grasps the clear difference 
between religious witnessing and epistemic as well as juridical witnessing. 
While the epistemological and legal view of witnessing are based on the 
transmittability of experience, the Christological view of witnessing – from 
Kierkegaard’s perspective – assumes that it is impossible to relay Christian 
experiences through language. This is remarkable, for the aporia that a 
‘witness’ precisely cannot witness effectively ‘compels’ the testimony of 
the truth to take a different route: If testimony cannot be given in words, 
it must be given through the body, suffering, and life.
While Kierkegaard conceives of witnessing through words and through 
suffering as a systematically explicable dichotomy that creates an unbridge-
able divide between the legal and the martyrological meaning of testimony, 
Markus Barth shows how in the New Testament the word ‘martys’ was used 
in at least three different ways, which connects it to the legal-epistemic 
perspective.291 His main point is that the ‘apostles’, who in a literal sense 
are considered the ‘delegates of God’, unite the three properties of ‘martys’ 
as their speech, life, and death combine all three versions of witnessing.
(i) First, there are eyewitnesses.292 The New Testament thus complies 
with common legal practice: A witness is someone who was present at a 
particular event, was able to perceive this event by listening and seeing, 
and then provides an account of this perception in words. The apostles were 
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eyewitnesses, as they encountered Jesus after his death and they thus bore 
witness to the resurrection.293 This was the original meaning of witnessing: 
The resurrection was improbable and unusual, but the apostles testif ied 
that it was something they actually perceived. The role assigned to the body 
is particularly signif icant, as bodily presence constitutes the sine qua non 
of being an eyewitness. This bodily presence involves being able not only 
to see with one’s eyes and to hear with one’s ears but also to feel with one’s 
hands, as Jesus invites the disciples to touch him. As Markus Barth notes, 
the disciples became ‘indissolubly’ one with the ‘incarnation of Jesus Christ’ 
through seeing, hearing, and touching.294
(ii) Second, there are confessional witnesses and faith witnesses, who do 
not bear witness to an external perception but rather to an internal condi-
tion or personal conviction. These witnesses feel called upon to serve as 
advocates and promoters,295 and they avow themselves as Christians before 
Jews and non-Christians.296 The ‘inner world of personal conviction’ is a 
new dimension that separates confessional witnesses from legal witnesses.
It is characteristic of the apostles that they integrate the functions of 
both eyewitnessing and confessional witnessing: The apostles represent a 
point of intersection where the testimony of (internal) faith can be traced 
back to the testimony of (external) facts: ‘Which we have heard, which 
we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked at and our hands have 
touched – this we proclaim.’297
(iii) Third and lastly, there are witnesses of suffering and death. As Barth 
explicitly emphasizes, however, this does not refer to someone who ‘earns’ 
an honorary title by suffering, like the early Christian martyrs. While 
martyrs were witnesses in the conventional sense because they were killed, 
witnesses of suffering in the biblical sense were killed because they were 
witnesses.298 Death is therefore not a prerequisite for but rather a result of 
being a witness. Socrates is a witness in this sense,299 as is Jesus himself, 
who became the ‘archetypal’ witness of death.300 The same also applies to 
the apostles, who died because of their faith.
The apostles were ‘delegates’, therefore, because they combined all three 
modalities of witnessing. On the other hand, this leads to an interesting 
implication: If the apostles are the only people able to bear witness to Jesus 
as a perceived event and their faith is thus based on and can be traced back 
to ‘having been there’, and if the apostles alone personally embody the triad 
of eyewitness, witness of faith, and witness of suffering, then martyrological 
witnessing, which is not yet available to the apostles in the New Testament, 
becomes inevitable, for there can no longer be any sensual and therefore 
transmittable experience of the divine as revealed through the resurrection 
156 MediuM, Messenger, TransMission
of Jesus. But how can the authenticity of the belief that Jesus is the son of God 
be guaranteed if this subjective belief can no longer be ‘legitimized’ through 
eyewitnesses? The ability of words to guarantee the truth is thus no longer 
dependent on the corporeality of eyewitnessing, but rather on martyrdom. 
For Jesus and the apostles suffering signif ied an a posteriori condition for 
being a witness, but it subsequently became an a priori condition, which 
lead to the emergence of ‘martyrs’ in the conventional sense. The visibility, 
exteriority, and sensual corporeality of torture and death thus compensated 
for the invisibility, interiority, and spiritual intellectuality of a faith that is 
no longer able to bear witness to ‘facts’. Words no longer refer to the bodily 
perception of an event, but rather to the experience of suffering death. The 
‘dying messenger’ similarly bears witness through suffering. In this sense, 
there is a surviving letter concerning the martyrdom of Bishop Polycarp 
that was sent from his congregation in Smyrna to a congregation in Phrygia 
in the second century A.D., and it can be considered the f irst text to employ 
a ‘f ixed martyrological use of language’.301
Perhaps it is now clear how the christological and martyrological sense of 
witnessing sheds light on the concept and problem of witnessing in general. 
The martyr transcends and surpasses the primal scene of legal witnessing 
and it reveals an aporetic structure that is inherent to the phenomenon 
of witnessing itself. To start with, the origins of legal witnessing and faith 
witnessing are similar: The legal context provides the basis for eyewitness 
testimony, and the special position of apostolic testimony is a result of this. 
The materiality and sensitivity of touching and feeling forges a corporeal 
bond between Jesus and the disciples, who acquire the ability to testify that 
the ‘risen’ Jesus is ‘the son of God’ through their physical, tactile, visual, 
and auditory connection to him. For the Christians, however, this bond no 
longer exists. They bear witness not to the immanence of their perception, 
but rather only to the transcendence of their faith. The dilemma is obvious: 
They must publicly bear witness to something that is not publicly accessible. 
This situation reveals the entire problematic of witnessing.
Faith witnessing does not involve a form of (intersubjectively verif iable) 
knowledge, which can be transmitted; rather, it concerns a thoroughly 
private ‘conviction’ or belief. This, then, is the fundamental situation of 
being a Christian. Kierkegaard also points out that words no longer count at 
all; only life itself is still able to vouch for something. The authenticity and 
coherence of a Christian’s inner conviction can only be witnessed through 
the authenticity and coherence of his external behaviour. The truth of tes-
timony, or in this case the truth of the testif ied belief, can therefore only be 
shown through the truthfulness of the person or his credibility.302 And the 
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credibility of the person as a medium for transmitting messages is strongest 
when he is prepared to be depersonalized through dying and death. It is not 
simply the person but rather the behaviour of the person that authenticates 
his testimony and the borderline case of this behaviour is self-abandonment 
in death. Does the martyr embody the topos of the dying messenger?
Survivors
The martyr testif ies by dying, but the survivor of a catastrophe testif ies by 
living. The survivor witness is another extreme form of witnessing, and it 
reveals dimensions that surpass the classical situation of legal witnessing 
while at the same time bringing to light dilemmas that apply to witnessing 
in general. Through the process of coming to terms with the Holocaust 
and forming a cultural memory of this event, the survivors of concentra-
tion camps impressively illustrate these ‘fractures of witnessing’.303 In his 
edited collection ‘Nobody Bears Witness to the Witnesses’: The Culture of 
Remembrance after the Shoah, Ulrich Baer conceives of the Holocaust as a 
fundamental historical crisis of witnessing.304 I will now attempt to explicate 
the ‘fractures of survivor testimony’:
(i) Witnessing on condition of the loss of identity: The idea that the witness 
can occupy the role of an external, neutral observer is part of the ‘grammar 
of witnessing’, but the survivors of a catastrophe are always victims. The 
convergence of their victim status and their role as witnesses makes it 
impossible for them to remain ‘neutral’ observers. Witnesses are ideally 
expected to separate their passive perception of a situation from their 
active processing of this perception into an experience that is informed by 
opinions, beliefs, and emotions, but this is hardly possible for survivors. 
The fact that this separation is fundamentally illusionary – independent 
of the victim perspective – shows how survivor witnessing crystallizes a 
dilemma that defines all forms of witnessing. Incidentally, Renaud Dulong’s 
approach to the question of what constitutes an ‘eyewitness’ is based on this 
dilemma of being subject to the paradigm of objective registration yet at the 
same time not being able to fulf il it – in contrast to recording media like 
photography and f ilm. Dulong conceives of the ‘eyewitness’ as something 
precisely beyond the epistemic observer paradigm, and he thus interprets 
it as a fundamental ethical constellation and challenge.305 Survivors are 
not witnesses in a historiographic sense.306 In the words of Sigrid Weigel, 
the survivor witness is to the legal or historiographic witness as a lament 
is to an accusation.307
This context sheds light on an exhortation by the SS to concentration 
camp inmates, which was recorded by Levi and often cited: ‘None of you will 
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be left to bear witness, but even if someone were to survive, the world will 
not believe him.’308 Dori Laub refers to the Holocaust as an ‘event without 
witness’309 and states that ‘what precisely made a Holocaust out of the event 
is the unique way in which, during its historical occurrence, the event pro-
duced not witnesses. Not only, in effect, did the Nazis try to exterminate the 
physical witnesses of their crime; but the inherently incomprehensible and 
deceptive psychological structure of the event precluded its own witnessing, 
even by its very victims.’310 This lack of witnesses did not simply consist in 
the fact that the dead could not testify to their deaths and that given the 
enormity and ‘incredibility’ of the survivor’s experiences their stories would 
not be accepted as testimony. No, this dilemma involves yet another dimen-
sion: There were only victims and perpetrators in concentration camps, and 
therefore there could be no neutral observers. This means that from the 
perspective of the perpetrators the inhumane practices experienced by the 
prisoners contaminated them so extensively that they were deprived of their 
identity and their humanity and they thus became ‘inhuman’: The integrity 
of one’s own personhood, which must at the same time have been regarded 
as the (legal) condition of witnessing, was thus subject to destruction.
Giorgio Agamben has reflected on this more recently by reference to the 
f igure of the ‘Muselmann’,311 which embodies precisely this loss of personal-
ity. ‘Muselmann’ is camp slang for a prisoner who has given up and who has 
been forsaken by his comrades. He is regarded as a mummy or as the living 
dead. He is no longer consciously alive and cannot differentiate between 
good and evil or kindness and malice; he cannot even differentiate between 
life and death, as even the will to survive has faded.312 The ‘living corpse’ of 
the Muselmann is no longer a person. At the same time, however, he is also 
‘the complete witness’.313 The Muselmann thus embodies the fundamental 
paradox of witnessing the Holocaust: By mutating into a non-human, a 
victim of the Holocaust is (no longer) able to bear witness according to 
the ‘grammar of witnessing’; at the same time, however, he is also ‘the 
true witness, the absolute witness’.314 The impossibility of speaking is thus 
inscribed in the speech of all Holocaust survivors, and the impossibility of 
witnessing is the Holocaust survivor’s cross of ash.
(ii) Witnessing as Restoration of Identity: This aporia – bearing witnessing 
to the impossibility of bearing witness and thus articulating what cannot 
be articulated – nevertheless makes the recounting of events necessary, 
important, and meaningful. The meaning of these stories does not lie in 
what they contribute to the reconstruction of history and the formation of 
historical knowledge. Rather, the testimony given by survivors is primarily 
an act that restores their identity and integrity as victims of this event. It is 
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therefore not surprising that these survivors remained silent immediately 
following World War II: Some historical distance was needed before it 
was possible for Holocaust survivors to speak as witnesses. As a result of 
this distance survivors were able to speak not only as humbled victims of 
concentration camps, but as respectable and respected contemporaries and 
thus as people who their have found their way back into life again – insofar 
as that is possible. Holocaust witnesses thus speak on behalf of the present 
and not simply the past.
What matters most in these accounts is not the testimony of facts but 
rather the performance of witnessing itself. It is an act that precisely does not 
obey the logic of a ‘demonstrative speech act’.315 Interviews with survivors 
resemble psychoanalytic dialogue in many respects: As Geoffrey Hartman 
emphasizes in his reflections on Holocaust witnessing,316 traumas are (ac-
cording to Freud) events that have not been emotionally and intellectually 
processed and that resist being integrated into experience. Articulating 
these monstrous events is thus a means of integrating them into one’s own 
biography, becoming consciously aware of oneself as a being who incarnates 
history in its cruellest form, and also existentially accepting this role for 
oneself.317 As Arthur Danto points out, ‘to exist historically is to perceive 
the events one lives through as part of a story later to be told’.318
For the survivors of the Holocaust, such a re-humanization through 
witnessing is only possible if it establishes a kind of ‘affective community’ 
with the listeners: Interviews with survivors thus become a collective ‘social 
act’.319 Like every act of witnessing, the addressee is an integral component of 
survivor testimony.320 In the case of survivor testimony, however, the ‘trust-
worthiness’ that constitutes the conditio sine qua non of a person’s capacity 
to testify is transferred to the listener: It is the interviewer who endows 
trust in the survivor and his ability to communicate his past experiences.
Is the structure of survivor testimony exceptional because the survivor 
turns the listener into a medium for his testimony and thus transforms 
the listener himself into a witness? Does the hope of the Yale Testimony 
Project consist in ‘providing a witness for the witness’?321 Does the inter-
relationship of a double witnessing – namely, of the survivor as well as 
the listener – correspond to the interrelationship of dehumanization and 
rehumanization? Survivor testimony is exceptional because the listener 
himself is transformed into a kind of medium or ‘secondary witness’.322 As 
Dori Laub writes: ‘Bearing witness to the trauma involves the audience 
in that this audience functions as an empty surface on which the event is 
inscribed for the f irst time.’323 The impossibility of witnessing caused by 
the loss of personal integrity is thus compensated through the restitution 
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of personality in the social act of the interview, in which the interviewer 
testif ies to the survivor’s capacity to testify by recognizing and treating the 
survivor as a person who bears witness.
Social Epistemology
After discussing two extreme forms of existential witnessing – the mar-
tyr and the survivor – I want to return f inally to the ordinary, everyday 
dimension of bearing testimony. It concerns the knowledge that we 
acquire through the words and writings of other people. In contrast to the 
‘formal testimony’ given in a legal context, Coady identif ies knowledge 
acquired through the words of others as informal or ‘natural testimony’.324 
We are able to acquire knowledge about things that we could never 
experience on our own through the f irst-hand, second-hand, third-hand, 
etc. accounts presented in books, pictures, television, f ilms, newspapers, 
maps, and timetables, and we (must) naturally depend on others for this 
knowledge.
The analysis of assertory speech acts has adequately examined speech 
acts whose illocutive role is that someone not only says something but at 
the same time also claims that what he says is true.325 However, there is a 
significant difference between ordinary assertions and informal testimony: 
An assertion involves a truth claim, as the speaker believes that what he 
says is true, and these claims can be rejected. If a person has good reason 
to doubt such a claim, he may enter into a discourse concerning the truth 
or falsity of the assertion and the one who asserted the claim must also be 
able to provide evidence. When bearing testimony, however, the statement 
itself is also at the same time evidence that what is being said is true – an 
idea that is embodied in the paradigmatic f igure of the legal witness. This 
kind of performativity enables the emergence of new knowledge through 
the collective circulation of testimony326 – and it does not require belief in 
the solidarity of the source of the information. This once again raises the 
issue of trustworthiness, which is inevitable when discussing testimony. 
The key element of testimony is not the truth of the statement, but rather 
the truthfulness of the person. The truth of a statement thus depends on 
the truthfulness attributed to the people or the reliability attributed to 
the institutions that inform us. In a way, people ‘blindly’ accept the truth 
of a statement insofar as they have confidence in the trustworthiness of 
the information source.327 In everyday ‘natural testimony’, the condition of 
trustworthiness assumes the prosaic form of ‘good informants’ and ‘use-
ful information sources’.328 Trustworthiness is therefore always subject to 
power, politics, and practices: As Steven Shapin was able to show, in the 
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seventeenth century ‘gentlemen’ were considered trustworthy witnesses 
of experiments in the context of the Royal Society.329
What matters here is what remained unquestioned in this form of 
knowledge transmission. Although information sources can (or could) 
in principle always be critically verif ied,330 people generally refrain from 
doing so because they trust the parents who teach them language, the 
teachers who educate them, the lexicons they consult, and the news reports 
they watch on television. It is impossible for people to orient themselves 
in the world any other way. The notion that people acquire most – if not 
all – of their knowledge through the testimony of others applies not only 
to everyday life, but also to science and research itself.
The reductionist position – whose most prominent representative is 
David Hume331 – argues that the knowledge acquired through the testimony 
of others can be substantiated and single-handedly justif ied through the 
listener’s own perception, memory, or inductive reasoning. According to 
this position, therefore, the individual’s perceptual organs and abilities 
constitute the basis of testif ied knowledge. However, this supposition is 
absurd: In practice it is impossible for people to verify all of their knowledge 
in this way because testimony usually involves facts and perceptions that 
are beyond the scope of what listeners are able to f ind out for themselves.332
There is therefore an ‘irreducible asynchrony’ in all situations that involve 
bearing testimony333 – and is this surprising in the context of the mes-
senger model? Nevertheless, there is yet another reason for the necessity 
and irreducibility of bearing testimony: Perception is not the foundation of 
knowledge, but rather it is also tied to concepts that enable something to be 
perceived as something in the f irst place; furthermore, these concepts are 
based on language, and it is impossible to acquire language without acts 
of knowledge through the words of others.334
This insight constitutes an epistemological turning point in these reflec-
tions on the ‘inescapability’ of bearing testimony in everyday life as well as 
scientific practices. It effectively represents a revision of the epistemological 
individual and a rejection of the idea of ‘knowing-it-yourself’.
The individualistically-oriented epistemology of the modern era, in 
which the heroically isolated and independent subject rigorously verif ies 
and justif ies all of his opinions and relies exclusively on perception and 
logic as sources of information in order to achieve absolute certainty ‘in the 
f ight against the windmills of scepticism’ – this epistemology stylizes an 
impossible f ictional f igure who – in the words of Oliver R. Scholz – more 
closely resembles ‘the Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance’.335 Testimonial 
knowledge constitutes the foundation and reservoir of our epistemological 
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practices and it accounts for the fact that our epistemology is a thoroughly 
social epistemology. People are thus inevitably dependent upon interactions 
with others not only in their everyday lives, but also in their cognitive activi-
ties. This ‘interaction’ proves to be f irst and foremost the unidirectional 
adoption of knowledge, which cannot (any longer) be verif ied and is thus 
rooted in one’s faith in others. The fact that large amounts of knowledge are 
transmitted between individuals and are by no means originally produced 
by individuals means that sociality has become the innermost core of our 
knowledge practices and witnessing has become a basic epistemological 
phenomenon.
Conclusion: Transmission of Knowledge through Trustworthiness
(1) These ref lections on witnessing have differentiated between the 
‘grammar’ of witnessing and the ‘pragmatic’ aspects of witnessing. The 
‘grammar’ of witnessing includes all of the attributes that characterize 
witnessing as the announcement of the perception of a past event by a non-
participating observer speaking before a public that was not able to perceive 
this event for themselves, and this concept of witnessing culminates in 
the ideal f igure of the legal witness. The ‘pragmatic’ aspects of witnessing 
consist of the diverse ways in which witnessing occurs as a process situated 
in space and time, from the information people receive through the words 
of others in their everyday lives to more extreme forms of witnessing, like 
the survivors of a catastrophe. Witnessing is a ubiquitous phenomenon in 
all cultures, yet the ‘pragmatic’ aspects of witnessing reveal a dilemma that 
is inherent to the ‘grammar’ of witnessing.
(2) The act of witnessing presupposes a divide between the witness and 
his listeners, who are excluded from the perception of the testif ied event 
by an irreducible asynchrony. The witness basically stands alone due to 
his singular experience. This gap cannot be closed not only because the 
past experience of the witness can only be – at best – communicated to 
others rather than shared with them, but also because this experience is 
not (any longer) verif iable through reality testing. Due to the fact that the 
witness’s testimony is singular and secondary, it is exempt from the process 
of confirmation and proof. However, not only is the witness’s perception 
fallible, but the discursivity of the witness’s statement also introduces the 
possibility of lying. Formal testimony, as presented by legal witness, is 
therefore an institutionalized performative act, which effectively makes 
a statement true by virtue of the fact that it is uttered. This distinguishes 
testimony from ordinary claims, whose truth is not already sealed by the 
mere performance of being uttered but rather is based on the possibility that 
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a speaker can also justify what she has said. The special status of witness 
statements is therefore that they produce evidence but they cannot be 
justif ied in the conventional sense.
(3) Given the fallibility of witness statements, their truth potential is 
grounded in the trustworthiness of the witness as a person, in his honesty 
and integrity. The witness performs a double or ‘divided’ role: On the one 
hand, he is supposed to be a neutral, non-participating observer. To put it 
more radically, he is a ‘data collection and retrieval instrument’, and he must 
therefore largely ignore his own reflections, opinions, and judgements. At 
the same time, however, he must also prove to be a person of integrity who is 
consistently credible and trustworthy and whose external behaviour corre-
sponds (supposedly) to his inner convictions. There is an inherent dilemma 
in this concept of the witness as a medium whose task is to transmit and 
convey perceptions, and this dilemma is characteristic of the f igure of the 
witness: He must act as both a ‘thing’ and an ‘authentic person’ at the same 
time. This dilemma becomes particularly apparent in two of the extreme 
versions of witnessing: namely, the martyr and the survivor.
(4) Martyrs: In the Christian tradition the apostles could still lay claim to 
being eyewitnesses, as they apparently met the resurrected Jesus ‘in person’, 
yet Christians bear witness not to the immanence of such a perception, 
but only to the transcendence of their faith experience. People are most 
trustworthy when they are prepared to die, so the guarantee of truth gradu-
ally becomes not words, but the suffering body and death. In the process 
of transmitting his message, therefore, the ‘dying messenger’ transforms 
into a martyr.
Survivors: The people killed in a catastrophe can no longer bear witness 
to it. The dilemma of survivor witnesses, therefore, consists in the fact not 
only that they are both victims and witnesses, but also that they mark 
the empty position left behind by the dead. It is precisely because they 
survived and escaped annihilation that they embody the very impossibility 
of bearing witness to such a devastating event. When the act of bearing 
witness becomes at the same time also the act of processing a traumatic 
experience, the listener assumes a special role that consists in witnessing 
and vouching for the reintegration of the traumatic experience in the ‘unity 
of the person’ of the survivor.
(5) The prosaic form of witnessing lies in the ubiquity of knowledge 
acquired through the words and writings of others, without which socializa-
tion and orientation in a culture would not be possible. The ubiquity of this 
kind of witnessing, which is not actually formal (i.e. juridical) but rather in-
formal or ‘natural’ testimony, reveals the social dimension of epistemology, 
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which cannot be eliminated. The impossibility of verifying the knowledge 
acquired from others through transmission using one’s own perception and 
reasoning makes epistemological individualism an untenable position. The 
kind of knowledge produced through witnessing is based on the interaction 
between the witness and the listeners. It f irst emerges in the in-between 
space of this interaction, and it thus depends on two different things: on 
the one hand it depends on the transmission of perception and/or knowledge 
by the witness, and on the other hand it also depends on the trust and faith 
of the listener. The social epistemology of witnessing always contains an 
ethical dimension because transmission through witnessing is only possible 
when the witness is believed and trusted.
 So What Does ‘Transmission’ Mean?
Making Perceptible
Up until now I have been dealing with forms of transmission in widely 
diverse f ields. I have also been dealing with forms of transmission that are 
not obviously subject to the regime of a medium, like radio or television, 
as this – albeit entirely random – selection of transmission modalities 
was designed to trace by analogy the functional logic of the messenger 
precisely where the mediality of this process was not at all obvious. And the 
discovery of these forms of transmission was bound up with the hope that 
their subtlety and diversity could assess and also expand the categorical 
abundance of the rather simple theoretical model of the messenger.
These forms reflect very different transmission strategies: hybridization, 
transcription, desubstantiation, complementarity, affective resonance, 
and f inally trustworthiness. Hardly any list could be so diverse, and every 
attempt to measure these various modalities according to the same coher-
ent theory of transmission unavoidably exercises a kind of conceptual 
violence with regard to the abundance of phenomena. This danger is real. 
Nevertheless, I want to venture a generalizing perspective, which asks: Do 
these diverse transmission processes reflect a coherent set of attributes 
concerning transmission and mediality?
My answer includes four points, which also play a role in the messenger 
model but which have become clearer over the course of analyzing concrete 
forms of transmission: (1) Transmissions presuppose a difference that is not 
reducible to spatial or temporal distance. (2) The role of the mediator is not 
always to bridge and level this difference, but also to maintain it. Media – as 
seen in the functional logic of the messenger – thus make it possible to 
deal with difference. (3) The function of the messenger – and this is media-
theoretically generalizable – is to make something perceptible. Aistheticiza-
tion thus constitutes the very nucleus of all transmission processes, and 
transmission can be reconstructed as a form of display. (4) This is possible 
through a transformation that manifests a difference by neutralizing what 
is ‘singular’ in each case. Medial mediation thus creates the impression of 
immediacy.
Difference as Prerequisite for Transmissions
As you will recall, the original meaning of the word ‘transmission’1 was 
tantamount to ‘carry across’: A burden is taken up and carried ‘across 
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something’,2 like a bridge. It is a matter of overcoming not simply a distance, 
but rather a divide or a chasm. This image is quite revealing. Wherever 
transmissions are present, there must also be ruptures or oppositions, 
which could also be, in Thomas Mann’s words, ‘chasms of strangeness’.3 
Transmission thus acquires a fundamental dif ference-theoretical 
dimension.
This encourages a reconsideration of the various transmission phe-
nomena discussed thus far: Despite the fact that they were created ‘in the 
image of God’, humans project onto God precisely those attributes that are 
unattainable to them, such as being immortal or omnipotent; as a result, the 
monotheistic God is as distant and different from humans as conceivably 
possible. Is it possible to imagine an abyss or schism more radical than the 
one between inf inite god and f inite humans?
Or, to move on to contagion: In the transmission of diseases, the practice 
of immunization through a controlled infection with a pathogen depends 
precisely on the obliteration of the difference between the self and the 
other so that the chain of transmissions can be interrupted. And conversely, 
this ‘forced levelling’ also shows that a form of difference constitutes the 
prerequisite for medical infection, as there can be no infection without a 
difference between the self and the other.
Or consider the intermediary function of money: The role of money f irst 
emerges in situations where there is a divide between desire and possession, 
when someone wants precisely what someone else has. Using the principle 
that ‘one must give in order to be able to take’, money also contributes to 
the (relatively) peaceful equalization of this separation. Furthermore, the 
heterogeneity of goods is the motor that drives the exchange of goods, and 
the function of money is to make disparate things commensurable through 
prices. This heterogeneity applies all the more to the credit function money, 
which is central to my argument.
In psychoanalysis transference could help rather than disrupt therapy 
– as Freud originally assumed – precisely because the patient’s past, which 
was shaped by traumatic experiences, and his present, which is shaped by 
the affective resonance of ‘his’ analyst, are so clearly different that project-
ing an ‘old’ pattern of feeling onto the analyst potentially transforms rather 
than repeats that pattern.
And in the case of witnessing an irreconcilable difference obviously 
exists between, on the one hand, the perception and knowledge of the 
witness with regard to a past event and, on the other hand, the ignorance 
of the listeners before whom the witness testif ies, who do not have access 
to this event.
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In summary: A pronounced difference, an imbalance, a heterogeneity 
constitutes the ‘divide’ capable of sparking the maelstrom of a transmission 
event. The intensity of this difference can undoubtedly be modulated: It 
might simply be a separation in space and time, but in its most extreme form 
it is a reciprocal otherness and inaccessibility that can even make individu-
als afraid of one another. There is no transmission without differentiality.
Levelling or Articulation of Difference?
The fascinating question now is what happens to this difference in the 
course of transmission. As I already pointed out in my discussion of the 
messenger f igure, messengers do not just bridge differences, but rather their 
acts of transmission also serve to maintain and reinforce these differences. 
This idea offers a more multifaceted image of transmission.
The same principle can be applied to Benjamin’s reflections on transla-
tion: Translators could certainly understand the act of translating as the 
transmission of a text from one language to another. In this perspective, 
if the meaning of the text seems to remain ‘the same’ then translatability 
implies the possibility that linguistic differences can be neutralized: The 
same thing can be said in different ways both intralingually and inter-
lingually. For Benjamin, however, this is precisely the attitude of the ‘bad 
translator’. The ‘good translator’ does not depend on the equivalence of 
meaning; rather, he leaves space for the inherent deviations in the ‘ways of 
thinking’ to unfold, which brings the differences between languages to light. 
Instead of concealing the diversity and incommensurability of languages, 
therefore, translations make them apparent.
To return to the question of whether difference is levelled or articulated: 
Following Benjamin’s concept of translation, is it possible to assume that 
transmission can be viewed from both perspectives – as the levelling and 
articulation of difference – although the more revealing philosophical 
perspective is the one in which transmission does not conceal differences 
but rather makes them apparent? To accept the normative element of 
Benjamin’s ‘good translator’: If the question of what constitutes a medium 
is situated in the context of transmission, does this reveal an ‘ethos of the 
medial’ in the form of the demand that media must always manifest the 
difference in whose ‘in-between space’ they operate?
Consider the concrete transmissions that have already been discussed: 
A virus is insidious precisely because it is able to lodge itself in the cells of 
the host’s body and reproduce like the host’s own cells by transcribing and 
participating in the host’s mechanisms of cellular reproduction. In the case 
of viral contagion, therefore, the divide between the self and the other is 
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subtly and radically suspended without ‘instances’ coming into play that 
mark this original difference.
Interestingly, however, such ‘instances’ occur in the case of personal 
messenger f igures: In the context of this bipolar function, the apparent 
double role played by both the psychoanalyst and the witness can also be 
interpreted as bridging and exposing a difference at the same time.
As a ‘neutral medium’ the psychoanalyst constitutes a projection surface 
on which unprocessed experiences from the patient’s past can be inscribed. 
This process thus opens up the possibility of repeating or re-experiencing 
problematic feelings from the past in the here and now of the psychoanalytic 
situation. As a participant, however, the analyst also establishes a personal 
relationship with his patient and becomes an affective resonant body, which 
makes it possible for a change to emerge from the repetition. A transforma-
tion of the patient’s mental and emotional life thus takes place, and as a 
result the past can be forgotten and is no longer repetitively acted out.
Like the psychoanalyst, the witness also performs a double task: He must 
prove to be an infallible recording device, a disinterested witness, a mere 
medium of a past event, but at the same time he must also appear as a person 
who is authentic, credible, and trustworthy. The dilemma of the Holocaust 
witness sheds light on precisely this situation: It is only after the survivors 
have once again become respected members of society and have situated 
themselves as people in this society – if it may be put like this – that they 
can appear (for the f irst time) as witnesses of their own depersonalized 
status as victims of the Nazis. They are only able to bear witness to their 
disintegrated past from the distance of their reintegrated present.
It is thus clear that transmissions are a way of dealing with difference; 
they make differences manageable. I now want to probe a little deeper, and 
perhaps also more radically, into the idea that transmissions can equalize 
and at the same time mark differences between worlds, f ields, or systems. 
Such a transmission strategy is ‘ideally’ realized precisely when transmis-
sion is interpreted as a process of making something perceptible.
Making Something Inaccessible Perceptible
This represents a turning point in my reflections. The idea of the messenger 
depends on the semantic f ield of communication and language use. And 
because the idea of transmission as the relaying of communication is tied 
to the origin of the word ‘transmission’ as the carrying across of a burden, 
it is also connected to the semantic f ield of transportation.
The history of words is irreversible, yet we create our concepts ourselves. 
As a thought experiment, imagine that it were possible to conceive of 
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‘transmission’ in a way that evoked entirely different associations than 
those of movement, carrying, and thus transport. Imagine that this concept 
was associated with the possibility of bridging a distance by allowing one 
side to ‘visualize’ the other and thus discover something that normally 
eludes perception because it is either strange or just distant. This thought 
experiment calls attention to the productive function that lies in the ability 
of transmission to expose and mark differences. It shows precisely the 
visualization potential of the image, whose power is based on both the 
opening and closing of the separation between the absence and presence 
of image content.
Is the connection between the role of the messenger and the act of mak-
ing something perceptible echoed in these transmission procedures?
I will begin with Benjamin: Perhaps the concept of ‘making perceptible’ 
can account for the peculiar sacred turn in Benjamin’s theory of translation 
and language, as the acknowledgment that ‘post-Babylonian’ linguistic 
diversity cannot be circumvented does not remain his f inal word on the 
matter: Benjamin actually starts from the premise that translations do not 
reveal identical meanings but rather divergent ways of thinking. However, 
because individual languages can be translated into one another they 
turn out to be different yet nevertheless compatible fragments of the ‘pure 
language’ that has been lost since the Fall of Man. This ‘pure language’ 
does not (any longer) exist, but translation can provide an image and an 
idea of it by manifesting a fundamental compatibility within the diversity 
of languages; the activity of the translator thus bears witness to the factual 
heterogeneity of languages while simultaneously revealing a universal bond 
that connects all languages in the vanishing point of the one ‘pure language’ 
that does not (any longer) exist.
Benjamin’s theory of translation thus reflects a tension that is inherent 
to any form of imaging that consists in sensualizing (and symbolizing) 
something that was previously distant and hidden.4 This tension was already 
discussed in the chapter on angels insofar as angels bridge the distance 
between the divine and the human and through their appearance they 
bear witness to the fundamental absence of God as well as God’s real activi-
ties among humans. It is this duplicity that induced Massimo Cacciari to 
conclude that angels represent the incarnation of the principle of the image, 
which he interprets as ‘(being) one with his absence’.5
I now turn to the phenomenon of witnessing. The witness’s statement 
– ordinarily – testif ies to something the witness perceived himself; his 
speech is not supposed to make any claims about an event in the sense 
of judgements, but rather he is supposed to convey an image of what he 
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perceived as precisely as possible; and he presents this testimony in a 
situation where the perceived event is irrevocably past and hidden be-
cause it is (usually) no longer reproducible. The ‘image’ produced by the 
witness is thus made from language, and it becomes a substitute for the 
perception of a past event, which has become impossible to perceive in 
the present. The verbalized testimony should – ideally – mean the same 
thing to the jury that the original perception meant to the witness, but 
this is impossible due to the separation between the witness’s private 
experience in the past and his public verbalization of that experience 
in the present; the witness perceived something, but the listeners before 
whom he testif ies only receive a linguistic description of this perception, 
which can – intentionally or unintentionally – always be false. This is the 
origin of the paradox of witnessing, which is rooted in the fact that the 
witness must act in two different forms: as both a depersonalized recording 
instrument and at the same time as an authentic trustworthy person. 
The speech of the witness can thus be understood as the act of making 
something perceptible for others, yet at the same time it must also mark 
the impossibility of reproducing a private perception as a perception for 
others, as this making perceptible ‘only’ occurs in a linguistic form that 
opens up the possibility of false testimony.
In specifying transmission as a process of making something perceptible, 
as ‘aistheticization’,6 it is essential not to confuse this with ‘aestheticization’. 
As Martin Seel points out, aesthetic perception is a special mode of percep-
tion.7 It is directed towards the phenomenal individuality of an appearing 
object or the game of appearances in the simultaneity of that which mani-
fests in the presence of an object.8 However, transmission processes make 
something perceptible while simultaneously evoking the absence of what 
is visualized, just as the messenger who speaks for someone else reveals the 
absence of the one in whose name he speaks while simultaneously making 
the ‘aura’ of this absent person present.
If transmission must be conceived as a process of making something that 
is sensually inaccessible perceptible, then a similarity becomes apparent: 
Isn’t this principle – making something perceptible while simultaneously 
revealing is hiddenness – connected to my previous discussion of traces? The 
trace reveals not simply ‘something’, but rather the ‘absence of something’. 
Wherever a trace is encountered or something is interpreted as a trace, this 
trace is understood as a material mark that refers to something which is no 
longer there – otherwise there would be no trace.
Until now I have focused on transmission within the context of the 
messenger model; is it possible and perhaps also time to conceive of traces 
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as ‘involuntary messengers’ so that the meaning of ‘transmission’ might 
also be discussed in terms of the formation and interpretation of traces? 
Is it thus possible that what is strange about the messenger model (i.e. that 
the messenger is still a passive example of someone who has been commis-
sioned for an assignment) could lose its potential for irritation to a certain 
extent if it is associated with the concept of the trace? Before pursuing this 
line of inquiry, I would like to explore a further attribute related to the 
‘material of transmission’: What does it mean to reveal something precisely 
by withdrawing oneself?
Articulating Difference through Self-Neutralization
The messenger’s characteristic gesture, which is based on the heteronomy 
of the messenger’s errand, is self-neutralization. It is only by suppressing 
his own senses and structures that the messenger is able to manifest other 
senses and structures medially. The medium thus presents its message by 
withdrawing at the same time. There is an inherent connection between, 
on the one hand, the ‘immediacy’ of mediation, which is immanent in the 
medium itself, and, on the other hand, the suppression of the medium’s 
own logic. I will explain this more concretely:
Money reveals this process of self-neutralization in an exemplary way 
because its intermediary role is based on desubstantiation. There is only talk of 
‘money’ when the means of circulation is no longer a concrete good, like wheat, 
pearls, or clams. In the conventional sense money can neither be ‘used’ nor can 
it be subject to any physical changes at all over time. Due to its mobility and its 
lack of qualities, which reinforces its ‘pure countability’ (discreteness), money 
thus embodies – whether as coins, paper, or electronic money – the function 
of providing a standard measure of value for relations of economic exchange.9 
Money provides a standard measure for the exchange for goods precisely 
because of its ‘desubstantiated substance’ and its ‘indifferent non-content’, 
which enable the homogenizing quantification of qualitative differences.
Or consider viral infections. Aren’t viruses able to make themselves 
‘unrecognizable’ to the host precisely by transcribing the DNA of the host’s 
cells and reproducing themselves in the host, thus becoming part of the af-
flicted organism itself? It is also possible to describe the viral transcription 
of cell DNA metaphorically as follows: Viruses neutralize their otherness by 
converting to the host’s mechanism of cellular reproduction and thereby 
donning the ‘mask’ of the host cell.
The interplay of depersonalization and personality is fundamental to the 
f igure of the ‘personal messenger’. For Freud – unlike many proponents of 
the ‘interactive turn’ in psychoanalysis – the self-withdrawal of the analyst 
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in the sense of the suppressing of his own personality is precisely a conditio 
sine qua non of psychoanalysis. Various strategies of ‘anonymization’ – like 
sitting outside of the patient’s f ield of vision – are supposed to enable the 
physician to function as a suitable projection surface for the transmissions 
from the patient. However, the analyst is not supposed to consider himself 
and behave as a receiver of these transmissions, but rather he is supposed 
to act as a mediator between the (unprocessed) emotions of the patient’s 
past and his present emotions.
The f igure of the witness also presupposes a seismographic potential 
(which is paradoxical, like all such unrealizable assumptions) in that the 
witness is an observer of rather than a participant in a past event and he 
must withhold his own judgement and commentary when describing this 
event.
And aren’t word-for-word translations, which Benjamin prefers because 
they manifest the differences between languages better than ‘creative’ ad-
aptations, also a form in which the translator is considered ‘good’ precisely 
because he relinquishes his own personal ingenuity?
Various approaches to the self-withdrawal and self-neutralization of the 
medium have already been thematized – as pointed out earlier10 – such 
as Aristotle’s ‘diaphanous medium’,11 Fritz Heider’s ‘extra-conditionality’ 
of media,12 Niklas Luhmann’s ‘loose coupling’ by virtue of which the me-
dium remains invisible in the visibility of the form itself,13 Dieter Mersch’s 
withdrawal of media in their implementation,14 and Boris Groys’s notion of 
the medium as a material sign vehicle that remains concealed behind the 
meaning of the sign and is only seen when the sign function is suspended,15 
not to mention the topos of the ‘disappearing messenger’!
This raises the question of what has actually been accomplished by 
locating the an-aistheticization and self-neutralization of the medium in 
the messenger’s errand? What is the ‘added value’ of reformulating this 
phenomenon in the context of the messenger model?
To start with, the definitional core of my media concept is that the 
medium must suppress itself in order for something to be visualized. This 
conditional relationship can be considered the ‘basic law’ of the perfor-
mance of media. The interrelationship between ‘making something appear’ 
and ‘withdrawing oneself’ provides a criterion that distinguishes media 
from related phenomena, such as signs but also technologies. To express this 
idea in a more ontologically cautious way: This criterion makes it possible to 
delineate the unique character of the media perspective from the perspective 
of signs and technologies. Moreover, this criterion represents the point at 
which medial disruptions and derailments are identif iable, as a medium 
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turns into a non-medium when it discards the neutrality of the mediator 
position in order to become a ‘party’ and actor itself. And the media of the 
arts can for the most part be understood as suspending this ‘functional law 
of mediality’, but in the process they also contribute to its illumination.
Nevertheless, the ‘added value’ of this concept exceeds the functional 
logic of mediality and the criteriological framework associated with it. It is 
related to a fundamental metaphysical intuition that the world in which we 
live is not the same as the world that appears to us. In the Western tradition, 
this intuition introduced a transcendence that was furnished with the 
index of an immateriality, which enabled it to elude localization in space 
and time. Yet regarding the medium as a messenger, who can only perform 
his task by withdrawing and suppressing himself, opens the possibility of 
reconstructing the relationship between the visible and the invisible (or: the 
audible, the palpable, etc.) as a continuum of materiality. And once again it 
is the trace – which I will address in the next chapter – that is particularly 
significant for this ‘grounding’ in materiality. First, however, I want to go one 
step further in answering the question of how the messenger perspective 
and the an-aistheticizing tendency of the medium provide a new dimension.
The messenger is a f igure whose performance depends not on the 
strengthening, but rather on the weakening of the ‘self’: In order to reveal 
the other, the self must thereby withdraw. It is not an ‘I’, or even a ‘you’, 
but rather a ‘he, she, it’ in their unmitigated exteriority that are (made) 
present in the messenger’s errand. The messenger is the incarnation of the 
metamorphosis in which an I becomes an other by transcending the self in 
the act and as an act of making the other perceptible. Consider once again the 
metaphysical impulse to transcend one’s immediate existence. Is it possible 
that this impulse is based not simply on our epistemological relationship to 
the (visible or invisible) world, but rather – much more – on our ethical rela-
tionship to the other? To start with, does the ‘double world’ that metaphysics 
understands as its own reflection represent the social realm of experience 
of our personhood, which does not bear witness to the unalterable identity 
of the self but rather to the possibility of self-abandonment in order to 
render the other visible? The messenger perspective thus suggests that 
transcendence proves to be fundamentally self-transcendence: People do 
not transcend the visible world so much as the self in that they ‘speak with 
someone else’s voice’. It is no coincidence that the word ‘person’ refers to 
‘per-sonare’, or speaking through the mask. How signif icant is the cultural-
historical coincidence of theatre and metaphysics in this context?16
These thoughts anticipate the epilogue, but I will now turn to the ques-
tion of how the idea of making something perceptible appertains to traces.
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Reading Traces
This chapter will shed new light on the meaning of transmission by reflect-
ing once again on the phenomenon of the trace. I will begin by clarifying 
the meaning of the term ‘trace’.
Traces as ‘Messengers from the Past’?
The word ‘footprint’ (Old High German ‘spor’, Middle High German ‘spur’)17 
is etymologically significant because it provides a way of intuitively tracking 
down the conceptual origins of the trace.18 A footprint is an impression that 
reveals the presence of someone or something in the past; it crystallizes a 
movement in time as a spatial configuration. The presence of the trace thus 
bears witness to the absence of what caused it. While the trace is visible, 
what produced it remains withdrawn and invisible. In other words, the 
presence of the trace visualizes the non-presence of what left it behind. The 
trace embodies not the absent thing itself, but rather its absence.
The trace actually reflects the same quasi-magical ‘real presence’ that 
I already discussed as a facet of the eff icacy of images, which similarly 
oscillate between the absence and presence of the pictured object: Because 
traces are due to the causal nexus of a past event, this event is ‘somehow’ 
projected into the present in the form of the trace. The trace thus reveals 
something that is irreversibly past yet still indirectly apparent at the time 
when the trace is recorded and interpreted.
Unlike the index, which signif ies something synchronous even if it is 
perhaps not visible – like the (functioning) weathercock that demonstrates 
the direction of the wind – the formation of the trace is based on the funda-
mental asynchrony between the time when it is made and the time when it 
is read. Smoke is an index of f ire, but ashes are its trace. Traces thus require 
a temporal break, as they always refer to a past event: traces are remnants.
This immediately suggests the question: Is it possible to conceive of 
traces as ‘messengers from the past’? Wouldn’t this provide the key to 
explain the presumably close relationship between messengers and traces, 
as messengers are understood as conveying transmissions across space 
while traces convey transmissions across time? Messengers and traces thus 
constitute different dimensions of transmission, which is understood in the 
former case as a spatial process and in the latter case as a temporal process. 
It would undoubtedly be possible to see it this way, yet this approach is 
not suff icient. From the very beginning, the basis of all transmission 
processes was described as the ‘in-between’ position of the messenger, 
which refers not only to spatial distances but to ‘difference’ in general. 
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Temporal displacements are therefore already implicitly included in the 
messenger model.
However, there is still a deeper underlying reason why it is insuff icient 
to presume that traces are simply ‘messengers from the past’ – a reason, 
moreover, whose explanation suggests that the trace is more like a reversal 
of the messenger’s errand. That is therefore my hypothesis: Messengers and 
traces are paradigmatic configurations of transmission insofar as they are 
related to one another f iguratively like the front and back sides of a page. 
As basic versions of transmission, messengers and traces are inseparably 
connected to each other. Nevertheless, they are connected such that – in 
keeping with the same metaphor – the ‘inscription’ that the messenger 
model leaves behind on the front side of the page is read ‘backwards’ and 
is thus inverted from the perspective of the back side – that of the trace. 
Reading traces is thus considered the inverse function of the messenger’s 
errand. This inversion suggests an expansion of the concept of transmission, 
but this expansion nevertheless reveals at the same time the borders of 
this concept.
So what does it mean to understand reading traces as an ‘inversion of 
the messenger’s errand’?
Reading Traces as an Inversion of the Messenger’s Errand
You will recall that the messenger is situated between two divergent hetero-
geneous sides and is thus associated with the postal principle. The roles of 
activity and passivity are clearly distributed: The sender tells the messenger 
to do something and the addressee receives something. The receiver is seen 
as the one to whom something is delivered; to express it in the language 
of telecommunications, he functions here only as an ‘information sink’. 
The messenger operates in the space of meaning deferral, which means 
precisely that the materiality and the meaning of the message are separate. 
The messenger’s ‘business’ thus unfolds in a continuum of materiality that 
serves its purpose when the transmitted message is received, regardless of 
the meaning that the message has for the receiver. Reception is independent 
of interpretation. That is why the postal principle is absolved of the burden 
of meaning – from the perspective of the messenger function at least.
But what happens to the distribution of activity and passivity and the 
abstraction of meaning when seen from the perspective of the trace? Can 
it be assumed that the one who left the trace behind plays the active role 
and the one who records and reads the trace more or less plays the passive 
role? Moreover, can traces also be localized in the intermediate space of 
meaning deferral, like messengers? Obviously traces cannot be reasonably 
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described in this way. And there are (at least) two interrelated reasons for 
this: The lack of motivation on the part of those who cause traces and the 
creation of traces through the act of reading them.
(1) I will begin with the lack of motivation: Traces are not produced, and 
this fundamentally distinguishes them from all other sign events – as well as 
from the messenger’s errand. Traces are unintentional remains: Only things 
left behind involuntarily, unintentionally, and uncontrollably can then be 
read as traces. If something is consciously designed as a trace, then it is not 
really a trace but rather the staging of a trace. It is not intentionality and 
conscious awareness that give rise to traces, but rather only the materiality 
and gravitational force of being; Traces are due to the ‘blind force’ of bodies 
acting on each other in the continuum of material worldly relations. This 
lack of motivation means that leaving traces behind is not a theoretical act: 
It is an effect, but it is never the intention, purpose, or goal of an action. 
Traces are phenomena that must be caused but cannot be intended. Traces 
are not ordered or commissioned.
(2) At the same time, the idea of intentionally creating traces does not 
completely disappear. In the messenger model it is the employer who ac-
tively creates, but in the case of traces this role is performed by the one who 
pursues and identif ies them. Traces are thus constructed, and this insight 
shows how they invert the postal principle: Despite the fact that traces lack 
motivation, it is not absurd to assume that traces have a ‘creator’; however, 
this creator is to be found not where traces are caused, but rather where they 
are perceived and pursued. In order to understand this idea it is necessary 
to explain more precisely what it means to ‘read traces’.
Traces are read – or at least this is what our language use implies; how-
ever, they are not written.19 The act of reading traces must therefore be 
understood as the act of ‘picking up’ and ‘reading out’. Traces are not simply 
encountered, but rather they originate in acts of securing and identifying 
traces, which in some cases are very diff icult and elaborate. Strictly speak-
ing, traces originate in the eye of the reader. Through the process of reading 
traces, ‘things’ that are the effects of something are transformed into traces for 
something. The direction of this process is shaped by the actual context of 
the search for traces or the interests that guide it. Furthermore, the search 
for traces is an activity that is only able to expose traces at all through 
intense engagement with the material that qualif ies as a possible trace. 
Nevertheless, the use of the word ‘expose’, as well as ‘f ind’ and ‘discover’, 
is thoroughly ambiguous. When traces can be conventionalized in a kind 
of ‘sign register’, such as when ideal examples of tracks are represented in 
a hunting handbook, then it is possible to speak unproblematically of a 
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‘discovery of traces’ on the forest f loor. However, this situation becomes 
much more complicated when the forest f loor is half frozen and countless 
tracks run through one another; it is then a matter of determining how 
fresh or old the tracks are.
Actually, something only becomes a trace when it occupies a well-defined 
place in relation to a plausible story that produces a connection between 
the visible and the invisible. The formation of traces is always due to a 
disruption of order, which is then integrated into a new narrative order 
by reconstructing the trace-forming event as a story. And the story that 
corresponds to this reading – and thus the ‘semantic’ of the trace – is 
dependent on the interests of the reader, who is searching for a way to 
resolve something uncertain or unknown with the help of this practical 
and theoretical activity. Reading traces thus means ‘making things talk’, 
yet things are mute. They only become eloquent – and thus become traces 
– through the stories told by readers. And there are always many possible 
stories; traces are thus polysemic. Yet the idea of polysemy itself needs to 
be defined more precisely.20 Traces are not strictly speaking ambiguous, but 
rather the same perceptible mark can be transformed into entirely different 
traces of something depending on the narrative contexts and the reader’s 
orientation requirements.
Traces thus emerge through the work of interpretation, which is rooted 
in the actual context of the reader and is compatible with the narrative 
creation of causal dependencies. It is therefore impossible to separate what a 
trace is from the meaning associated with it. Traces represent the formation 
of sense out of non-sense.
Perhaps it is now clear: The concept of the trace as ‘involuntary mes-
senger’ does not simply refer to traces of the past. Rather, some element of 
the material continuum, in which we are all embedded, is transformed into a 
medium insofar as something perceptible is regarded as a point of reference 
in order to reconstruct an event that is no longer perceptible. Causes have 
effects, but these effects do not have the status of traces. The transformation 
of an effect into a trace is not an act that can be attributed to those who 
caused the trace – who seldom have any interest in leaving traces behind; 
rather, it can only be attributed to those who receive what the trace medium 
can transmit. The trace is a ‘messenger’ that is ‘delegated’ – metaphorically 
speaking – by the receiver of the message.
In the context of the postal principle, this idea can also be expressed as 
follows: The reader of the trace acts as an addressee of something whose 
unintentional sender must f irst be reconstructed.21 It is precisely because 
of this role reversal that the trace is an inversion of the messenger concept.
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Messenger and Trace, or On the ‘Sign’ as the Basis of Communication 
and Cognition
But what has been gained by this inversion? In other words, if the messenger 
and the trace are viewed as inverse media-theoretical f igures that embody 
the ‘front and back sides’ of the postal principle, how does a consideration 
of this inversion expand the messenger perspective?
An answer immediately suggests itself: What the trace opens and adds 
is an epistemological expansion. Even though the transmission event is 
fundamentally about making something perceptible, the messenger is 
still an instance of communication. But the trace is part of the domain of 
cognition. The acts of identif ication associated with the reading of traces 
can provide a sense of guidance and transform uncertainty into certainty; 
the reading of traces is thus a cultural technique of knowledge produc-
tion. When viewed from this perspective, reflecting on the trace expands 
the messenger model precisely by adding a dimension that is marked as a 
constraint in the transmission aspect of messages: namely, the idea that 
something new emerges and is discovered through transmission.
Carlo Ginzburg’s ‘paradigm of signs’ established a connection between, 
on the one hand, the ‘wild knowledge’ of reading traces as an archaic 
technique of orientation and, on the other hand, cognition through signs 
and symptoms as a humanities methodology.22 Even in the natural sciences 
– as Jörg Rheinberger already emphatically pointed out23 – the bulk of the 
investigations of what are often ‘invisible phenomena’ are due to the cultural 
technique of reading traces. Ludwig Jäger showed with his ‘transcription’24 
approach that our ability to refer back to what we do as a trace, and thus to 
be able to maintain a distanced, observing, and reflecting relation to what 
we voluntarily and involuntarily create, is a if not the culture-endowing 
act. The aspects of this epistemology of the trace have been well examined 
elsewhere, so I won’t go into it here.25
A preliminary answer has now been found to the question of what is 
gained by shifting from the messenger to the trace. Our communication and 
our episteme are dependent on transmission conditions that are embodied 
in the f igures of the messenger and the trace, which make something 
perceptible. When seen in the light of this concept of transmission, ‘signs’ 
prove to be the root of understanding (communication) and cognition.
However, as remarkable and momentous as the cultural and episte-
mological technique of reading traces is, this expansion of the messenger 
model is not yet enough. For the joke of the inversion of the messenger 
f igure does not lie simply in the fact that it compensates for the def icits of 
the messenger model and thus expands it such that the act of ‘making the 
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imperceptible perceptible’ through transmission is not only fundamental 
to communication but also to cognition; even though this expansion is of 
considerable value. Rather, in the course of reflecting on traces the idea of 
transmission and medial mediation itself can become to a certain extent 
problematic and thus its borders can be made apparent. These borders 
emerge when the ‘reconstruction of the sender through the addressee’, 
which constitutes the nucleus of reading traces – up until now at least – is 
visualized as a ‘non-thing’, as something virtually impossible. And this 
dimension is revealed through Emmanuel Levinas’s ref lections on the 
trace.26
Transmission as ‘Transition’: Mediality beyond Transmission
Levinas also leaves no doubt that traces can function as a kind of sign. 
While the mark lies in plain view, something concealed behind it can be 
deduced. In the process of interpreting this appearance as a trace, what is 
presently veiled can at the same time be unveiled. This is how a detective 
examines traces at a crime scene, how a hunter pursues tracks in the wild, 
how an archaeologist digs for the remains of past civilizations. Levinas 
actually distinguishes between signs and traces in terms of intentionality/
unintentionality, but the trace always ‘also plays the role of a sign; it can be 
taken for a sign’.27 So, as my epistemology of the trace already shows, the 
trace is part of the universal referential context of the world, in which every 
effect can at the same time be considered a sign of its cause. When seen 
from this semiological perspective, the trace represents the possibility that 
the past is still available in the present through remains and the future can 
already be deduced in the present through signs. When the trace is viewed 
as a sign, according to Levinas, the world of the present merges with the 
past and the future in a more or less unif ied order. It is a ‘strategy’ that 
forces everything imperceptible back into the immanence of a discernible 
and manageable present, that reveals its transcendental character, and 
that integrates it more or less seamlessly into the familiar world. Through 
the semiology of the trace, the inaccessible beyond becomes part of the 
accessible world.
Yet this epistemological positivity obscures the specif ic meaning of the 
trace, which cannot be reduced to denotation and identification or revealing 
and unveiling. The authentic trace actually ‘disturbs the order of the world’28 
insofar as it asserts an irresolvable unfamiliarity, an incomprehensible 
otherness, an irreversible pastness, a constitutive withdrawal. And it is this 
‘disturbing’ function of the trace that reveals a mediality beyond transmis-
sion. I will address these points one by one.
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First, visualize the philosophical motive that moves Levinas to un-
derstand the trace in the context of an ungraspable otherness. Western 
philosophy assumes that everything external, unfamiliar, transcendent, 
and otherworldly can be subsumed and absorbed into one’s own under-
standing by virtue of the egological function of consciousness. Odysseus, 
whose journey is ultimately a return to the self, thus becomes a symbolic 
f igure: ‘This experience would still remain a movement of the same, a 
movement of an I.’29 This defence against the unfamiliar is an inherent 
part of human relationships, the fundamental aim of which is (usually) to 
unveil and understand the other and thus deprive the other of precisely his 
otherness.30 By understanding and assimilating the other according to the 
standards set by one’s own consciousness, the ‘I’ becomes absolute and the 
other becomes an ‘alter ego’.
But is this egological absorption the only possible way? What would 
it mean if the other actually remained ‘absolutely exterior’,31 if the ‘I’ 
experienced the other as something entirely external to the self – what 
Levinas calls a ‘heteronomous experience’32 – or, more precisely, if the ‘I’ 
was subjected to this experience of heteronomy? This would initiate a 
movement that does not return to its own starting point – like Odysseus; 
it would reveal a transcendence that no longer bends to the immanence of 
the self’s own familiar world.
This emergence of something other than the self occurs when the other 
is encountered as a trace – an ‘authentic trace’ that cannot function as a 
sign for something. Of course the other always remains a decipherable sign 
that can be deduced through ‘hermeneutics and exegesis’. But that is not 
the extent of its meaning. And this surplus of meaning, which is inherently 
beyond understanding, revealing, and unveiling, becomes apparent for 
Levinas in the ‘face’: ‘The phenomenon which is the apparition of the other 
is also a face.’33 Levinas’s concept of the ‘face’ must be understood as the 
manifestation of an inaccessible world whose essence cannot be found 
through the conscious interpretation of an appearance. This approach 
conceives of the face as an expression, but what manifests in the face cannot 
be understood as a sign. It is a sign that no longer refers to anything, and 
such a sign is precisely that of the ‘authentic trace’.
The face does not reveal a hidden world behind the visible surface, which 
emerges through the act of reading traces. The face is a kind of trace that is 
beyond our world; it transcends sign-mediated cognition. It is the trace of 
an absence that does not manifest in the present. ‘Such is the signifyingness 
of a trace.’34 The face reveals a transcendence that is opposed to the order 
of immanence insofar as time is experienced in the trace as absolutely 
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irreversible, as an irreversible past. It is therefore no longer a trace that 
is ‘created’ through interpretation, but rather it is a trace of the ‘weight of 
being itself’.35
So long as the trace is conceived as an index, it is always still committed 
to a model of simultaneity insofar as a past event becomes part of the present 
of a trace reader and this present can be successfully overcome through 
reference to the trace. In Levinas’s interpretation however, the inimitability 
of the trace lies in the irreversible pastness of something; it testif ies to 
a movement that is not (any longer) an Odysseian return and cannot be 
def ined merely as ‘passing toward a past’.36 Levinas does not say that time 
is spatialized in the trace or that time is thus inscribed in space, but rather 
that the spatial itself becomes temporal: ‘A trace is the insertion of space 
in time, the point at which the world inclines toward a past and a time.’37
Traces are usually spatial configurations that accommodate our prefer-
ence for representing and understanding temporality as spatial order (time 
frame, arrow of time, point in time…). Yet Levinas radically interprets traces 
as a temporal phenomenon, to which everything spatial must ‘defer’: As a 
result, the irreversible temporality that is encountered in the trace can no 
longer be converted into a simultaneity.
When the other is encountered as a face – Levinas emphasizes – he 
moves into the position of a third, which is outside the bipolarity of ap-
pearance and essence or ‘I’ and ‘you’. He becomes the ‘possibility of that 
third direction’ beyond the game of immanence and transcendence, which 
immanence always won. He is no longer subordinated to the ‘I’ and yet 
also escapes the familiarity of the ‘you’. He (‘il’) is the third person and is 
actually understood as ‘ille’ or ‘that’: Thirdness is encountered in the other 
as ‘illéité’.38 This inconceivability of the other permanently disrupts the 
egotism and autonomy involved in thinking of others as projections of the 
self. The face disarms the ‘I’. Levinas describes it as an ‘expulsion’ of the ‘I’ 
and his consciousness.39
Yet for Levinas this ‘putting into question of the self’ is then transformed 
into a receiving of the other.40 And this reception of the incomprehensible 
other must be imagined as a call to be answered by the ego. The ‘I’ is virtu-
ally compelled to answer and the only thing that makes him unique is 
the fact that no one else can answer in his place. What emerges in the 
encounter with the inexplicable other is therefore responsibility as the 
nucleus of morality and ethics, which depends on this ‘practical turn’. Let 
it be understood: How this answer turns out, whether it results in solidarity 
or violence, is not at all certain. That is what makes the situation ethical: It 
can be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and it is thus characterized by the either-or of a moral 
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decision. With the ‘via negativa’41 of the trace it becomes the starting point 
for exiting the self and entering into personal responsibility for the other. 
For Levinas, the ‘negative epistemology of the trace’ is transformed into a 
‘positive ethics of the trace’, which can only be achieved as practical activity 
and practiced intersubjectivity.
‘Authentic Trace’ and Presence
How does Levinas’s idea of the ‘authentic trace’ contribute to these reflec-
tions on the theory of transmission?
(1) The authentic trace as opaque medium. To start with, it is a remarkable 
coincidence that Levinas’s concepts – summa summarum and taken literally 
– are reminiscent of the messenger model, as they involve a heteronomy, an 
exteriority that cannot be converted into an interiority, a thirdness beyond 
the relationship of ‘I’ and ‘you’, a passivity and a receiving, the spiriting 
away of interpretation and meaning, and even the material ‘weight of being’, 
which manifests itself instead of consciousness. The concept of reading 
traces provides a new perspective that expands the concept of the mes-
senger by altering the distribution pattern of passivity and activity; instead 
of the sender, it is the interpreting and reconstructing reader and thus 
the ‘receiver’ who performs the active role. Although Levinas has good 
epistemological reasons for emphasizing this interpretative aspect of the 
trace as a sign, it is not philosophically appropriate for his concept of the 
trace, as everything there is to say about traces-used-as-signs has (already) 
been best explored and analyzed in semiotic discourse.
No, Levinas describes the reader of traces – the ‘I’ who encounters the face 
as a trace – as someone who receives and is even ‘afflicted’ but who precisely 
cannot seek refuge from this passivity in the activity of interpretation. 
What occurs here is a pole reversal of activity and passivity, if you will, as 
the ego loses the power of construction and interpretation granted to him 
as a reader of traces.
What the ‘I’ encounters in the trace is a form of mediacy that cannot 
dissolve into immediacy; it is not a transparent medium for another world, 
from which it bears witness to a message. The ‘authentic trace’ is a medium 
in its opacity: It is the appearance of the indissolubly unfamiliar, which does 
not belong to the world of the ego.
Until now the foundation of mediality has been characterized as ‘mak-
ing the imperceptible perceptible’, which assumes that there is something 
beyond the medium that manifests in the medium itself, but this view must 
now be amended or to a certain extent revised: When the trace becomes 
an opaque medium for the ‘I’ rather than a referential sign, the result of its 
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refusal to ‘make something perceptible’ is that it elicits a response from 
the ‘I’ – no: it compels the ‘I’ to respond. But this response cannot be an 
epistemological-interpretative gesture, as Levinas rejects the notion that 
the medium mediates between the ‘I’ and a distant world. This response 
thus proves to be the elementary form of an ‘ethical act’ insofar as it initiates 
a relationship to the other – whether sympathetic or antipathetic. The 
‘authentic trace’ of the other thus constitutes a medium, and the opacity of 
this medium precludes the possibility of semiological interpretation, which 
becomes the seed of (moral) action. For Levinas the difference between the 
sign and the trace, which can also be read as the difference between the 
sign and the medium, manifests as the difference between interpretation 
and action: Traces compel people to act. Does this relationship between 
mediality and action echo Benjamin’s claim that media have a performative 
dimension, as the immediacy of the medium reflects an agency that is most 
clearly expressed in the creative power of the word of God?
(2) The ‘authentic trace’ as the embodiment of a presence. Levinas’s 
considerations assume that by ‘using’ the trace as a sign for something, 
the reconstructed past as well as the predicted future are adapted to the 
regime of the familiar present. For the purpose of formulating a theory of 
transmission, this can also be understood as follows: The spatial implica-
tions of ‘carrying across’ – the etymological origin of transmission – ensure 
that references to time are based on simultaneity rather than asynchrony, 
which is inescapably tied to the idea of time as a continuous succession of 
events. Simultaneity is a spatially inspired notion of time that negates its 
irreversibility or its simple pastness.
Interestingly, this corresponds to an aspect of media that Friedrich 
Kittler saw more incisively than anyone else42: It is the fact that all media 
have an inherent tendency towards time axis manipulation; the reversal 
of temporal orders is central to media technologies. There is no doubt that 
the mediality of the trace – inspired by Levinas – is to be understood as 
a break with this tendency to negate the irreversibility of time. It directly 
ushers in the irreversibility of time. For Levinas, therefore, ‘being other’ is 
actually ‘becoming other’, as it is contingent on the passage of time, and 
as a result the concept of ‘transmission’ is replaced by ‘transition’, which is 
embodied in the pastness of the trace. ‘Pastness’ should not be understood 
here as referring to a past event or to someone passing by who leaves 
behind a footprint that – potentially – allows him to be identif ied and 
recognized in the present. Rather, ‘pastness’ acknowledges the irreversible 
and ungraspable absence of these past events, which no media technology 
or interpretation is capable of bringing back.
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While ‘transmission’ depends on and bears witness to the possibility of 
interrelating different things through simultaneity, the opaque trace is based 
on irreducible asynchrony. Yet this is precisely why the trace demands a 
response. The opaque mediality encountered in the face as a trace of the 
other at the same time proves to be the seed of an intersubjectivity that 
does not integrate the other into the subject’s horizon of understanding by 
transforming him into a sign, but rather allows him to ‘stand on his own’. 
The other is no longer a condensation of descriptions and designations, 
but rather he is ‘beyond representation’. For the f irst time, the other is 
truly present. The encounter with the other thus embodies a subversion of 
representation, which enables the experience of presence.
To return once again to the beginning of this study: From the outset it 
emphasized the difference between a medium and a sign – a difference, 
nevertheless, that should not be understood as disjointed ontological sort-
ing, but rather as a methodological difference in the perspective that can be 
adopted with respect to one and the same fact. A medium is precisely not 
a material signif ier. Indeed, what distinguishes a metaphysical approach, 
which attempts to unveil a hidden reality ‘behind the appearance’, is that 
the medium and the sign deviate from each other.
Material sign carriers must be perceptible, as their appearance to the 
senses promises an immateriality and transparency of the sensual that al-
lows the meaning of the sign to be deduced (not through the senses). Media, 
on the other hand, convey meaning by virtue of their ability to conceal 
their own materiality and make themselves invisible. The relationship 
between mediacy and immediacy, between ‘depth’ and ‘surface’, is therefore 
transposed for the sign and the medium: The immediacy of the material 
sign carrier requires penetrating the surface and reaching the meaning 
of the sign, which is no longer visible but rather only interpretable. The 
immediacy of medially conveyed meaning, on the other hand, requires 
leaving the surface behind in order to expose the hidden materiality of 
the medium in its ‘depths’. This materiality has just been explicated in the 
context of the transmission functions of the messenger.
Yet in the transition to the trace, which is considered an inverted form 
of the messenger model, a constellation emerges that is similar to the one 
between the sign and the medium. As a positive technique of orientation 
and cognition, the trace makes identif ication possible and thus proves 
to be semiological. The cause of the trace is therefore determined by the 
reader who interprets it, and it is only explicable as a narrative connection 
of transformations in the continuum of materiality of interrelated events. 
A posteriori, it could then be said of ‘successful’ interpretations that the 
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materiality of the perceptible trace represents their no longer perceptible 
and thus absent cause.
However, the materiality and exteriority of the authentic trace presents a 
presence that cannot be defined by relating it to something ideal or material 
or to causal relationships at all. And it is precisely for this reason that the 
authentic trace embodies a presence and (not only) a representation.
Understanding traces as modalities of the messenger serves to ref ine 
the distinction between the sign perspective and the media perspective, 
as this methodological distinction appears once again within the media 
perspective itself – namely, in the difference between the semiological 
and authentic trace.
Is it possible to conclude this discussion with a very general observation 
that signs are to media as representing is to presenting? Do media therefore 
create experiences of presence? Is this the source of their efficacy and fascina-
tion? The paradoxical ‘joke’ of this presence lies in the fact that – and this is 
precisely what is implied by the non-semiological dimension of the trace – it 
is the presence of an absence that cannot be converted into a presence 
but that still ‘draws in’ and involves the subject. (One example is Levinas’s 
‘response’ but another is ‘immersion’, a tendency inscribed in all media that 
does not begin with the virtual reality of the computer but rather already 
takes effect in the reading of a book, which grips and transfixes the reader.) 
Media produce an immediacy of the mediated. Does this involvement in 
something immediately at hand yet at the same time withdrawn constitute 
the nucleus of cultural practices? Is ‘unmediated mediation’ the term for 
this, and isn’t this precisely what Benjamin understood by ‘medium’ (in 
contrast to ‘instrument’)?
The telos of the Enlightenment project seemed to be the discovery of 
symbolic difference, the categorical distinction between signif iers and 
signif ieds, but in the late twentieth century this became problematic to 
a certain extent due to the discovery of the ‘quasi-magical power’ of the 
performative (Searle). ‘Performativity’ was thereby reconstructed as an 
attribute of semiotic processes insofar as these processes also perform and 
carry out what they signify.
It could also be said that in the performative representation changes into 
presence. From the perspective of the performative, the ingrained borders 
between ‘sign’ and ‘thing’ prove to be permeable. Can it be assumed that 
from the perspective of media theory presence is made possible through 
transmissions precisely because the imperceptible is made perceptible (as 
in the messenger’s errand)? Can it also be assumed that the perceptible 
appears as the irreducible and indissoluble presence of an absence (as in the 
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experience of the trace), which is no longer defined in relation to something 
imperceptible because medial presence is its only form of perceptibility and 
givenness? The complexity of the interplay between the messenger and the 
trace consists in the fact that both assumptions can be confirmed.
 Test Case
Maps, Charts, Cartography
I have not yet provided an example of a phenomenon that can unproblemati-
cally be identif ied as a medium or demonstrated how the messenger and 
transmission perspective I have developed actually brings to light new 
aspects of this phenomenon. There are two additional requirements that 
would – ideally – be satisf ied by such a test case: It should be a medium 
that cuts across different times, that is not rooted in only one respectable 
tradition, but rather that provides a context in which the changes associated 
with the development of information technologies and digitalization can 
also be reflected and studied. Furthermore, this medium should embody 
its mediumness in such an exemplary way that it is endowed with a certain 
metaphorical potential and its mediality condenses or is condensed into 
a dispositif.1
I have chosen to focus on maps and cartography. It is no accident that 
‘maps’ and ‘cartography’ have been named here at once, for a theoretical 
dispute has arisen concerning the ‘epistemological nature’ of maps that 
is quite revealing for my own purpose. The perspective of the messenger 
and the trace will hopefully provide a new view of maps, which is distinct 
precisely because it introduces a new position in this cartographic dispute. 
It should come as no surprise that I want to conceive of this new position 
as a ‘third’ or a mediated position.
Maps are ‘foundational texts’ of our civilization.2 Maps drastically 
visualize what ‘world pictures’ or ‘worldviews’ literally mean and how 
fast they change.3 They have so deeply penetrated everyday life that their 
mostly unobtrusive presence is hardly noticed. Whether as weather chart, 
city map, subway plan, or road atlas, it is nearly impossible to imagine 
movement through space without the intervention of maps. These ex-
amples suggest what is initially meant here by the word ‘map’: pages4 or 
surfaces that contain graphic markings of relations between places in the 
form of a spatial, two-dimensional representation. These places can be 
real or f ictional, they can refer to every possible form of bodies, territories, 
empirical facts or purely epistemic entities. There is hardly anything that 
cannot be represented cartographically in the form of spatial relations. 
The tremendous diversity of the maps that have survived from differ-
ent times, cultures, practices, and orders of knowledge is also virtually 
incalculable.
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I will thus focus on a fairly selective view: I am only interested here in 
the elementary forms of familiar maps that claim to represent a more or less 
substantial spatial territory in such a way that people are able to orient their 
actions within this territory. These maps are employed to refer to a given 
‘reality’ beyond the map, in which the user of the map is practically embed-
ded. I will not address f ictional or thematic maps, as their representational 
form is always already dependent on the model of geographical maps.5
I will now discuss the theoretical dispute concerning cartography, which 
serves as a starting point.
The Narratives of ‘Transparent’ and ‘Opaque’ Maps
This dispute focuses on a difference in the interpretation of maps, which I 
will call – following Christian Jacob – the difference between ‘transparent’ 
and ‘opaque’ maps.6
(1) From a naturalistic-oriented perspective the map is considered 
‘transparent’, as it is committed to the general principle of exact repre-
sentation. Its narrative is thus reconstructed as follows: Like the cinema 
screen on which a f ilm is projected, the map is a technical and symbolic 
artefact that disappears ‘behind’ the information it transmits. The con-
tent of this information is an illustration of the actual conditions of an 
external territory, which is as precise as possible. The goal of mapping 
is to produce a correct and undistorted relational model of a terrain, 
which enables the producer of the map to transmit information about 
a territory to the user. The map is thus a medium that represents and 
mediates knowledge. What matters most is the content of the map or 
what the map represents.
There is a clear progression in the precision of maps, as they are de-
pendent on the evolution of measuring techniques and forms of graphic 
representation, and as they become more precise they also approach ever 
closer to reality. At the same time there is an important historical break in 
this progressive narrative, the so-called ‘cartographic reformation’7 in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when map producers abandoned the 
elaborate and fantastic projections created in their studios and exchanged 
them for f ieldwork in a landscape whose topology was exactly quantifiable.8 
The production of maps was considered no longer an ‘art’, but rather a ‘sci-
ence’. The map became an incarnation of the purity and neutrality required 
of exact scientif ic representation. It evolved into a metaphor, which was the 
force behind the knowledge claims of science: to know something was to 
be able to substitute it with a symbolic representation that approximated 
it exactly.9
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(2) This approach can be distinguished from the instrumentalist-
constructivist perspective, which is committed to the narrative of the 
‘opaque’ map.10 To return once more to the film analogy, which Jacob himself 
introduces to explain the difference between ‘transparent’ and ‘opaque’.11 
Film can be discussed in terms of the optical, chemical, technical, social, 
and cultural conditions that make f ilm projections and the institution of 
the cinema possible. This is the standpoint of the ‘opaque’ map, as the map 
itself becomes an object. From this perspective maps do not simply depict 
a territory, but rather they create it. Mapping techniques obey their own 
technical, semiotic, and social conditions and conventions, which are in 
no way congruent with the rules of mathematics and logic. Politics and 
power are then also part of the conditions of cartographic activity.12 The 
key question thus becomes not what a map represents but rather how it does 
this. And this ‘how’ is bound to and shaped by the interests that determine 
the production as well as the use of maps. Maps are no longer considered 
a neutral means of representing knowledge, but rather they are seen as 
instruments and tools that can only be understood in the context of their 
production and use. This instrumental approach is graduated: It ranges 
from the description of maps as means of communication and text to the 
notion of maps as ideological and political instruments of power. In the 
opaque view maps are considered social constructs; they are anchored in 
practices that are informed by the worldview of an epoch. In other words, 
maps are witnesses of time. This post-representational13 or representation-
critical approach to maps is methodologically legitimated as a form of 
deconstruction, as it applies the deconstruction of textuality, introduced 
by Foucault’s socialization and historicization of epistemes and developed 
by Derrida, to maps.14
This is the basic constellation of approaches to cartography, which can 
also refer to different philosophical traditions and schools: For example, 
the supporters of the ‘transparent’ map naturalize the artificial, and they 
are therefore part of the tradition of British empiricism; the proponents of 
the ‘opaque’ map, on the other hand, culturalize the natural, and they are 
therefore inspired by continental philosophy and its critique of discourse.
As this sketch suggests, both sides seem to offer opposed and irreconcil-
ably divergent views of mapping. And this divergence is deep-seated, as it 
exceeds the limited field of cartography and stems from the epistemological 
alternative between a ‘realistic’, naturalistically-oriented interpretation of 
human cognition and knowledge and a ‘constructivist’, culturalistically-
oriented interpretation. But is the disjunctivity of both positions the only 
possible view? Would it not be possible to understand both perspectives 
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not as exclusive but rather as inclusive and thus interrelated approaches 
to the map?
This is precisely what my suggestion implies. It is based on the assumption 
that a connection between the ‘transparent’ and the ‘opaque’ interpreta-
tions can be brought to light if the map is understood in the context of the 
media-theoretical distinction between the ‘messenger’ and the ‘trace’. While 
the ‘representationalists’ refer to maps as if they function as ‘messengers’ 
of the territories they represent and the knowledge of the map producers, 
the ‘anti-representationalists’ regard maps as ‘traces’ of the conditions that 
determined their production and use. ‘Transparency’ and ‘opacity’ thus 
prove to be the names of two co-existing ways of reading maps, yet they 
still ‘speak’ in two different ways, namely in their visible (explicit, manifest) 
as well as in their hidden (implicit, latent) dimensions. To refer to what 
maps explicitly show means using them for practical orientation in order 
to operate on a terrain with their help. The fact that the materiality and 
autonomy of the map ‘make themselves invisible’ in order to represent 
something external to the map itself thus corresponds to our ‘natural’ 
way of using heteronomous media, which require self-neutralization and 
self-withdrawal to function smoothly. To refer to the implicit dimension of 
maps, on the other hand, means focusing on this self-concealing mediality 
and employing the map as an instrument to undercover the contexts of its 
production, representation, and use, which are crystallized in the map but 
are more or less buried; the map thus functions as a cartographic dispositif.
Nevertheless, the separation of these two dimensions, which are constitu-
tive for the (modern) map and which are to be understood according to the 
model of ‘message transmission’ and ‘reading traces’, does not tell the whole 
story concerning the narratives of ‘transparent’ and ‘opaque’ maps. Actually, 
the degree to which both of these dimensions reciprocally depend on one 
another is more intense than the distinction between these two approaches 
to maps. You will recall the media-theoretical formulation that in the course 
of using media the message of the medium is visible but the medium itself 
is invisible. It can also be assumed that in the course of using media the 
medium itself appears ‘only’ as a trace of its message.15 In fact, by critiquing 
the notion of the map as text the narrative of the ‘opaque’ map reveals not 
only the distortions,16 rhetorics, and myths17 of maps, but also their hidden 
contents, which are due to the inherent logic of mapping practices as well 
as their social-political embeddedness and instrumentalization.18 However, 
these traces of the unsaid and unseen can only be analyzed as something 
not-said and not-seen because they are implicitly shown through what is 
said and seen. This means that the map can be regarded as a trace in the 
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narrative of opacity only because and insofar as it functions as a messenger 
in the narrative of transparency.
Let me explain more precisely what it means to understand the message 
of a map as the function of a trace.
It is f irst necessary to register a remarkable shift in the positions of both 
‘competing’ approaches. Supporters of the narrative of the ‘transparent’ 
map are usually believed to be the ones who remain blind with respect to 
the practices of producing and using maps insofar as they only treat the 
map as a representation of knowledge and thus they only pay attention to 
its representational content. The proponents of the narrative of the ‘opaque’ 
map, on the other hand, are understood as the ones who situate maps in 
terms of their relations of production and use. However, from the perspec-
tive of the medium as messenger the transparency of the map appears to 
be a condition precisely of its practical use, while conversely the notion of 
the map as a trace presupposes an examination of what it implies, in the 
sense of Husserl’s ‘epoché’, and thus ignores its practical use as a medium of 
orientation within a territory. It is almost trivial: The map can only become 
an object of critical analysis when it is not at the same time deployed to 
facilitate movements in disorienting spaces; in other words, the map does 
not appear as a trace until it is no longer used for practical purposes. How-
ever, this break with the map’s original terms of use still refers to them ex 
negativo. It must be possible to assume how a map is supposed to be used, 
even if it is not being used.
The narrative of the ‘transparent’ map is therefore surprisingly informed 
by a practical approach with respect to the map as a medium, and the 
narrative of the ‘opaque’ map is informed by a theoretical approach. So 
what is this ‘practical approach’?
On the Everyday Use of Maps
When someone looks for directions to an address on a city map, determines 
where to transfer on a subway plan, or uses a road atlas to make a detour 
around a traff ic jam: in all of these situations an uncertainty has been 
eliminated with the help of a map. The map provides new information, 
which facilitates goal-directed mobility and practical actions in a territory. 
The legend of the map very rarely plays a role in the everyday use of maps. 
The reading of maps is a form of routinized literality and technical com-
petence that becomes familiar through practice. This familiarity is rooted 
in the acceptance of a correspondence between the map and the territory. 
Practical experience instructs people as to whether they have read a map 
‘correctly’: When someone notices while hiking in the mountains that the 
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shorter route shows considerable height differences and the destination will 
thus be reached faster by taking the longer but flatter route, this person has 
learned that the ‘right’ reading of a map means accounting for the routes 
and contour lines.
In an initially unproblematic way it can be said that reading maps means 
acquiring knowledge about something other than the nature of maps: The 
message of the map is thus based on reference. Maps are only useful for 
orientation when a ‘correspondence’ can be expected between the existing 
territory and its cartographic representation. This correspondence can take 
many forms – from a three-dimensional inf initely diverse surface to a con-
venient little two-dimensional schematic. All that matters here is the fact 
of referentiality, which vividly shows that maps age. In an ironic twist,19not 
unlike buying milk, it is necessary to pay attention to the date.20 The fact that 
maps can be read incorrectly, as well as the fact that they can actually be 
‘false’ and territories thus have a ‘veto power’ with respect to maps, shows 
that the narrative of ‘transparency’ is woven into the everyday use of maps. 
And it is this use alone that provides the criteria for evaluating maps: The 
purpose of the map is the criterion of the quality of its representation.
In this elementary form the map actually functions as an ambassador 
who mediates between the territory and the user or between the knowledge 
of the map producer and the user’s lack of knowledge. And the medium of 
the map does this better the more it is able to visualize something beyond 
itself in a transparent, objective, and neutral way. Like all media, therefore, 
maps are heteronomous. In light of this heteronomy, the idea of the ‘trans-
parent’ map proves to be not an ideologeme but rather a thoroughly practical 
requirement. It refers to the ‘natural’ position, which is distinctive of an 
operational approach to maps. ‘Transparency’ and ‘representationality’ 
are characteristics of the use of maps. A map in itself is not a medium, but 
rather a thing with visual marks on it that is easy to handle or hang on a 
wall. The map does not become a medium until it is situated in practices that 
at the same time assume its representational transparency, such as when 
someone uses the map to orient himself. In the words of Rob Kitchin: ‘The 
map emerges through contingent, relational, context-embedded practices.’21
To look more closely at this practice, which f irst constitutes the map 
as a medium, it is helpful to consider Michel de Certeau’s distinction 
between ‘places’ and ‘spaces’.22 For de Certeau ‘places’ are f ixed points that 
can be determined through relations of coexistence. ‘Spaces’, on the other 
hand, emerge through the movements of subjects and their goal-oriented 
activities. ‘Spaces’ thus result from ‘places’, as historical subjects have done 
something with and at these places.23 By actually walking on the street 
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marked on the map, a person transforms – according to de Certeau – a place 
into a space. The meaning of this difference can also be expressed by means 
of other terms, such as the concepts of absolute or relative, objective or 
subjective, geometrical or anthropogenic, mathematical or existential, etc.
These two kinds of spatiality reveal the function of the map as a medium: 
‘Transparent’ maps depict places so that they can be transformed by us-
ers into spaces. In other words, the messenger function of the map is to 
facilitate – in cooperation with a user – the transformation of objective 
places into subjective spaces. The transmissions performed by the map as 
a medium thus activate a metamorphosis: The representation of places on 
the map is transformed into the presence of walkable spaces for the user. 
The map mediates this gestalt-switch, whose signif icance as a cultural 
technique of civilizing spatial integration cannot be overestimated. To 
begin to understand the function of maps it is necessary to explain how 
this transformation of representation into presence is possible.
Indexicality
The clearest indicator that maps are bound to an external territory is their 
indexicalizability. Whenever someone wants to use a map for guidance he 
must f irst know how to locate himself, such as the red arrow on the subway 
plan stretched across the wall of the station that says ‘you are here’, the worn 
and no longer readable position on an enlarged extract from a city plan 
posted for tourist information, or the pointer on a trail map that indicates 
the hiker’s location.
Indexicalizability is an essential element of every operational approach 
to maps. It is the connecting link in the transformation of places into spaces. 
Like the pronoun ‘I’, the indexical ‘here’, and the deictic pointer f inger, 
something is being referred to whose meaning changes with each articula-
tion: If a person looks at a map of the territory on which he is currently 
standing, walking, or driving, he is present in two ways. While reading 
the map the ‘I am here’ becomes ‘I am there’. This is a remarkable deictic 
gesture, which points from the body to the map and thus at the same time 
to the self. Through this indexical identif ication of his own position the 
map user becomes part of the map. He identif ies a position on the map 
that not only represents an external territory, but also presents the map 
user. This transformation is what matters here. While maps transform an 
objectively described place into a subjectively experienced space, their 
indexicalizability reveals that the reverse is also a necessary condition of 
the operative use of maps: The map user must transform his individual 
location in the world into a generalizable position on the map. By ‘locating’ 
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himself on the map in the third person perspective, the map user assumes 
the role of an external observer. Determining one’s own position with the 
help of a map is often a tedious business, which demands a constant balance 
between what is seen and what is marked on the map. The institution of 
proper names – of streets – also plays a key role.
If indexicalizability as a condition of the operative use of maps requires 
that there be a correspondence between the map and the territory, then it 
is necessary to explain how this ‘message’ of the map is to be understood.
The Cartographic Paradox
There is no question that any interpretation of cartography has to respect 
one principle: ‘The map is not the territory.’ The transparency of the 
map, which reveals something that is not ‘of the nature of maps’, cannot 
be achieved because the map actually creates a double of an unfamiliar 
external reality and it is therefore doubly unfamiliar. There are countless 
anecdotes about the anachronism and also the absurdity of a map that 
reproduces the landscape on a scale of 1:1 and therefore completely covers 
it.24
A three-dimensional world, which constitutes the living environment, 
and a two-dimensional map, which is part of the living environment of 
this world, are each of a different ontological nature and weight. All of the 
potential contained in the cultural technique of mapping is based precisely 
on the difference between a territory and its map. How can this difference 
be def ined?
Maps are f lat. This is something they share with paintings and pho-
tographs, yet there is a notable difference between them: Maps are not 
perspective representations. While the f latness of a central perspective 
image appears to transform optically into a window, through which the 
eye can see a three-dimensional space, the map has precisely no depth 
dimension – in the case of normal topographic maps at least. The map is 
regarded as the view of a surface and it is precisely for this reason that it 
provides an overview. Its ordering principle is the visual graphic marking 
of adjacent neighbourhoods with the help of lines, points, shading, colours, 
etc. Maps give an ‘aerial view’. The world appears primarily in horizontal 
outline for people who walk upright. Yet maps reverse this point of view and 
show the territory vertically in that it is seen from above – even from way, 
way above depending on the size of the mapped section.
This standpoint of the Apollonian eye,25 with which the world is ob-
served ‘from outside’ in a way that was impossible before the invention 
of airplanes, rockets, and satellites, has a profound signif icance not only 
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for our worldview, but also for our role as epistemological subjects. I will 
return to this later.
I want to focus here on the representational-technical aspects of this 
Apollonian perspective: Maps show territorial surfaces from a perspective 
that is usually impossible for human eyes. But their representational claim is 
based precisely on the art of adopting this ‘unnatural’ perspective. This view 
from above also applies to globes, spherical models featuring representa-
tions of the earth’s surface, and it is no coincidence that the production 
of globes and the design of maps went hand-in-hand in the epoch of the 
‘cartographic reformation’.
If they both represent surfaces as seen from the perspective of a ‘di-
vine eye’, what distinguishes the two-dimensional map from the three-
dimensional globe? This is a key turning point in my reflections on maps. 
Three-dimensionality cannot be transmitted onto two-dimensionality 
without distortion. Can the peel of an orange be spread out flat on a table? 
Because the map represents the surface of the earth without its curvature, 
two-dimensional maps cannot depict surfaces, angles, contours, distances, 
and directions at the same time without distortion.26 This constitutes the 
‘cartographic paradox’. To understand this paradox it is necessary to be 
familiar with several other aspects of the inherent logic of the map as 
medium: In addition to a font, which is part of its ‘language’,27 maps must 
have (i) a scale, (ii) a grid-like coordinate system for positioning places, and 
(iii) a method of projection.
(i) The scale indicates the proportions between distances on the earth’s 
surface and the distances represented on the map, therefore 1:100, 1:1000, 
etc. It ensures not only the manageability and clarity of the map, but also 
the undeniable difference and structural similarity between a territory and 
its cartographic representation.
(ii) In the Western tradition latitude and longitude (meridians) have been 
established as the coordinate system for positioning places on the earth’s 
surface. They are oriented towards the equator and the prime meridian, 
which stands perpendicular to it. The equator (from the Latin ‘aequāre’, to 
equalize) is based on the ideal spherical shape of the earth. It is a geometric 
form created by a plane that goes through the centre of the sphere and stands 
perpendicular to the rotational axis of the earth. The equator vertically 
intersects circles of longitude, which lead through the poles. The equator 
also marks the point of zero degrees latitude, while the prime meridian was 
designated the point of zero degrees longitude purely out of convention.
These mathematical-geographical relationships will not be enlarged 
upon here. It is suff icient to note that the arrangement of the earth’s surface 
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according to coordinates of latitude and longitude is a mathematical con-
struct (whose relationship, by the way, is etymologically due to seafaring on 
the Mediterranean, whose length runs from east to west and whose width 
stretches from north to south).28
The mathematical poles are also not identical to the magnetic poles, to 
which compass needles point. Longitudinal and latitudinal lines provide the 
earth with a ‘network’ that treats all places equally; regardless of whether 
they are located on the summits of mountains or in the depths of the ocean, 
they only distinguishable in terms of their mathematically exact position. 
It is almost redundant to add that the mathematically exact configuration 
of this ‘network’ is a feature of the representation of the earth as a globe, 
but not an attribute of the earth itself. So how can this mathematical ar-
rangement of the earth’s surface, which is only geometrically correct on 
a three-dimensional globe, be transmitted onto a two-dimensional map? 
This is only possible through methods of projection.
(iii)For a curved surface to be represented on a f lat plane it must be 
projected onto it. All maps claiming to be ‘transparent’ must embody a 
method of projection, but there is always a plurality of them.29 Projecting 
the surface of a sphere onto a flat plane means changing it – and this is a 
topological law. The price of the projection, therefore, is that a map cannot 
preserve both the areas and angles of a globe at the same time. When the 
surface of a globe is stretched out onto a map, in other words, the map 
cannot retain both the proportions and the right angles at the points where 
the longitudinal and latitudinal lines intersect. The kind of distortion that 
is then preferred depends solely on the pragmatic purpose of a map.
I will now turn to an example: the conformal world map designed by 
Gerhard Mercator (1512-1594) in 1569. Mercator’s map is the prime example 
used to deconstruct the idea of the ‘transparent’ map, as it is obviously 
‘Eurocentric’: The distortion increases from the equator to the poles so that 
northern regions are represented as disproportionately large in relation to 
equatorial regions. Greenland (2.2 million km2) appears to be the same size 
as Africa (30.3 million km2) on this map.
So what was Mercator’s method of projection?
It is helpful to imagine projecting the surface of a sphere onto a cylinder. 
The cylinder is ‘wrapped’ around the globe like a coat, but only touches it at 
the equator. A light inside the globe casts shadows of the continents onto 
the surface of the cylinder.30 If this cylinder is then cut open at a random 
place and rolled out, it will look approximately like Mercator’s world map. 
In order to retain the angles between the longitudinal and latitudinal lines, 
Mercator had to stretch the map vertically and thus increase the distance 
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between latitudinal lines. An image is also helpful here: Imagine that the 
globe is a balloon stuck inside the cylinder, which (again) only touches the 
surface of the cylinder at the equator. If the balloon is inflated so that it 
touches the entire surface of the cylinder – and not only the equator – then 
the polar regions of the balloon will have to let in more air, as the surface 
of the balloon has to stretch further at these places in order to come into 
contact with the cylinder. Because the distance between latitudinal lines 
increases towards the poles, the surface area will be greatly enlarged in 
these regions. The price of preserving the angles is thus the distortion of 
the areas.
I will now return to the accusation that this map is Eurocentric.
Arno Peters developed a map in 1974 that was intended to do justice to 
the ‘countries of the third world’ by using an equal-area projection so that 
every square meter on the earth was represented as true to scale on the 
map.31 This resulted in an ideologically heated debate.32 Of course Peters’s 
projection was also distorted, but in a different way: this time it was not 
the surface areas, but rather the lengths and angles that were ‘falsif ied’.
I will not delve any deeper here into the artistry or diversity of carto-
graphic projections, none of which are able to escape the cartographic 
paradox that maps are only able to depict something by distorting it. The 
ideological critique of Mercator’s world map nevertheless reveals a constel-
lation that was already encountered in the narratives of the ‘transparent’ 
and ‘opaque’ map. Every critique of distortions must nolens volens invoke 
the narrative of the representationality of maps, as this narrative establishes 
the criterion necessary to diagnose something as a distortion. Peters’s map 
claims to represent the land masses in the equatorial region ‘more cor-
rectly’ than the Mercator projection. Such a claim explicitly presupposes 
that there is a correspondence between the map and the territory and 
that this correspondence is the organizing principle of mapping. And the 
presupposition that maps are supposed to represent an external territory 
as faithfully as possible overlooks their pragmatic purpose and practical 
use, which provide the only means of evaluating whether a map is ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. Maps are not simply visual representations of something, but rather 
they are a means of exploring and operating with what is represented. The 
performance and limits of the Mercator projection can only be determined 
in the context of its production and use.
Mercator Projection and Navigation
According to the cartographic paradox a certain structure can only be 
transmitted onto the map ‘faithfully’ when other structures are thereby 
198 MediuM, Messenger, TransMission
replicated ‘unfaithfully’. And the topology and topography do not determine 
which structures retain their proportions and which ones are distorted, but 
rather the purpose that the map ‘serves’. Representationality and relativity 
are not mutually exclusive but rather inclusive.
Peters’s correction of the Mercator projection is ‘naïve’ because in over-
looking the cartographic paradox it also ignores the pragmatic situation 
of maps. While the Peters projection absolutely makes sense as a means of 
revealing the ‘unconscious’ and ‘discreet’ enlargement of temperate land 
masses at the expense of equatorial regions on traditional maps, and it 
is rightly deployed by aid organizations for precisely this function,33 the 
meaning of the Mercator map is entirely different. It is less epistemic and 
therefore decidedly practical. This map served less as a projection of a 
worldview (which it also naturally is) than as a means of navigation. It f irst 
became a medium through its interaction with sailors who needed to orient 
themselves at sea. Its conformal quality made it possible to f ind the sim-
plest and safest route to a target destination through so-called loxodromes 
or straight courses in a constant direction on the sea. Loxodromes are 
mathematical constructs, like latitudinal and longitudinal lines. They look 
like helixes on a circular cylinder, as they approach the poles in spiralling 
coils. What is special about the conformal Mercator map is that these coils 
appear to be straight on the map, and this enables a ship to proceed on a 
constant course with a compass. It is only necessary – and actually with 
the help of the map, which is thus an act of graphic measurement – to take 
an initial bearing of the course from the home port to the destination port 
and then to maintain this bearing at sea without constantly adjusting 
one’s direction.
This movement along a cartographically determined line applies not only 
to nautical but also to aerial navigation. The Mercator projection underlies 
nearly all nautical and aeronautical charts to this day. This map enables 
the calculation of spaces without markings or traces, like the sea and the 
air, which then become ‘navigable’ and ‘traversable’.
Therefore, if a map is viewed as a mediating third between a user and a 
territory then its mediality evolves solely in the f ield of activity of a triadic 
relation between people, maps, and territories. The map links data docu-
menting the structures of a territory to the intentions of the map user (‘I 
am here and want to go there’). Every interpretation that considers maps 
to be either illustrations or constructions thus falls short.
I will now return once more to the relationship between representation 
and relativity in order to address the ‘inherent logic’ of maps, which is at the 
same time constantly rooted in their terms of use. The next section focuses 
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on the abstractions and generalizations that are necessarily connected to 
cartographic representations.
Generalization, Schematization, Stylization
Unlike pictures and photographs maps are not ‘consistent’ but rather ‘dis-
jointed’ symbolic systems and they can thus be highly selective (measured 
against the territory they represent): They equalize things that are different, 
they omit some things and highlight others. For example, it is impossible 
to use an aerial photograph as a city map due to the vast range of details. 
Consider a contemporary electronic practice: It is only when the zoomed-
in photographic details from ‘Google Earth’ are superimposed over the 
corresponding maps from ‘Google Maps’, and thus the aerial photograph of 
a city is furnished with a schematic inscription of streets, that a visual repre-
sentation emerges that actually makes it possible to identify and determine 
places, distances, and directions. What distinguishes an aerial photograph 
of a place from a map are processes of generalization, schematization, and 
stylization.
Maps can be considered a modality of representation that is sui generis. 
They emerged semiotically from the intersection of language and image. 
Graphic variables like two-dimensionality, size, brightness, pattern, colours, 
forms, etc. become conventional signs. With the help of these signs, the 
individual details of a territory are assigned different kinds of objects that 
then appear on the map as individual streets, rivers, places, mountains, 
etc. The map intertwines the graphic-visual with the linguistic-syntactical. 
Maps visually represent relations that in principle can also be translated 
into linguistic expressions, such as relations of position like ‘A is east of B’ or 
relations of quantity like ‘A is larger than B’. Maps thus contain an element 
of testimony, and what they show can be completely false.34 Please keep in 
mind that the territory does not predetermine the criterion of correctness 
and falsity, but rather the method of projection as well as the purpose and 
use of the map. To return to the example of representations of distances: 
Maps signify planimetric distances, horizontal distances in which height 
differences are levelled. Planimetric distances are always less than real dis-
tances, and even less than linear distances, as all of the terrain coordinates 
are projected onto a horizontal surface and thus – necessarily – distorted.35
To return to the issue of generalization: Maps would not be possible 
without processes of abstraction like selection, simplif ication, elimination, 
equalization, straightening, and typesetting. A meandering river becomes 
a curve; a winding road becomes a line; constantly crisscrossing streets, 
trains, and rivers become parallel; a constantly changing coastal zone 
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becomes a stroke; and villages of different sizes and populations become 
equal points.
Subway cartograms depend on neglecting the real geometry of a city. 
They depict constellations of places in a way that ensures precisely that 
the user is able to transform these places into subjective spaces through his 
own movement: Subway lines are always straight on subway plans and the 
distance between stations is expanded in the city centre and compressed on 
the periphery.36 Readability is more important than topological precision.37
The topic of cartographic generalization is virtually inexhaustible, and 
what has been presented here constitutes nothing more than a fragment. I 
will now turn to a phenomenon that is related to cartographic generaliza-
tion but is not limited to it; moreover, it is a phenomenon that continues 
one of the central media-theoretical propositions of this study: Maps – 
fundamentally – make the invisible visible.
The Visualization of the Invisible
Maps require these practices of abstraction due to their selectivity: Maps 
can only exist because it is possible to ignore the excessive abundance 
of what is seen. If mapping is also rooted in the art of abstraction then 
it can only develop as a strategy of visualization in connection with the 
ability to concretize, visualize, and embody something that is abstract and 
thus not simply perceptible. To understand the culture-endowing function 
and epistemic power of maps it is therefore necessary to conceive of this 
embodying and concretizing potential as the ability to visualize the non-
sensory and to transfer it to the register of perceptibility. There are different 
kinds of invisibility that thereby come into play.
(i) On the first level, it is necessary to undo an oversimplification. Up until 
now I have referred to the representation of a ‘territory’ on a map, yet strictly 
speaking is it not a territory but rather knowledge about this territory that is 
visualized as a map. The map does not depict things, but rather ‘epistemic 
things’, to use Jörg Rheinberger’s concept.38 And these knowledge-things 
must be quantif iable: They must be able to be described as the result of 
measurement methods (in the f ield) and they must be regarded as bodies 
of measurable data that can be inscribed. However, measurement methods 
are cultural techniques that work with different scales and constantly 
change with the evolution of knowledge cultures, especially mathematics 
and technology.
(ii) The concept of visualizing something invisible applies even more 
to the plotting of purely mathematical constructs, like latitudinal and 
longitudinal lines, and this is the second level. By appearing on maps these 
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lines not only enable the identif iability of (previously surveyed) places, but 
above all they also introduce self-positioning. Making these mathematical 
constructs and epistemic things perceptible opens up the possibility of 
concretely situating the user in the map. This indexical place is a ‘known 
place’: The user does not simply see where he has positioned himself within 
the map, but rather he must deduce this position.
(iii) Maps make not only mathematical constructs and the determina-
tion of indexical positions perceptible, but also political bodies that are 
almost never encountered in the phenomenal world, and this is the third 
level. In the history of nations, the unif ied image of the map has quite 
often suggested a sense of national unity that did not exist politically or 
administratively. David Guggerli and Daniel Speich show what this means 
using the example of the f irst topographic map of Switzerland. Exhibited 
in 1883, the cartographic representation of the entire confederation, which 
was f irst founded as a federal state in 1848, became an identif ication 
model with which the public began to transform itself into one nation of 
Swiss people – an idea that had previously been largely a utopian dream.39 
Nevertheless, this national map also sparked conflicts concerning the 
borders of cantons. Before then ‘clear borders’ had meant nothing more 
than a lack of border disputes, but as a result of this map people had to 
wrestle with the exact locations of political borders.40 It is no accident that 
the creation of topographic maps became an off icial and thus national 
task in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Topographic maps or 
so-called ‘general maps’ always depict – like most maps – a constellation 
of political power. This power largely consists of the ‘power of naming’, and 
the example of Switzerland is also instructive here.41 Because the places 
depicted on maps are always furnished with proper names, but these 
places mostly bear different names in the practical life of the population, 
the erasure of this difference in support of a single name makes it ‘quasi-
off icial’,42 and it thus becomes a ‘political issue’. The map is granted ‘the 
character of a decree’.43
The political function of maps is a well-explored f ield44 and does not 
require any further discussion here. Yet the ‘power of naming’ clearly shows 
how maps visualize the invisible: namely, what is visualized on the map 
is at the same time created and constituted by this act of visualization. 
Because maps refer to something independent of and prior to the map itself, 
in a gesture of naturalistic transparency, they have the power to shape this 
independent and prior thing according to the model of the map. And ‘model’ 
here does not mean an after-image, but rather a ‘prototype’. It is through 
the map that a worldview emerges.
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(iv) To explain what this means I will now turn to the fourth and perhaps 
most signif icant level. Maps depict something that in principle and not only 
with respect to some abstractions cannot be seen by anyone in this form.45 
And it is precisely because maps present something that is not accessible 
to people, who are embedded in the living environment, that a non-human 
standpoint beyond the living environment must be adopted in the construc-
tion of the map. Maps thus represent a ‘view from nowhere’ or an Apollonian 
perspective. With maps something enters into our world thanks to our 
ability to imagine stepping out of it.
Before the moon landing and the development of satellite images, the 
only way of representing the earth as a planet was in the form of a globe. 
Planimetric maps inherited this unique function of representing the world 
from the perspective of an external observer, who is (or seems to be) not part 
of the world. Because people do not perceive things in sequence, like the 
experience of listening, but rather in juxtaposition, like the experience of 
seeing,46 they are able to compare objects and visualize their proportionality 
through their proximity to one another. The visualization of simultane-
ous spatial relations introduces a disposition of perception that is most 
conducive to the cognitive understanding of the perceived, as observing 
something simultaneous from a distance offers a perspective that is optimal 
for cognition and objectivity. Maps that treat this distance even more radi-
cally as the position of the ‘Apollonian eye’, which underlies their principle 
of construction and representation, constitute a nucleus of crystallization 
that honours the eye as an organ of perception.
Maps thus present the world in a form that is not actually accessible to 
the human eye, but for that reason they come even closer to the modern 
scientif ic and philosophical position of the human as subject of cognition. 
In other words, maps present the world as seen with an ‘intellectual eye’. 
Yet this ‘intellectual eye’ depends on the potential of visualization, which 
is due to the materiality of the map as medium. The form of invisibility 
that matters here is therefore the position of the modern subject, which 
is the organizing perspective of planimetric-topographic mapping. The 
arrangement of a simultaneous overview, which the map communicates, 
requires a standpoint ‘high above’. Unlike the real map user, who positions 
himself indexically on the map and can then also see his position like an 
external observer, the Apollonian point of view of the subject of cognition 
exists not on the map as a perceptible event, but rather – like the central 
perspective image – as its ‘inner organizing principle’. The invisible form 
that the map implicitly visualizes is the methodological function of the 
modern subject to be able to adopt the perspective of an external, neutral 
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observer. Or, to express this in Kantian terms, what the map visualizes is 
the epistemological fact that the subject is not part of the world, but rather 
constitutes the transcendental condition of its visibility and cognizability.
This connection between the map’s visualization of the invisible and the 
constitution of the modern idea of the subject is only plausible so long as 
it is clear that the standpoint of the ‘Apollonian eye’ is an epistemological 
abstraction that belongs to the realm of the imaginary, that cannot be based 
on real experience, and that only develops into an illustrative function 
within the symbolic world of the map.
But what happens when the imaginary ‘Apollonian eye’ transforms into a 
satellite camera and the perspective from ‘nowhere’ is located as a position 
in space? The f inal step in my reflections on maps will thus question how 
mapping changes as a result of digitalization.
Digital Maps
It is remarkable that with the triumph of the computer the principle of 
location seemed to become obsolete and space and spatiality seemed to 
become almost superfluous. Yet in recent years there has been a noticeable 
expansion of precisely those practices in which the computer is deployed 
as an instrument of mapping and localized ‘georeferencing’ information.47 
I want to look more closely at such phenomena of digitalized mapping, 
which are associated with buzzwords like ‘virtual globe’ and ‘digital earth’.48 
Programs like Google Earth and Google Map49 not only enable the pleasure 
of exploring the earth’s surface from the perspective of a bird in flight, but 
also pave the way for the creation of thousands of individual maps, as users 
are able to feed local information into these programs with global datasets 
that contain everything localizable and digitalizable.
Google Earth is a software program that consists of an animated model of 
the earth’s surface. This model was created by digitally combining hundreds 
of thousands of satellite and aerial photographs taken from different points 
of view. Using this program it is possible to ‘navigate’ around the world, or 
more vividly: to fly over the earth’s surface and thereby visit random places. 
The detail resolution usually amounts to 15 m, but in urban centres it can 
also be up to 15 cm; cars and people are then already recognizable. Moreover, 
Google Earth is frequently coupled with three-dimensional terrain and city 
models. In any case, users are able to zoom in and out of places, always in 
gliding flight, and the reloading of the image does not disrupt the continual 
view of the landscape.
People have seen sections of the earth’s surface from a bird’s perspective 
before in the form of photographs or through airplane windows; what is new 
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about Google Earth, however, is its interactivity or the possibility that the 
user can determine which places he wants to view and explore as a ‘virtual 
visitor’. From its origin, Google Earth is a game for virtual hobby pilots. This 
feature leads to unexpected and sometimes even bizarre discoveries, like 
the swastika formation of a US Marine barracks in Coronado, California 
that was ‘uncovered’ and brought to the world’s attention through Google 
Earth: The swastika-like arrangement of the building could only be seen 
from above, and it had never attracted attention before because the build-
ing was located in a no-fly zone.50 The degree to which the virtual pilot 
perspective of Google Earth had become a publicly recognized common 
property capable of raising political issues was signalled by the decision 
of the US Marines to conceal the building from aerial photographs (using 
plants and solar panels). Google Earth had (until then) made the invisible 
visible.
What was introduced as a game turned out to be – to say it in jargon – a 
‘georeferencing information machine’. For this purpose it is only necessary 
for Google Earth to be connected to locally specif ied datasets. The Danish 
biologist Erik Born equipped walruses on Greenland’s arctic coast with 
sensors in order to track their movements through the Arctic Ocean.51 He 
was then able to use Google Earth to identify the location and migration 
of every walrus on his screen. The biologist was also able to superimpose 
his walrus migration map onto a map created by his geographer colleague, 
which visualized data concerning the thickness of arctic ice and the direc-
tion of arctic currents. The image that then emerged enabled the biologist 
to obtain new f indings about the influence of the melting of the ice on the 
behaviour of the animal world and thus to discover new causal relationships 
in times of climate change.52 Observations of the virtual world of visualized 
data thus introduce new insights to the real world.
Or, to go from science to the everyday: So-called ‘mash ups’ are indi-
vidually created maps that result from combining local data with global 
services like Google Earth or Google Maps; these maps are then uploaded 
onto the Internet, where they reproduce explosively.53 Maps then emerge of 
everything indexicalizable: the geographical distribution of approximately 
12,000 ant species,54 all of the airliners flying over the USA, the distribution 
of comics on buildings in Brussels, speed traps in Cologne, or free wireless 
hotspots in Berlin.55 People also like to point to the example of emergency 
relief efforts during catastrophic situations, as viewing destroyed areas from 
above allows people not only to diagnose the severity of the catastrophe 
but also to determine which routes are still intact and can be used for 
supporting measures.56
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The virtual globe is thus f illed with traces of local events and individual 
preferences.
There is no question that the digitalization of mapping has far-reaching 
consequences for the creation, distribution, and use of maps and that it 
fundamentally alters the face of cartography. There appears to be some truth 
to the speculation that we will witness a revolution in the cultural technique 
of mapping whose potential for radical change is even greater than that of 
the ‘cartographic reformation’ in the early modern period. But I want to look 
once again at what is new about the use of maps ‘via the Internet’, which can 
be subdivided into three dimensions that are nevertheless always integrated 
in digitalized mapping: operating, exploring, and presenting.
(i) Operating: Generalizing maps record the places and structures of 
a region supra-individually: the subway network of Berlin, the city plan 
of London, the hiking map of the Ötztal Alps. In order to use a map the 
individual must be able to locate himself in and indexically inscribe himself 
onto the map; the individual is then able to acquire new knowledge from 
the map, which is essential for orienting his movements in space. The work 
of locating is now automated by GPS and satellite technology, and the indi-
vidualized maps that these technologies produce depict a territory in a way 
that is fundamentally based on the standpoint of the user. The conversion of 
objective spatial relations into subjective and tangible spatiality is now – for 
the most part – automated by the computer.
(ii) Exploring: The possibility of exploring random places on the earth 
from the perspective of a bird in f light is fascinating, and this activity 
also offers an unprecedented degree of freedom and playfulness. More 
importantly, the empirical observation of the world itself becomes virtual, 
which creates new ‘possibilities of observation’. Through the hybridization 
of different geographically indexicalized datasets (resulting from surveys), 
new knowledge can be acquired about relations on the ‘real earth itself’. 
Patterns become discernible that can only be seen on the screen in the 
form of computer-generated visualizations. Visualization thus evolves 
into a scientif ic instrument of perception that plays a fundamental role in 
empirical observations, experiments, and theory.
(iii) Presenting: Information can be represented in different ways: lin-
guistically, visually, or through a mixture of both modalities, as in writing, 
diagrams, and maps. Because ‘mash ups’ combine global and local data 
and thus specify and make visible local information in countless ways 
(properties for sale, company headquarters, clusters of retired people, Ital-
ian restaurants, residences of sex offenders, etc.), the map lends itself as a 
substitute for purely linguistic representations of information. Commercial 
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directories are no longer written, but rather they are available in the form 
of digitalized maps that clearly show where companies can be found – near 
the user’s place of residence, for example.
It is not necessary to provide an overly incisive conclusion to see that 
what digitalization contributes to our approach to maps lies in its visualiza-
tion, with which the map develops into a ubiquitous format of information 
acquisition and mediation. The often diagnosed ‘topographical turn’57 
thus f inds its counterpart in the fact that the signif icance of maps has not 
declined but rather grown. Yet an interesting shift in the function of the 
use of maps becomes apparent with digitalization. I would like to formulate 
this shift in the form of a hypothesis that can prepare the way for a more 
comprehensive investigation, which cannot be carried out here: While the 
creation and use of overview maps was developed during the ‘cartographic 
reformation’ as a cultural technique for practical operations in complex 
territories, ‘cartographic digitalization’ transforms mapping into a cultural 
technique for movement in landscapes of knowledge. These ‘landscapes’, 
however, are no longer accessible at all except through media.
The Messenger Model Considered in Light of the Map: In Lieu of a 
Conclusion
Up to now I have been focusing on what my basic media-theoretical as-
sumptions reveal about maps. I would now like to reverse this perspective 
and explore what maps, as a text case, reveal about media theory.
One of the main goals of this study is to avoid the creative-oriented 
(generative) image of media, which conventionalizes media as more or less 
autonomous agents of cultural dynamics. The basis of these reflections is 
the presupposition that the f igure of the messenger – in conjunction with 
the involuntary errand of the trace – constitutes a prototype of what it 
means to function as a medium. What distinguishes this ‘function’ is that 
it is not self-organized. The ‘heteronomy’ that makes media into instances 
of being-directed-by-others is a basic idea, if not the basic principle of this 
media theory. But this raises some unavoidable questions:
– If media transmit and mediate something that they themselves have 
not created, how is it nevertheless possible to trace the creativity that 
is still ‘somehow’ immanent in this approach to media? How can the 
culture-endowing power of media be explained if they are so strongly 
thematized as foils of transmission and not of creation and transforma-
tion? There can be no reasonable doubt that media possess an inherent 
logic through which they also (pre)form what they transmit and medi-
ate. Is the shaping power of media fundamentally neglected – and does 
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it therefore remain inexplicable – if the messenger is made into the 
ur-scenario of a media theory? Is there a danger of throwing out the 
‘media-theoretical baby’ with the ‘generative bathwater’?
– I wanted to avoid both the marginalization and hypostatization of the 
medial, but doesn’t the rejection of a generative approach marginalize 
media once again, as the assumption that they are directed by others 
seems to reduce media in relative importance to merely a secondary 
phenomenon? How is the claim that media have an irrefutable function 
in communication, perception, thought, and experience consistent with 
their reduction to ‘mere’ relations of transmission?
In summary, how can media have a culture-endowing power if their creative 
power is denied?
My assumption is that these media-theoretical ref lections on maps 
suggest an answer to these questions in two ways:
(1) Media as Mediator and Third: Distributed Activity – Media occupy 
the position of a middle, a mediator, and a third in a triadic relationship 
between two heterogeneous f ields. Describing media as the ‘middle’ spa-
tially connotes and (misleadingly) suggests that this constellation should 
be understood as a – more or less static – structural relationship. Yet the 
map reveals that mediality is less structural than pragmatic: The map is 
not a medium, but rather it becomes a medium when and only as long as 
someone actively orients himself in a territory with the help of the map. The 
map thus occupies the position of a mediator only when it is being used. 
Media only exist in the processuality of their implementation.
The idea that the meaning of something only emerges through its use may 
seem banal. Moreover, this use-oriented explanation would seem to lump 
media together with signs, which this is something I have tried to avoid from 
the beginning. However, the point of establishing use as the foundation of the 
map’s function as a medium lies elsewhere. When the map is employed as a 
medium, this does not simply mean that the map is read and interpreted as a 
form of symbolic representation, but rather it means that something outside 
of the map is altered through the act of orienting oneself with the map. It 
thus depends not on an interpretation, but rather on a transformation that 
turns an ocean without markings into a straight traversable ‘sea lane’ or an 
unfamiliar city into a walkable space. This transformation is caused not by 
the medium per se, but rather by the operative unity of user, map, and terri-
tory. This functioning ‘unity’ alone has agency and the attributes of an actor.
When media are denied any original creative power, therefore, it does 
not mean that this ability is then granted instead to those who employ 
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media. Being subjected to a complex, confusing, and unfamiliar space 
without a map is adventure, and it leaves people thoroughly powerless. 
Something like ‘agency’ only emerges in the practical tripartite connection 
in which the medium is situated as middle and mediator. The mediatized 
ability to act must therefore be understood as a ‘distributed’ potential whose 
productivity always depends on the collaboration of human and non-human 
components. This type of distributed activity is not prevented but rather 
made possible by the heteronomy of media or their ability to incorporate 
attributes of both of the worlds between which they mediate.
(2) Media Make the Imperceptible Perceptible: Transparency and Opacity 
and the Possibility of a Media-Critical Epistemology. – What could be easier 
than to suppose that maps reproduce something prior and already extant 
and they are considered practical failures if they do not reproduce it more or 
less exactly? Where, if not with maps, does ‘imaging’ prove to be an essential 
dimension of our symbolic processes? Nevertheless, even though media 
are fundamentally based on something prior (remember that ‘topographic 
maps’ were chosen as the starting point, which disregards f ictional maps) 
they still make perceptible something that is invisible to the eye – in many 
possible ways.
Making something that eludes the senses perceptible is a creative 
transformation that obviously depends on the presupposition that the 
medium is transparent, as it must represent the expanse of the ocean or the 
branching of subway lines ‘in reality’, like an incorruptible messenger. But 
maps depict neither the sea and the land nor subway lines and stations, but 
rather the spatial and positional relationships between them – relationships 
that can only be seen in the diagram of the map. The map is undoubtedly 
not the territory, but more importantly it also does not depict it. Maps can 
at best reveal something about a territory, yet they always do this from 
an Apollonian or non-human perspective that is not part of the territory 
itself. Maps incorporate something into our life world that can only be 
seen from a standpoint outside of this world – something that is therefore 
not accessible to the senses – and it is precisely for this reason that they 
possess an explosive potential through which new orientation knowledge 
can be generated.
Cartographic visualization is therefore always also a process of construc-
tion. The representational and generative dimensions of media are not 
exclusive, but rather inclusive.
The ‘cartographic paradox’ shows that cartographic representations are 
inherently distorted and that this distortion is not a disruption but rather 
a condition of possibility of representation. Like the relationship between 
TesT case 209
‘representation’ and ‘generation’, it could also be said that transparency 
and opacity are two distinguishable dimensions of maps that nevertheless 
require and include one another. They are related to each other like the 
messenger aspect and the trace aspect of media.
The difference between transparency and opacity must not be bypassed 
or even annulled. It is distinctive, it is eminently practical, and it is also the 
source of a media-critical epistemology: To use maps for everyday orientation 
and self-localization one ‘must remain blind’ to the inherent distortions in 
cartographic projection methods.
To critically analyze map projections and their social instrumentaliza-
tions, on the other hand, one must render the user’s approach inoperative. 
Like a Husserlian ‘epoché’, a theoretical approach requires dispensing with 
the practical use of maps.
Thematizing the medium as messenger also ref lects my practical 
approach to media – how analyzing the medium as a trace of its social-
historical contextualization and instrumentalization can be the starting 
point of a media-critical approach. A critical epistemology of media is 
inevitably tied to the duplicity of the transparent and opaque dimensions or 
of the messenger and the trace – a doubling that corresponds to all media in 
one way or another. This relationship is epistemologically generalizable: 
‘realism’ and ‘constructivism’ (or ‘instrumentalism’) appear to be not com-




Worldview Dimensions, Ambivalences, Possible Directions for 
Further Research
This discussion is (almost) at an end; all that remains is a conclusion, and I 
want to open this conclusion by raising a concluding and very fundamental 
question: What is the use of a study that proposes to rehabilitate the model 
of the messenger and transmission? Surely it is intended to develop a more 
interesting – if also slightly outmoded – approach to media theory, but 
isn’t the risk of misunderstandings too high a price to pay for this media-
theoretical perspective given the obvious heteronomy of the messenger f ig-
ure and his apparently dependent transmission activity? This risk is further 
exacerbated by the fact that I have neglected to distinguish conceptually 
between the activity of a mere transmitter and the much more complex 
activity of a mediator (a difference that calls for a follow up to this study, 
as it is not addressed here). If it was only a matter of accenting a new aspect 
of this media concept, then the ‘dangers’ caused by the problems lurking 
in the messenger model could indeed compromise its potential benefits.
Yet the aim and motivation of this study is not to def ine a concept of 
media. If it were, I would have had to engage the diverse landscape of con-
temporary media theoretical discourse, which has only been mentioned 
here peripherally, in an entirely different way.1 If the work of philosophy is 
considered to be the non-empirical def inition of concepts in the form of 
intersubjectively understandable argumentation – and this is a respectable 
def inition of the work of philosophy that is shared by many people – then 
this study would indeed be inadequate.
However, the question of what philosophy is and what makes a text philo-
sophical can also be answered differently: Philosophers reflect. Of course the 
sciences and the arts also depend on reflection, so what is distinctive about 
‘philosophical reflection’? The double meaning of the word ‘reflection’ offers 
a starting point: Before ‘reflection’ denoted contemplation or linguistically-
oriented deliberation it originally referred to an optical phenomenon – 
the reflection of light from surfaces. This optical-epistemological double 
meaning of the term ‘reflection’ is no accident, and it has been extensively 
examined as a signature of mirror-oriented modern epistemology.2 All 
that matters here is that ‘reflection’ is tied not only to speaking but also to 
showing. Philosophical statements do not exclude, overcome, or suspend 
the act of ‘showing’; rather, they always indicate something by making it 
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appear. It is a kind of showing that renders something visible from the 
surface of what is said and also what is not said. Philosophical reflection can 
thus be considered a form of reflection that reveals something through the 
interplay of the spoken and the unspoken. But what does philosophy show?
This once again concerns the ‘worldview function’ of philosophy. Because 
philosophy involves the definition of concepts – this constitutes the ‘surface’ 
of its discursive practice, so to speak – it always also conceptualizes an 
image of the overall context of our experience, which can hardly be grasped 
discursively. In the propositionality of their domain-specif ic statements, 
coupled with the gaps out of which their network of statements is (literally) 
woven, philosophical texts always also contain a view of our relationship 
to the self and to the world in general and they reveal this image on closer 
inspection. What is special about this ‘closer inspection’ is that it makes the 
implicit explicit and thus discursif ied; it can then, in turn, be made into an 
object of reflection. This is precisely what I want to do now by asking which 
image ‘of the world’ and which conception of the self is revealed in this text.
For those who are nevertheless sceptical-minded towards such an 
‘imaging function’ of philosophy – even when it is understood as some-
thing thoroughly explicable – and who remain convinced that successful 
philosophical reflection is only possible through the propositionality of 
disambiguation and argumentation, the matter can also be expressed differ-
ently: The meaning of conceptual work lies – in principle – in the possibility 
of prompting further research and debate. This conclusion can thus be 
characterized as an attempt to highlight the theoretical consequences of 
this study and possible directions for further research. I will thus proceed 
with a two-pronged approach: The f irst section primarily addresses the 
worldview and self-image implications of this study, and it also reflects these 
images in a way that is not ‘risk-free’. Whoever would like to be spared this 
section can proceed immediately to the second section, which addresses 
possible directions for further theoretical research.
Worldview and Self-Image Implications
The concept of the ‘medium’ is central to this work, yet individual media 
analyses – with regard to sensory perceptual media, semiotic information 
and communication media, or technical distribution, processing, and stor-
age media – do not play a role3 and general media theories – like those of 
McLuhan, Baudrillard, Flusser, or Luhmann – are not discussed.4 It would 
not be mistaken to justify these omissions by saying that ‘individual media 
ontologies’5 and reconstructions of ‘general media theories’6 have already 
been done, but this does not go to the heart of the matter. Rather, the 
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concentration on the messenger as a f igurative model of mediality is to be 
understood as a theoretical gesture that deliberately and definitely origi-
nates from the human sphere and is thus oriented towards the personal, but 
there are two phenomena that bracket the personal aspects of this approach. 
On the one hand, the ‘individual personhood’ of the messenger recedes 
and fades out for the benef it of the voice of the other, which articulates 
itself in the voice of the messenger. On the other hand, the messenger can 
be replaced by apparatuses and sign configurations because nothing is as 
transmissible as the function of transmission.7
Therefore it is not simply a matter of presenting the human as a medium 
in place of technical or semiotic instruments, which are commonly seen 
as the reservoir of media. Rather, this study focuses on the movement of 
personality and depersonalization through which people, apparatuses, and 
sign systems become as permeable to one another as a person who is able to 
act as (or advocate for) another and speak in their name. ‘Heteronomy’ then 
means not simply that the messenger obediently transmits what he hears, 
but rather that transmission represents a network of culture-endowing 
activities in which the suppression of one’s own personality appears to be not 
dissolution and loss, but rather a kind of productivity. Although the concept 
of persona (‘per-sonare’: to sound through the mask) originated in theatrical 
role-playing, personhood is usually associated with individual identity and 
autonomy of action. Yet it is necessary for the messenger f igure to be able 
to withdraw and fade out as a person – to be able to depersonalize himself 
to a certain extent – in order to perform his function.
This leads to the self-image implications of this study, as the decision 
to focus on the personal messenger model takes the following questions 
seriously: How can the human understand his own position in the world 
according to the model of the messenger? How can our self-image not be 
based on ‘authorship’ – on our continuing function and our constructive 
potential? How can we (also) understand our position in the world as that of 
having a ‘mission’? This study can raise such questions, but answering them 
lies beyond its scope. Nevertheless, what can and also must be pointed out 
here is that every reflection on the messenger perspective as a dimension 
of the conditio humana has to concede a fundamental ambivalence that is 
inevitably inscribed in the heteronomy of the messenger. This ambivalence 
is already indicated by the fact that every messenger acts as a reversible 
f igure: the angel becomes the devil, the mediator becomes the schemer, 
the circulation of money develops into greed and avarice, etc. This ‘lapse’ is 
thus understood as an ambivalence that is inherent in the role of the mes-
senger as a medium that must negotiate between the conflicting priorities 
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of personality and depersonalization. In order to understand this ‘lapse’ 
more precisely, it is helpful to draw on Wolfgang Schirmacher’s diagnosis 
that ‘The f irst law of media is: The self is the focal point.’8 This ‘self’ does not 
actually coincide with the modern concept of the subject, but rather it is an 
ego that develops, in the sense of a progression, from ‘homo faber’ to ‘homo 
generator’ to a direct object of its own design – an activity that creates 
everything, including the self.
This diagnosis of the times, which still sees a remnant of the creative 
potential that originally conf igured the modern idea of the subject in 
the current ‘turn to self-care’,9 is quite evident and Schirmacher is not 
the only one to have recognized it. Undoubtedly my considerations on 
the culture-theoretical rehabilitation of transmission manifest a decid-
edly ‘a-demiurgical’ approach, which perhaps shares with Schirmacher 
the motive of prof iling our image of the human without absolutizing his 
constructive power. Schirmacher’s diagnosis does differ from mine on one 
crucial point: While I claim that ‘self-neutralization’ constitutes the basic 
functional law of media, Schirmacher argues, to the contrary, that the basic 
law of media is ‘self-stylization’. Nevertheless, this controversy is easily 
resolved by recalling the complementary terms ‘transparency’ and ‘opacity’, 
as something different is meant here in each case: While Schirmacher’s 
‘self-stylization’ and ‘self-care’ refer to the ‘what’ of media – the content that 
media, especially the current mass media, transparently communicate – I 
am referring to the ‘how’ of media – the mechanism of self-withdrawal 
that only becomes apparent when the opacity of the medium enables its 
content to be disregarded.
But if the opposition between ‘self-neutralization’ and ‘self-stylization’ 
is so easily resolved, then why have I referred to Schirmacher’s diagnosis? 
Because it helps to avoid the snares of a simplif ication that could arise in 
connection with this study. It is indeed a central concern of this work to 
raise the guiding question of what it means to have a mission that can only 
be fulf illed when one is ready and able to withdraw oneself. The goal of 
this study is therefore a long-overdue correction of many varieties of the 
demiurgical notion of self-understanding, which is still operative today. 
However, this correction raises another question: What does it mean for 
our understanding of ‘productivity’, ‘community’, and ‘culture’ if circula-
tion is valued above production,10 mediation is valued above creation,11 
dissemination is valued above dialogue,12 and unidirectionality is valued 
above interactivity? In this context it is important to avoid a simple ei-
ther/or, for if it is assumed that the demiurge (author) and the messenger 
(transmitter) constitute two archetypes of our being-in-the-world, then a 
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messenger-oriented media theory could suggest – by generalizing an image 
of the world and the self – that the human should be understood precisely 
not as an autonomous author, but rather as a heteronomous transmitter 
and mediator. Such a simplif ication would do more harm than good to the 
project outlined here.
(i) The first method of working against this simplif ication involves ap-
plying the idea of a ‘mediator’ and a ‘third’ to the study itself; it is therefore 
central to the methodology of this study to avoid opposing dichotomies. 
Our role in the world is then not simply to have a mission, but rather it 
is characterized by the always also precarious interplay of creating and 
transmitting, of activity and passivity, of autonomy and heteronomy, of 
generation and simulation, of self-determination and determination by 
others,13 of constructivism and realism. The methodological benefit of this 
study lies in its self-application of the ‘idea of the third’14 as opposed to all 
of the schematizing binarizations in the ‘realm of concepts’, and one of the 
research tasks that remains is to work out the f igures that reflect and relate 
both sides of the both/and.15
(ii) Yet there is an even more complex way of overcoming the simplif ica-
tion of an either/or in the tension between the f igures of the demiurge 
and the messenger, and this second method reveals an ambivalence that is 
inherent to the messenger model. The self-withdrawal of the medium, as 
opposed to the message it conveys, has been characterized as the hidden 
mechanism of the medium; this mechanism does not become apparent to 
the media user because what it makes perceptible is in effect the voice of 
an other. It is just like Luhmann’s medium/form distinction: one always 
perceives the form but never the medium.16 But what if this self-withdrawal, 
self-neutralization, and selflessness become the content and the ‘mission’ 
of the medium by enabling the creation of the self to mutate into a hidden 
mechanism? What if an evidently prevailing heteronomy becomes an 
instrument of a self-concealing and thus perhaps all the more destructive 
autonomy? It is possible for a suicide bomber to want to appear as the martyr 
type of messenger, for example, as his attack instrumentalizes his self-
effacement and can thus be inaugurated as a medium of martyrdom.17 Don’t 
all of the perpetrators with a ‘mission’ have perhaps the highest potential for 
violence and destruction? The topos of the ‘dying messenger’ offers the most 
radical image of the human becoming a thing, and this extreme example 
of self-withdrawal reflects the ambiguity and ambivalence embedded in 
the messenger function.
Michel Serres’s rehabilitation of the parasite18 as a structural condition of 
community was intended to show the creative potential that is immanent 
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in the breaking of reciprocity, and this study is similarly concerned with 
positivizing the non-reciprocal. Nevertheless, my considerations go 
beyond such a ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘positivization’: If the distinctions and 
responsibilities that correspond to the human condition are localized in 
autonomy, then practically all of the dramatics and fallibilities of our being 
are grounded in it as well. If heteronomy is interpreted for the most part 
as a self-renouncing sovereignty, then it can also be included among the 
failures of autonomy.19 The rehabilitation of heteronomy as a culturally 
necessary and culturally creative f iguration – in the form of thousands of 
transmissions from mediator f igures – is thus undoubtedly sensible and 
important for relativizing the absolutism of autonomy. One cannot overlook 
the fact that the human ability to be ‘selfless’ and ‘determined by others’ 
is also inherently ambiguous, and this ambiguity is in no way inferior to 
the ambiguity of autonomy. Yet as a result of these considerations it is at 
least possible to diagnose the crucial point, which is that the potential 
‘to have a mission’ not only constitutes a ground-breaking relativization 
of the ‘generative image of the human’ but it also takes on threatening 
features when the medial mechanism of self-neutralization and selflessness 
is employed as an instrument of self-empowerment. Is it now possible to 
better understand why Walter Benjamin allegorically associated the idea 
of a medium becoming an instrument with the Fall of Man?
Possible Directions for Further Research
(1) On Productivity – The messenger is not the origin and the beginning of 
what he does. He is not a subject in the theoretical sense of constitution 
or construction. He receives and relays something that he does not create 
himself. He does not operate in the sphere of production, but rather in the 
sphere of circulation. He withdraws and is thus able to ‘lend’ his voice to 
an other. The use of representational vocabulary seems obsolete today, as 
concepts like imitation and mimesis or ‘similarity’ in the tradition of our 
demiurgical self-understanding have been largely discredited. Yet doesn’t 
‘assuming the role of an other’ and ‘acting in place of an other’ constitute 
a vital source of creativity that enables people to appear as others and 
speak in the name of others? Isn’t this what the theatre embodies in an 
exemplary way: that people assume and perform a role whose lines they 
have not written themselves? In the words of Arthur Rimbaud (although 
with somewhat different intentions): ‘I is someone else.’20
(2) On Understanding – Can anything be more convincing than the 
idea that communality and intersubjectivity are based on understand-
ing the other? If society consists of a plurality of individuals, doesn’t this 
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immediately suggest that the nucleus of all sociality is a union that requires 
difference in order to f ind or ‘create’ identity – whether in the form of an 
intellectual or physical union? The understanding of the other thus takes 
place as a unified duality or pairing. Yet individuals mutated into pairs have 
a tendency to isolate themselves; this is an undeniable aspect of love and 
quite often of friendship as well. So why should the binary constellation 
or the dynamic principle be the distinguishing ‘archetype’ of successful 
sociality? The idea of the messenger introduces a third participant into 
this constellation. The tertiary relation21 then becomes the basis of inter-
subjectivity and gives rise to a community-building dynamic that is able 
to create the supraindividual in the form of institutions.
This tertiary basis of intersubjectivity also sheds new light on un-
derstanding: Mutual understanding no longer constitutes the heart of 
successful sociality. The messenger operates in the domain of meaning 
deferral, and this applies to understanding people as well as texts. Text 
and texture are separable, and this dissociation of meaning and materiality 
enables transmissibility through space and time, across the differences of 
individuals and epochs. Texture is communally shared, as it alone is mobile 
and goes from hand to hand. Interpretations, on the other hand, are always 
(also) individual: They are biased, historical, concept-specific, and therefore 
deeply embedded in the conditions of their place and time. The intersubjec-
tive use of signs would be inconceivable without the stability, not to mention 
the ‘conservation’, of a material signature whose semantic ‘allocation’ has 
the greatest possible, if not random, variability. The in-between space of 
deferred meanings thus depends on a ‘sign container’ that always remains 
the same, which enables the emergence of new meanings. Formalization22 
also constitutes not only an epistemic but even a culture-endowing power: 
By emptying signs of their meaning to a certain extent, it enables them at 
the same time to take on new meanings.23
(3) On Dialogue and/or Dissemination – If the nucleus of sociality shifts 
from a dyadic to a tertiary relationship then this also alters the model-
building meaning of dialogue, which in the interrelationship of talk and 
response, of question and answer, is always already implicitly informed by 
the dual connection of ego and alter ego, of speaker and listener, of identity 
and alterity. The interplay of the dyadic or the dialogical thus appears to be 
an elementary condition of successful intersubjectivity – an assumption that 
is rarely questioned despite the fact that it underlies most theories of com-
munication. Measured against this dialogical figure, the one-dimensionality 
of communication and transmission processes – and with it the concept 
of dissemination – appears to be a lost cause. It primarily appears as an 
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imitation, deformation, and alienation of dialogical interrelationships. In 
the widespread emphasis on any form of intersubjectivity – especially in 
connection with new media – it is easily seen as an echo of this hypostatiza-
tion of the dialogical. One of the remaining research tasks is to explore what 
it means to understand dissemination – the concept of ‘sowing seeds’ or 
transmitting from ‘one-to-many’, which takes place beyond intersubjectivity 
– no longer primarily as something that is unique to mass media, but rather 
as an inherent dimension of human communication. The f irst milestones 
have already been laid by Jacques Derrida24 und John Durham Peters.25
(4) On Distance – The question is not whether it is possible to understand 
the other, but whether it is necessary at all. Inherent in Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
assumption that we are only individuals as many is the idea of a ‘weak form’ 
of co-existing or being-with-one-another, which does not require that the 
subject adapt to the unfamiliar and to otherness but still maintains respect 
for the individuality of the other. And didn’t Emmanuel Levinas’s insight 
concerning the latent tyrannical gesture of the egological absorption of 
the other enable him to develop the ethos of a response to the voice of the 
other – and thus the ethos of a responsibility – that is not (any longer) guided 
by a demand for consensus? If the idea of individuality as an existential 
form of being is taken seriously, then the idea of speaking with one voice 
is and remains an illusion – and this idea must be taken seriously because 
otherwise it would be impossible to practice or even conceive of justice, 
freedom, and responsibility.
The idea of the messenger thus depends – even if it is conceived abstractly 
so as to avoid the hypostatization of unmediated communication – on the 
basic insight that a community of different individuals is founded on their 
capacity for distance. This constitutes one of the most enduring ‘binding 
agents’ of communities.
(5) On Showing, Showing Oneself, and Not Showing Oneself – ‘Showing’ 
has become the central focus of cultural theory and philosophy.26 Can the 
exemplary f igure of the messenger shed light on the meaning of ‘showing’ 
and ‘showing oneself’? The act of ‘showing’, in the conventional sense of 
‘pointing out’, preserves a distance between the person who shows and the 
thing that is shown, as the person who shows usually does not produce, 
handle, consume, or even have contact with the thing that is shown.27 It 
is a form of reference that is beyond appropriation. The person who shows 
directs attention away from himself towards something that he himself is 
not, something that is not coextensive with himself.
While ‘showing’ is usually understood as an act, ‘showing oneself’ is un-
derstood as an event. It is the medium, or more precisely the medium-in-use, 
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that reveals how ‘showing’ and ‘showing oneself ’ are dependent on and 
intertwined with one another. Through the withdrawal of the medium, 
the message is able to show itself. It is only through the self-neutralization 
of the messenger’s activity, in other words, that the other is able to appear 
in the sense of ‘show itself’. If, as Dieter Mersch states, the act of ‘showing 
something’ implies that something must f irst ‘show itself’,28 so every act 
of ‘showing’ thus depends on the reflexivity of ‘showing oneself’, then the 
medium is a strangely reversible f igure: The medium that does ‘not show 
itself’ becomes the condition of ‘showing something’.
(6) On Ontological Neutrality – The successive disengagement of hu-
manities research from people as a fundamental category, which Foucault 
introduced even though he returned to the topic of ‘care of the self’ in his 
last lecture,29 f inds its media-theoretical echo in two developments: On 
the one hand, there is a euphoria for apparatuses and programs whose 
technicity specif ies what is to be understood as mediality. This euphoria 
has not yet subsided and it continues to fascinate an entire generation of 
media theorists, who see these apparatuses and programs as textbook cases 
of medial functions. On the other hand, there is an echo of the ‘overcoming 
of methodological humanism’ in the attention given to the materiality of 
signs, to signif iers as well as sign vehicles, which then become a source of 
what counts as a medium. The medium is then identif ied with the material, 
perceptible signature of the sign. Media theory thus connects fairly easily 
to semiotics without having to dispense with the idea that signs are atoms 
of culture and constituent elements of any cultural theory.
It would undoubtedly go too far to characterize the apparatus and 
semiotic theories of media as the Scylla and Charybdis of media theory, 
particularly as the f indings of both approaches have laid open the f ield 
for this study. Nevertheless, my media-theoretical undertaking can also 
be interpreted as an attempt to avoid using either (technical) apparatuses 
or (semiotic) signif iers as media-theoretical ‘landing and docking sites’.
It is no coincidence that my series of messenger f igures contains not 
only human forms, like translators, analysts, and witnesses, but also non-
human forms, like angels, viruses, and money. It is thus necessary to take 
the ‘ontological neutrality’ of the messenger model seriously, as personal and 
material moments not only interact with one another but can also substitute 
for one another. Can this ‘ontological neutrality’ be understood in such a 
way that ‘being a messenger’ and ‘transmissibility’ are viewed as attributes 
that are not reserved for the sphere of culture – in other words, they are 
not socially constructed – but rather they also exist in sub-human nature? 
Consider, for example, the physiology of messengers. It is customary not to 
220 MediuM, Messenger, TransMission
apply concepts inspired by cultural practices to natural events. This custom 
is based on the recognition of a categorical divide between the explanation 
of the human (reasons) and the extrahuman (causes), and this divide can 
only be transgressed at the cost of committing a categorical mistake. But 
does it compromise the insight into the marvel of our cultural potential to 
view the human as a link in a connection that encompasses both nature 
and culture and is virtually inconceivable without transmission?
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229. Weiß, 1988, p. 65 ff. links his interaction theory of psychoanalysis directly to 
Spitz.
230. Spitz, 1956, p. 21.
231. Ibid., p. 48 ff.
232. Spitz, 1978, p. 123.
233. Ibid., p. 42.
234. Spitz, 1972, p. 197.
235. Spitz, 1957, p. 74.
236. ‘Life in our sense is created through dialogue.’ Spitz, 1976, p. 26. 
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242. See: Scholz, 2001a.
243. Reid, 1967, p. 194 ff.
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vol. 6, p. 2936.
252. Coady, 1992, p. 32.
253. Düttmann, 1996, p. 73, qtd. in Weigel, 2000, p. 117.
254. See: Schwemer, 1999, p. 323.
255. The fact that the theoretical question of ‘right’ information refers to the 
practical question of guilt, innocence, and judgement is made apparent 
by the possibility of the right to refuse to give evidence, such as testimony 
given by close relatives of the accused, as well as witness protection, which 
the state grants to witnesses for the prosecution when they are faced with 
anticipated acts of revenge on the part of the accused.
256. For more on this principle – and its undermining – see: Schünemann, 2001, 
p. 401.
257. In the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina of 1532, the first standardized code of 
law, hearsay was fundamentally excluded from witness statements: Scholz, 
2004, p. 1318.
258. English law treats ‘hearsay’ with scepticism. See: Coady, 1992, p. 33.
259. Nevertheless, it is not permitted to be the only means of evidence used to 
arrive at a verdict. See: Fachlexikon Recht, 2005, p. 1583.
260. Plato, 1937, vol. 2, p. 206.
261. Plautus, 1913, p. 231, qtd. in Scholz, 2004, p. 1323.
262. Meyer-Goßner, 2004, p. 152. 
263. Ibid.
264. It is explicitly noted in all legal commentaries that this also applies to chil-
dren and the mentally ill.
265. Peters, 2001, p. 709 ff.
266. ‘The kind of evidence in question here seems to be ›say-so‹ evidence: we 
are, that is, invited to accept something or other as true because someone 
says it is, where the someone in question is supposed to be in a position to 
speak authoritatively on the matter.’ Coady, 1992, p. 27.
267. Strafprozeßordnung §69, Sec. 1. See: Schünemann, 2001, p. 389.
268. Peters, 2001, p. 710.
269. Traces that are misinterpreted are no longer (involuntary) traces in the con-
ventional sense, just as a weathercock rusted in place is no longer an index.
270. For a detailed analysis of the ethical dimension of witnessing see: Schmidt, 
2007.
271. Whether a ‘court decides that a factual claim is to be deemed true or not’ 
depends on considerations of trustworthiness: Nack, 2001, p. 2.
noTes 239
272. This principle explains why writing (as transcribed oral speech) is the best 
form of admissible evidence, while videos and photographs are only admis-
sible to a limited extent, if at all.
273. Auslander, 1999, p. 112 ff., develops a media-theoretical analysis of orality in 
the American legal system.
274. Luhmann, 1968, p. 35.
275. In an entirely different way, the fallibility of testimony is a key element in 
two recent French studies on witnessing: Derrida, 2005, and Dulong, 1998.
276. Agamben, 2002, p. 145 f.
277. Schünemann, 2001, p. 388.
278. Ibid., p. 391.
279. Ibid., p. 388.
280. See also: Kaube, 2006; Barton, 1995.
281. Ross, Read, and Toglia, 1994.
282. Peters, 2001, p. 709.
283. Schünemann, 2001, p. 394.
284. This is shown most prominently in the reimbursement of expenses and the 
right to refuse to give evidence. Ibid., p. 395.
285. Ibid., p. 396.
286. This role usually entails the right to access records. Ibid., p. 396.
287. Kierkegaard also identifies this truth as the ‘discovery’ and the ‘dividend’ 
that is passed down within a community, and it therefore does not matter 
who discovered this truth. Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 205.
288. Ibid., p. 201.
289. ‘Wherein then lies the fundamental confusion in Pilate’s question?’ Ki-
erkegaard continues: ‘How then could Christ explain this to Pilate in words, 
when that which is the truth, Christ’s own life, has not opened Pilate’s eyes 
to what truth is? […] The question is just as foolish, precisely as foolish, as if 
one were to inquire of a man with whom one was talking, “Dost thou exist?” 
[…] And what could that man say in reply? He must say, “If one who stands 
here talking to me cannot feel sure that I exist, my asseveration can be of no 




293. Luke 24:48 employs this concept: ‘You are witnesses of these things’, namely 
of suffering, the appearance of Christ, and his words. Qtd. in ibid., p. 273.
294. Ibid., p. 275.
295. Ibid., p. 276-283.
296. Matthew 10:18, Mark 13:9, Luke 21:12 f. Qtd. in ibid., p. 276.
297. I John 1:1.
298. See also: Schwemer, 1999, p. 326.
299. Plato, 1937, vol. 1, p. 401 ff.
240 MediuM, Messenger, TransMission
300. As a loyal and true witness who certifies the authenticity of his spoken testi-
mony through his body and his death: Book of Revelation 1:5; 3:14.
301. Schwemer, 1999, p. 347.
302. Translator’s note: the German word for credibility, ‘Glaubwürdigkeit’, liter-
ally means ‘worthy of faith’.
303. This prominently includes the ‘Fortunoff Video Archive’, now located in 
the archive of Yale University, which contains 200 recordings of witness 
interviews, and the Yale Oral Testimony Project, which has recorded 4000 
personal reports from survivors and other witnesses of the Holocaust and 
has more than 30 branches operating in many countries: Hartman, 2000a, 
p. 100 f.
304. Baer, 2000, particularly the essays by Hartman, Laub, and Caruth.
305. Dulong, 1998.
306. Laub, 1992, p. 59 ff., mentions the case of an Auschwitz inmate who made 
factual errors when recounting her memories, who forgot her participation 
in the ‘Canada Commando’, and who marginalized the Jewish resistance.
307. Weigel, 2000, p. 131.
308. Levi, 1989, p. 11.
309. Also: Laub, 2000.
310. Laub, 1992, p. 80.




315. Weigel, 2000, p. 119.
316. Hartman, 2000b.
317. See also: Hartman, 2000b, p. 38 ff., and Laub, 2000, p. 70 ff.
318. Danto, 2007, p. 343.
319. Hartman, 2000a, p. 86.
320. See also: Weigel, 2000, p. 118.
321. Hartman, 2000a, p. 89. Schmidt, 2007 traces the ethical-social dimension of 
witnessing back to the problem that given the unverifiability of every wit-
ness statement the witness effectively needs a ‘guarantor’ who vouches for 
and bears witness to the trustworthiness of the witness.
322. For more on ‘secondary witnesses’, see: Baer, 2000, p. 101 ff.
323. Laub, 2000, p. 68.
324. Coady, 1992, p. 38.
325. For example: Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 182 ff.
326. Kusch, 2002, p. 67 f.
327. Fricker, 1994 critically grapples with the problem of ‘credulity’ – the dark 
shadow that witnessing casts over knowledge.
328. Craig, 1993, p. 43; see also: Gelfert, 2003, p. 133.
329. Shapin, 1994.
noTes 241
330. Wittgenstein nevertheless recalls: ‘A child learns there are reliable and unre-
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332. Weigel, 2000, p. 116.
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Map of the Empire on a Scale of 1 to 1’ (Eco, 1994, p. 95-106) and Lewis Car-
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the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well.’ 
Carroll, 1893, p. 169, qtd. in Edney, 1993, p. 55.
25. Cosgrove, 2001.
26. Monmonier, 1991, p. 8 ff.; Schlögel, 2003, p. 97 ff. 
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is derived from the Latin word ‘longitudo’, which means ‘length’.
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30. See Ossermann, 1997, p. 28 ff.
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32. See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kartografie, 1981; Crampton, 1994; Robinson, 
1985.
33. See Protestant mission work in Germany: ‘Die Welt mit anderen Augen 
sehen – Die Weltkarte des Bremer Historikers Prof. Dr. Arno Peters’ (http://
www.emw-d.de/fix/files/peters-proj.pdf).
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Admit Map Paranoia’, in: Wisconsin State Journal, vol. 3, September 1988, 
qtd. in Harley, 1989, p. 9.
35. Monmonier, 1991, p. 33; also Schlögel, 2003, p. 101.
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is proof of how strongly the representational conditions of maps condition 
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37. ‘Legibility overrides geometric fidelity’. Sismondo and Chrisman, 2001, p. 43.
38. Rheinberger, 1992.





44. Wood and Fels, 1986; Harley, 1988b.
45. ‘Cartography provides a means by which to classify, represent and com-
municate information about areas that are too large and too complex to be 
seen directly.’ Dodge and Kitchin, 2001, p. 2.
46. Jonas, 1997, p. 259 ff.
47. See the excellent compilation of digitalized maps in Dodge and Kitchin, 
2001.
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48. Programmatic for Al Gore’s speech ‘The Digital Earth: Understanding Our 
Planet in the 21st Century’ on January 31, 1998, in Los Angeles (http://www.
digitalearth.gov).
49. There are other similar programs like NASA World Wind, Microsoft Virtual 
Earth, Yahoo Maps, Amazon A9, Googletouring, Googlesightseeing, etc. See 
Soutschek, 2006.
50. ‘US-Marine will “Hakenkreuz“ tarnen’, Tagesspiegel, 28 September 2007.
51. Dworschak, 2006. 




56. Nourbakhsh et al., 2006.
57. Weigel, 2002.
Epilogue
1. The field of contemporary media theory is ‘surveyed’ in: Filk, Grampp, 
and Kirchmann, 2004; Jäger, 2004; Groys, 2012; Hartmann, 2000; Lagaay 
and Lauer, 2004; Krämer, 2002; Mersch, 2002a; Mersch, 2003; Mersch, 2004; 
Mersch, 2006; Münker, Roesler, and Sandbothe, 2003; Pias et al., 1999; Ram-
ming, 2001; Sandbothe, 2001; Sandbothe and Nagl, 2005; Tholen, 2002; Vogel, 
2012; Winkler, 2004.
2. Rorty, 1979.
3. Such an analysis constitutes the foundation of Systematische Medienphilos-
ophie, which was edited by Mike Sandbothe and Ludwig Nagl: see Sand-
bothe and Nagl, 2005.
4. Alice Lagaay and David Lauer have produced a series of annotated analy-
ses of these theories: see Lagaay and Lauer, 2004; Dieter Mersch has more 
recently worked on them in a monograph: see Mersch, 2006.
5. Leschke, 2003, p. 73.
6. Ibid., p. 161.
7. See chapter 9.
8. Schirmacher, 1994, p. 77; also: ‘Taking care of oneself is now the activity of 
media’. Ibid., p. 77.
9. It is remarkable in this regard that at the end of his life Foucault himself, to 
whom the ‘death of the subject’ is often attributed, returned to the subject 
from the perspective of subjective self-representation and self-formation. 
Nevertheless, Foucault based this idea of ‘self-care’ on classical Greek 
antiquity, in which self-care was not yet colonized by the principle of self-
awareness. It was therefore oriented towards not true knowledge but rather 
‘true life’. Foucault, 2005.





14. The idea of the third is understood here in a thoroughly ‘weak’ formal sense 
that consists in accepting a both/and instead of the disjointed either/or.
15. This study has only examined the transparency (representationality) and 
opacity (constructivity) of maps: see chapter 18.
16. Luhmann, 2000, p. 102 ff.
17. On suicide bombers and the cult of martyrs: see Weigel, 2007b, p. 11 ff.
18. Serres, 2007.
19. Unlike Werner Hamacher’s concept of ‘heterautonomies’. Hamacher, 2003.
20. Rimbaud, 1966, p. 305 (the original text reads: ‘Je est un autre’).
21. Fischer, 2000; Fischer, 2004.
22. Even if this concept mostly evokes a defensive response from humanities 
scholars!
23. For a discussion of what this means for the evolution of mathematics: see 
Krämer, 1988; Krämer, 1991.
24. It is no accident that Derrida is confronted with dissemination in the con-
text of his conviction that writing (which is based on absence) rather than 
speech (which is based on presence) constitutes the ‘ineluctable elemen-
tary form’ of our approach to signs: see Derrida, 1987.
25. Peters, 1999.
26. Mersch, 2001; Mersch, 2002b; Krämer, 2003b; Klein and Jungbluth, 2002; 
Gfrereis and Lepper, 2007.
27. For instructive debates concerning these considerations: see Figal, 2007.
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